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Abstract
This master’s thesis is divided in four independent articles. The main objective is to fill
some of the gaps concerning the determinants, dynamic and consequence of child labor
in Brazil. In the first essay, we explore the cultural-historical concept of child labor as a
natural phenomenon in Brazil. For this, we review the literature concerning the history of
child labor, focusing on its social and constitutional concepts. The main conclusion from
the first paper is that the concept of child labor as natural, i.e., part of the development
and education of children, inclusively to deviate them from delinquency, was historically
rooted and continues present in the mentality of the Brazilian society. In the second essay,
we investigate the determinants of child labor rate in Brazil, emphasizing the role of the
Bolsa Família program and the Labor Inspection conducted by the Ministry of Labor. For
this, data from 2004–2009 and 2011–2014 PNADs of the 27 federation units were used
to estimate panel data models. In this second essay, we found no conclusive empirical
evidence which permits to sustain the hypothesis that the Bolsa Família program and the
Labor Inspection contributed to reduce child labor. In the third article, we investigated
the probability of intergenerational persistence of child labor so as to find the point at
which the risk of transmission of child labor among two generations of the same family
turns minimum. For this, we used a pooled sample of 2004 to 2014 PNAD data to estimate
probit models. In this article, we found evidence which corroborates previous literature
about the existence of child labor trap in Brazil. Particularly, the risk of child labor in a
generation has negative and nonlinear relationship with the age at which parents started
working. In the fourth essay, also using probit regressions, we empirically analyzed the
relationship between child labor and mental depression using 2008 PNAD data and its
special supplement concerning health. In this last essay, we found the first empirical
evidence regarding a positive relationship between work during childhood and mental
depression during adulthood.
Key words: Child labor; Bolsa Família; Labor Inspection; Intergenerational persistence;
Mental depression.
Resumo
Esta dissertação é dividida em quatro artigos independentes. O principal objetivo é pre-
encher certas lacunas a respeito de determinantes, dinâmica e consequência de trabalho
infantil no Brasil. No primeiro ensaio, busca-se explorar o conceito de trabalho infantil
como um fenômeno natural no Brasil. Nesse intuito, é revisada a literatura sobre a histó-
ria do trabalho infantil, focando em seus conceitos sociais e constitucionais. A principal
conclusão desse ensaio é de que o conceito de trabalho infantil como natural, ou seja, parte
do desenvolvimento e aprendizado da criança, inclusive afastando-a da delinquência, foi
historicamente enraizado e continua presente na mentalidade da sociedade brasileira. No
segundo ensaio, investigam-se os determinantes da taxa de trabalho infantil no Brasil, res-
saltando o impacto do programa Bolsa Família e da fiscalização realizada pelo Ministério
do Trabalho. Utilizaram-se dados das PNADs 2004-2009 e 2011-2014 para a estimação de
um modelo de dados em painel construído para as 27 unidades federativas. Nesse segundo
ensaio, não encontrou-se evidência empírica conclusiva que permita sustentar a hipótese
de que o programa Bolsa Família e a fiscalização do trabalho contribuíram para a redução
do trabalho infantil. No terceiro estudo, é investigada a persistência intergeracional do
trabalho infantil, com o intuito de encontrar o ponto no qual o risco de transmissão de
trabalho infantil entre duas gerações da mesma família torna-se mínimo. Foram utilizados
dados empilhados das PNADs 2004-2009 e 2011-2014 para estimar modelos probit. Nesse
estudo, encontrou-se evidência que corrobora a literatura prévia sobre a existência da ar-
madilha de trabalho infantil no Brasil. Especificamente, o risco de trabalho infantil numa
geração possui relação negativa e não linear com a idade em que os pais começaram a
trabalhar. No último ensaio, também por meio de regressões probit, é analisada a relação
empírica entre trabalho infantil e depressão mental, utilizando dados da PNAD 2008 e de
seu suplemento especial sobre saúde. Nesse último artigo, encontrou-se evidência inédita
sobre a relação positiva entre trabalho na infância ou juventude e depressão mental na
fase adulta da vida.
Palavras-chave: Trabalho infantil; Bolsa Família; Fiscalização de trabalho; Persistência
intergeracional; Depressão mental.
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1 Introduction
Child labor is approached differently in every country due to the divergence of its
definition (EDMONDS, 2008). Generally, child labor is referred to as the participation of
children in labor activities, which are considered harmful, before a certain stipulated age.
According to ILO, child work is referred to as any activity in which a child is
engaged, which can be categorized as light work or child labor. Having that work is
prohibited for children under the age of 12, the ILO defines light work as any work
exercised by children between age 12 and 14, which does not affect their health, personal
development or interfere with their schooling. Such activity is considered positive, however
children can only participate in such activities for at least 14 hours per week.
Child labor is a category of work which is considered negative for it deprives
individuals of their childhood, potential, education and dignity, asides being harmful to
their physical and mental development. In addition, ILO stipulates that the worst forms1
of child labor involves activities in which children are enslaved, separated from their
families, exposed to health hazards or illness or left to fend for themselves on the streets
of large cities. In specific, child labor is considered: any form of work for children between
age 5–14; any regular work that exceeds 43 hours per week for children below 15 and;
any hazardous work or unconditional worst form of work for all children below age 18
(HILOWITZ et al., 2004a).
Brazil ratified Convention 182 concerning the worst forms of child labor on Febru-
ary 2, 2000, and Convention 138 concerning the minimum age for child labor June 28,
2001. Thus, child labor is strictly prohibited for children below age 16 by the Federal
Constitution and the Article 60 of the Statute of Children and adolescents. Similarly to
the ILO conventions, children above 14 are permitted to exercise light work in the con-
dition of apprenticeship and all children below 18 are prohibited to undertake hazardous
activities or unconditional worst forms of child labor. It is however important to highlight
that the ILO additionally stipulates that the minimum acceptable age for a child to start
work should not be less than the age for completion of compulsory schooling (article 2.2
of Convention 138)2.
In line with the ILO and the Brazilian Federal Constitution, child labor is defined
in this study as the engagement of children and adolescents from age 5 to 15 in any labor
activity, except in the condition of apprenticeship. This definition includes, activities
1 The worst form of child labor is often classified as hazardous work for specified industries and uncon-
ditional worst forms which involves trafficked children, children in forced and bounded labor, armed
conflict, prostitution and pornography and illicit activities (HAGEMANN et al., 2006).
2 Note that article 2.3 opens breach for countries with insufficiently developed educational facilities.
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regarding farming, fishing, livestock, building construction, mining, housekeeping or in
any other service, commercial or production establishments for self or household use.
Theoretical and empirical studies concerning the causes, consequences and coun-
termeasures of child labor are widespread in literature. However, there are still questions
that remain sparsely investigated. The contribution of this thesis is that it approaches
specific issues regarding the economic, sociological and psychological aspects of child la-
bor, which are at stake. For this task, we present four essays – one qualitative and three
quantitative.
The first essay presents an historical-cultural analysis of the concept of child labor
in Brazil, given special attention to the constitutional and social dimensions. Our postulate
here is that the historical development of child labor rooted the mentality of labor as a
natural phenomenon even for children and adolescents. In turn, such mentality creates
passiveness towards child labor. According to CONAETI (2011) and Rosado e Luciana
(2014), such concept hinders the effectiveness of measures which are centered to reduce
child labor. Therefore, the comprehension of the origin and logic of such concept is vital
for the effective combat against child labor in Brazil.
The second essay sheds more light on the macro-level determinants of child labor.
Most empirical studies in Brazil address the causes of child labor using microdata. Such
data enables to control for individual and micro-family level variables such as family
background (type of family, family size, family income, parent’s level of education, etc.)
and the individual’s personal characteristics (skin color, age, gender, etc.). In short, most
empirical evidence concerning these micro-level determinants are in consensus. For this
reason, we emphasize the macro-level determinants such as unemployment, urbanization
and poverty rate, which can not be addressed using individual data. Thus, focus is on the
variability of child labor rates among states.
Most importantly, the aggregation of individual data to state level enables to verify
the effect of government policies on the rate of child labor. The policies taken into account
are the Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer program which was implemented in 2003
and the Labor Inspection with focus on child labor which was first implemented in the
states of Minas Gerais and Goiás in 2005 and later adopted in other Brazilian states as
from 2006. Hence, this essay contributes to appease political and social debates regarding
the effectiveness of these governmental programs.
The third essay contributes to literature concerning the long-run dynamic of child
labor. Some studies emphasize the impact of early labor on individual’s future earnings.
According to these studies, this long-run negative impact is manifested through forgone
education during childhood. As noted by Basu (1999), Kassouf (2002), Kassouf (2007)
and ILO (2013) a child who works at early age is likely to accumulate less human capital
through education compared to that who only study. Low human capital accumulation,
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in turn, negatively affects future labor productivity and, consequently, future earnings.
We follow a similar direction in the sense that it analyzes the probability of parents who
were child laborers to send their children to work at early ages. According to Basu (1999),
such family is prone to be trapped in the vicious cycle of poverty and child labor. Aside
investigating the child labor cycle, this essay also provides the first empirical evidence of
the possibility of halting or reverting the same through the minimum age for work.
The fourth essay contributes to literature concerning the long-run consequence of
child labor. Studies such as, for example, Feitosa et al. (2001) and ILO (2013) investigated
the impact of early labor on child’s physical health using injuries or diseases contacted
during work as proxies. As upgrade, we allege that the hazardous effect of child labor
transcends physical to the mental health of a child laborer. The reason for this is that
child laborers, in most cases, face stress, coercion and psychological pressures at too early
stages of life. Moreover, in most cases of the worst form of child labor, children and
adolescents are also exposed to trauma. According to WHO (2001), childhood stress and
trauma, combined with other biological and social factors, are potential determinants of
mental depression. Therefore, this essay provides the first empirical evidence concerning
the effect of child labor on mental health of individuals.
In short, the main objective of this dissertation is to fill specific gaps concerning
economic, sociological and psychological aspects of child labor, which are at stake in Brazil.
In specific, in essay one, we seek explore the cultural-historical concept of child labor as a
natural phenomenon. In the essay two, we identify the macro-level determinants of child
labor and verify the effect of governmental social programs to reduce the child labor rate.
In essay three, we investigate the child labor trap and indicate its tipping point. Lastly,
in essay four, we verify the relationship between child labor and the risk of developing
mental depression.
The rest of this master’s thesis consist of five chapters. Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5
present essays one, two, three and four, respectively. In chapter 6, we present concluding
remarks and proposals concerning all essays.
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2 Cultural-Historical Concept of Child Labor
in Brazil
Most studies presuppose that child labor is generally conceived as a
negative phenomenon, but we postulate that this is not necessarily al-
ways true. According to the National Commission for the Eradication
of Child Labor (CONAETI, in Brazilian acronym), the concept of child
labor as natural for the development, education and protection of chil-
dren and adolescents persists in many aspects of the Brazilian society. To
CONAETI (2011), the existence of such mentality may restrain the fight
child labor. In this essay, we review Brazil historical literature concern-
ing child labor to point out events which indicate the existence of such
mentality. Thus, aside presenting the historical development of child la-
bor in Brazil, we examine the cultural-historical concepts which may be
shorthanding efforts to reduce child labor in the present. Through our
readings in this essay, we found that the concept of child labor as natu-
ral was historically rooted and continues present in the mentality of the
Brazilian society.
In Brazil, most of the literature concerning the history of child labor only focus on
its development over time without addressing. According to (VYGOTSKI, 1994), certain
historical events may be deeply internalized and transformed into social and cultural
values, which may cause profound transformation of the nature, conception and behavior
of individuals. Based on the contribution of this author, we explore the history of child
labor in Brazil as a determinant of the foundation for work culture among children and
adolescents.
Most studies presuppose that child labor is generally conceived as a negative phe-
nomenon for the development of children and adolescents. In this study, we postulate that
such assumption is not necessarily always true and that such biased focus in literature
may limit the comprehension of specific issues concerning the causes and persistence of
child labor over time.
According to (CONAETI, 2011), the major challenge which the combat of child
labor currently faces is that of its “hard core” (núcleo duro in Portuguese). This is a
state at which child labor is beyond is beyond the reach of either public policies or
inspection mechanisms, i.e, the reduction of child labor is less responsive in such state. In
accordance, the report published by (Repórter Brasil, 2013) and (ROSADO; LUCIANA,
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2014) clarified that such situation is observed mostly in family environments, especially
in family agriculture, domestic activities and in family commercial establishment.
In this study, although acknowledging the role of socioeconomic factors, we postu-
late that such core may be as a result of cultural resistance of society and, most especially,
families towards the role of work as a means to educate and inclusively protect children
and adolescents from delinquency. Specifically, we aim to show that the concept of child
labor as a natural phenomenon for the development and protection of young ones was
historically rooted and continues present in the Brazilian society.
This essay is structured in five sections, addressing the concepts of child labor in
distinct periods. In Section 2.1, we presented the period before the end of the imperialism
in Brazil. In Section 2.2, we addressed the period during the republican government. In
Section 2.3, we present the period during the New State and military regime. In Section
2.4, we presented the period of political openness and democratization. Section 2.5 pro-
vides concluding remarks concerning the concept of child labor as a natural phenomenon
in Brazil.
2.1 Child Labor Until the End of Imperial Period – Before 1900
Alike in most countries, the forms and concepts of child labor in Brazil is an
historical phenomenon, which significantly evolved over time. The history of childhood in
Brazil is usually addressed as from the “discovery” of the country by the Portuguese in
year 1500 or as from the beginning of the republican government in year 1900. However,
Lage e Rosa (2011) suggest that the history of childhood in Brazil should be treated right
from the recruitment of the children who sailed with the Portuguese ship en route to
Santa Cruz in Brazil. As at then in Portugal, work among children and adolescents was
a normal phenomenon in the sense that they were not valued but treated as mere labor
suppliers. In other words, little or no concern was expressed regarding the development of
children. Ramos (2010) detailed that the recruitment of children, mostly those between
the age of 9 and 16, was done by three means: kidnapping of Jewish children in order
to control Jewish population in Portugal; enrollment of children from poor families by
parents whose objective was to reduce household expenses and; enrollment of homeless
orphans. On board, these children were classified in two categories: the cabin and page
boys. According to Paganini (2011), the cabin boys were those responsible for the most
hazardous and arduous tasks carried out on the ship, while the page boys performed less
arduous tasks.
Lage e Rosa (2011) enlightened that the indigenous population who inhabited the
Brazilian territory before the arrival of Portuguese ships lived in social groups separated
by age and gender. In this society, children were valued and not regarded as mere suppliers
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of labor. Specifically, Leite (2011) asserted that children under age 8 were assumed to be
maternally dependent. Older male children were presented bows and arrows to play among
their peers, while older female children continue with their mothers with the objective of
learning how to spin cotton and knead clay. In short, work was considered a means of
involving and teaching children the ways of the social group.
This view corroborates that of Kassouf e Justus (2006) who informed that in
the pre-harvest period of the woodland areas, children participated alongside with their
parents to harvest honey, hunted birds, turtle eggs and other animal products. Despite
such activities barely involved employment relationship or implied exploitation of children,
they marked the beginning of child labor before the colonial era. This social and cultural
child-parent relationship among natives was marveled by the Portuguese explorers at first
contact because the indigenous population cared for and valued children and only require
them to learn the ways of the social group. However, such non-exploitative relationship
did not last long after the arrival of Portuguese.
After the colonization process started in the early 1530s, indigenous children were
forced to accompany their parents to work on crop fields. Gradually, the culture and
tradition of these indigenous population began to tarnish and the culture of labor among
children began to flourish.
The arrival of the Jesuit priests later in 1949 also played fundamental role in
rooting the culture of labor as positive and educative into the mentality of the Brazilian
indigenous population. According to Chambouleyron (1999), the objectives of the Jesuit
priests were to teach the natives, especially children, religious songs, how to read and write
and to moralize the value of work. Paganini (2011) and Cunha e Ogliari (2012) concurred
that the Jesuit priests successfully implanted the ideology of work as what makes a man
good, honest and obedient. In religious terms, these priests created the ideology that work
makes humans decent and clears their path to heaven (CUSTÓDIO; VERONESE, 2009).
As at 1550, the first slave ships, which mostly trafficked Africans, arrived in Brazil
with the intention of substituting the colonized indigenous labor force. Having that the
major objective of slavery was production, there was greater demand of agile adult labor
force and, therefore, reproduction among slaves was unwelcome to avoid costs. However,
after the extinction of slave trade in 1850, slave masters began to value slaves’ children
and incentive reproduction. According to Lage e Rosa (2011), the major intention for this
was to create more slaves since trade was no longer permitted. As a result, child labor
and slavery continued even after the abolition of slave trade.
The decade of 1850 was marked by two significant events concerning child labor:
the first decree regarding compulsory education and high incident of child abandonment.
Specifically in the year 1854, the decree no 1.331-A imposed the compulsory age for basic
education but instructed that children who suffer from communicable diseases, those who
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have not been vaccinated and slaves should not be enrolled in school (SILVA, 2009). This
contributed to deepen inequality among poor and rich population. Thusly, most poor
children who could not study had to be enrolled as work apprentice. During this period,
the abandonment of children by slave mothers who could not financially afford to have a
baby became alarming. According to Lage e Rosa (2011), these mothers preferred their
babies to be adopted by other parents so that they do not also become slaves.
These authors further added that abandonment was addressed differently in rural
and urban areas. While the rural population openheartedly adopted abandoned children
so as to increase labor force on crop fields, the urban population frankly rejected these
children for being “product” out of wedlock. In fact, women who had babies out of mar-
riage were judged and condemned by the society. Therefore, most women had to abandon
their babies to avoid moral condemnation. This situation became quite alarming since
there were not enough families to adopt these babies in the urban areas alike in the rural.
The aftermath of this is the boom of baby hatches, which are wooden cylinders attached to
the walls of welfare institutions. These cylinders have openings to the streets from which
mothers can anonymously abandon their children and simply spin the cylinder opening
for the institution to adopt the baby. According to Nascimento (2008), Paganini (2011)
and Lage e Rosa (2011), the availability of this facility made child abandonment in urban
areas easy and spared mothers from social condemnation.
In most cases, these abandoned children were forwarded to hospitals, churches,
convents, families or holy houses of mercy. In as much as these institutions try to cater for
these children, the alarming increase of the rate of abandonment makes such task difficult.
Thus, due to limited resources and rare government support, most of these children did
not get adequate care. As a result, the rate of mortality of abandoned children increased
expressively (NASCIMENTO, 2008). Moreover, Paganini (2011) added that the children
who survived up to the age of 7 were enrolled as apprentice in workshops where their
labor is exploited. Kassouf e Justus (2006) pointed that during the 1860s, the Navy –
probably the first government organization that exploited child labor – recruited children
and adolescents as apprentices and were eventually trained to fight in the Paraguay war
which started in 1864. Lage e Rosa (2011) informed that at certain age children from
charity institutions were sent out to strive on their own. As a result of extreme poverty
most ventured into crime to ensure a living. According to Fonseca (2001) and Paganini
(2011), these group of abandoned children were referred to as “minors” to differentiate
normal children and transgressors. Along the years, the rate of crime and vandalism by
these individuals increased expressively in the urban areas to the extent of creating social,
political and economic awareness.
At this point, the Brazilian government admitted that attention needs to be paid
to abandoned children in the urban areas not because of their well being, but for the sake
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of national security. Parallel to the increasing crime rate during the late XIX century,
Brazil was initiating its first experience of industrialization. According to Moura (1999),
due to the existing doctrine which regarded work as natural, the emerging industrial
sector counted fully on the supply of child labor. In the mid 1870s, announcements were
publicly placed for the recruitment of children, especially in the textile sector. As at 1890,
children and adolescents were already about 15% of the work force of the textile industry.
Although this sector was the major employer, the construction, service and food industries
also had their share of this cheap and unregulated labor.
Moura (1999) reported that by the end of the XIX century, most of the charity
asylums were already transformed in institutions, professional schools and agricultural
employers which could freely exploit child labor force. Thus far, the government had
no interest in prohibiting child labor since it serves economical use and equally sweeps
delinquents from the streets. Only in 1891, after countless reports of accident at work,
did the Brazilian government propose the decree no 1.313 which aimed to prohibit work
for children below 12 in the textile industry, except in the condition of apprenticeship
between the age of 8 and 12. However, Silva (2009) clarified that this decree was recurrently
breached since most of the migrant and poor children had no birth certificate.
2.2 Child Labor during the Republican Government – 1900 to 1930
The proclamation of the Republic in 1889 brought about severe political and eco-
nomical changes in Brazil. However, little was altered concerning the situation of children
in the society. As per child labor, the early XX century was marked by the creation
of the Disciplinary Institute in 1902. According to Fonseca (2001) and Cunha e Ogliari
(2012), this institution had the sole objective to correct and regenerate childhood through
work and for work. In other words, work was meant to discipline and recreate poor and
abandoned children who perambulated the urban streets and were considered, from the
political point of view, potential danger to the society. Fonseca (2001) reported that chil-
dren were separated in this Disciplinary Institute by their physical aptitude and later
sent to workshops or crop fields. Besides, these children were responsible for most services
which guaranteed the auto-sufficiency of the institute.
To Cunha e Ogliari (2012), the pursue of industrialization during this period made
the government to opt for professional education centered to create labor force for the
industrial sector. Having this intention, in 1909, the Brazilian president, Nilo Peçanha,
ordered the creation of nineteen craftsman schools in the capital of each state. Posteriorly
in the 1920s, twenty agricultural institutions were also created in order to overcome the
shortage of labor in the agricultural sector. These institutions mainly employed children
found in the streets to make them workers of the nation. Thus far, one perceives that ed-
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ucation, even during the republican government, was not specifically for the development
of children but rather for the creation of labor force.
Silva (2009) added that with intention to address the case of minors the government
created the juvenile justice law in 1923, whcih was later transformed into the Code of
minors in 1927 with the publication of the decree no 17.943. According to this author,
this decree is considered the first ever legal protection1 for children and adolescents in
Latin America. This code stipulates that abandoned or delinquent children below age 18
should be referred to social assistance institutions. Thus, with this code, these children
stopped being legally considered criminals and were supposed to be “cured” through
work. Literarily, the government chose to solve the juvenile delinquency problem with
work. Nevertheless, this code prohibited work for children under the age of 12.
2.3 Child Labor during the New State and Military Regime – 1930
to 1979
With the rise of the New State, adjustment were made to the Code of minors in
1932 to address child labor not only for the sake of public security, but also for economic
interest. The general minimum age for work was increased to 14, minimum age for night
work was stipulated at 16 and insalubrious work was limited to children above age 18. Pos-
teriorly, in the 1934 Federal Constitution, labor was considered not merely as an economic
and political issue, but also as a social issue. Subsequently, the Federal Constitution of
1946 made progress and throwback concerning child labor. As for progress, Silva (2009)
informed that this Constitution increased the minimum age for night work from 16 to
18. Whereas, as for throwback, (PAGANINI, 2011) informed that the same Constitution
empowered Judges to authorize children under 14 to work whenever deemed necessary.
In the early 1960s, there was an increasingly urgent concern about economic devel-
opment and national security. After the military coup in 1964, this concern intensified and
led to the creation of the National Foundation for the Welfare of Minors (FUNABEM, in
Brazilian acronym) and its respective state headquarters named FEBEM – State Foun-
dation for the Welfare of Minors. These institutes had similar objectives to that of the
Disciplinary Institute in the sense that they seek to reprimand, correct and integrate de-
viant “minors”, who were considered as threat to the security of the nation. According to
Lage e Rosa (2011), as always, the government had no intention to protect these children
but was only worried about “sweeping the bad apples”.
Still during the military government, further throwbacks were observed concerning
child labor. Firstly, the government, through the Act 158 X of the Federal Constitution of
1 Protection in the sense that cases concerning children and adolescents were treated outside the penal
code. (PAGANINI, 2011)
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1967, reduced the minimum age for work from 14 to 12. This solely contributed to mask
the rate of child labor at the moment. In 1979, the government presented the second Code
of minors, which reinstated the culture of work and legitimated all sort of exploitation
of child labor irrespective of age. Paganini (2011) further added that this code made no
mention of the difference between poor children, delinquent children and transgressors.
Therefore, the exploitation and segregation of vulnerable children and adolescents was
made easy.
2.4 Child Labor during Political Openness and Democratization –
As from 1980
In the early 1980s, Brazil began to adopt numerous open door policies. Fortunately,
this political openness came along with benefits to childhood in Brazil as a result of
the ongoing movements by international organizations such as the UNICEF to protect
children and the ILO to regulate work in general. With concern about it image abroad,
Brazil gradually started to ratify international norms and standards, inclusively those
concerning reduction of child labor (CONAETI, 2011).
As aftermath, differently from previous Constitutions, the Federal Constitution
of year 1988 (in vigor) treats labor exclusively as a social issue. Moreover, this current
Constitution presents legal and social rights, privileges of children, prioritizes education
and abandons the concept of work as “cure” to delinquency . Specifically, article 227 of
this Constitution disposes right to education, health, work, social security, protection of
maternity and childhood, and assistance to the destitute. In other words, children and
adolescents are now recognized as bearer of fundamental right and not as mere object.
As per definition of child labor, the 1988 Federal Constitution sets the minimum
age for work at 14 but permits work as apprentice as from the age of 12. In 1998, the
Constitution was amended and the minimum age for work, likewise the age for appren-
ticeship were increased to 16 and 14, respectively. In addition, work was prohibited in
insalubrious environments for individuals below the age of 18.
Progress were observed concerning the fight against child labor in subsequent years
such as the creation of the Program for the Eradication of Child labor (PETI, in Brazilian
acronym) in 1996, the ratification of the ILO Convention 182 regarding the worst forms
of child labor in 2000 and the ratification of the Convention 138 concerning the minimum
age for work in 2001. The creation of PETI marked the first governmental social program
strictly focused on the combat of child labor. In this program, families receive a certain
amount of money conditioned to the withdrawal of children under 16 form work, enroll-
ment and attendance of the children in school. Besides, Brazil has constantly updated
the list of the worst forms of child labor, which are prioritized in majority of the social
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programs to combat child labor.
Despite acknowledging the significant progress marked by the current Constitution,
Lage e Rosa (2011) argued that these changes were mere result of international pressure
due to adopted open door policies. This argument, however, seems reasonable in the
sense that all definitions and stipulations regarding child labor are those extracted from
international laws. In this context, these authors defend that certain Laws are clearly
distant from the Brazilian reality. Loosely speaking, the foreign Laws adopted in Brazil
have the objective of creating a culture in the society, whereas the same Law in its
country of origin has the objective to regulate an already existing culture. If this is true,
the question we ask is: what happened to the concept of work as dignifying, educative or
“cure” to delinquency and vandalism in children and adolescents?
2.5 Concluding Remarks
It will be too negligent to think that the mere implementation of the 1988 Federal
Constitution completely eroded the cultural and ideological concept of child labor which
have been historically rooted in the mentality of the population.
There are several of debates regarding the stipulated minimum age for work in
Brazil. On the one hand, those who are in support of the reduction of this age, which
are not few, conserve the dogma of child labor as educative or “cure” to delinquency. On
the other hand, others believe that the minimum age still has to be increased to avoid
side effect on future income, health and to avoid intergenerational persistence of poverty
and child labor. First, regarding the increase, studies such as that of Silva (2009) and
Oliva (2013) debated that according to the ILO Convention 138, which Brazil ratified,
the minimum age has to be 18. These authors justified that since the same ILO Convention
stipulates that the minimum age for work (currently 16, in Brazil) should not coincide
with the age for compulsory education (currently 4–17, in Brazil), the minimum age has to
be increased to, at least, 18. Justus et al. (2015) also supported similar argument through
empirical evidence which concludes that the best age to enter the labor market is far
beyond the age of 16.
Regarding the reduction of the minimum age for work, most of the claims are
defended through political debates and Proposal of Constitutional Amendments (PEC,
in Brazilian acronym). Recently, three PECs were submitted by deputies suggesting the
reduction of the minimum age for work from 16 to 14. Specifically, the PEC 18/2011
was presented by deputy Dilceu Sperafico, PEC 35/2011 by deputy Onofre Agostini and
PEC 274/2013 by deputy Edinho Bez (Congresso em Foco, 2015)2. All these PECs were
2 The Congresso em Foco (Congress in focus, in English) is a journalistic site which covers facts and
information, specifically, from the Brazilian National Congress.
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revitalized for discussion in February of year 2016. According to Deputy Dilceu Sperafico,
this proposal amplifies the rights of children in the sense that it formalizes the work of
those who really need to work and guarantee them labor and security rights. In consensus,
Deputy Onofre Agostini affirmed that if a child is regularly enrolled in school and is being
adequately followed up, work will bring benefits in the sense that it creates income for
the family and counts positively to his moral and educational formation. On the same
grounds, Deputy Edinho Bez considered work educative for individuals and also reminded
that “an empty mind is a devil’s workshop”. These processes continued in juridical analysis
until October 4, 2016, with the final review of Deputy Betinho Gomes, which deemed the
PECs as inadmissible.
At this point, it is clear that the concept of work as natural for children and ado-
lescents has always been present for centuries of Brazilian history. Although our literature
review so far focused on the constitutional dimension, the preeminence of such concept
is also very much present in the social dimension. The reason for our asymmetric focus
is due to the dearth of documented information concerning the social dimension of the
concept of child labor compared to the constitutional dimension. However, recent studies
have made attempts to fill this gap.
Majority of the studies which addressed the social dimension of the concept of child
labor in Brazil focus on families. Feitosa e Dimenstein (2004) embarked on this course
with the intention of discussing the perception of mothers concerning child labor. These
authors interview mothers of child laborers in the Northeast region of Brazil. Findings
showed that mothers worry concerning the idleness of their children after school. To
these mothers, such free time makes children vulnerable to negative influences from other
children. Specifically, occupying children’s time with work becomes a way to protect them
from becoming criminals, vagabonds or even drug users. In short, the mothers interview
by these authors firmly qualified child labor as a positive phenomenon for the protection
and development of their children. However, these parents clarified that child labor is not
considered a substitute for education, but for idleness, i.e time after school.
In line with these authors, Almeida e Lima (2010) defended that not only financial
necessity lure children and adolescents to work at tender age, but also the cultural and
ideological nature of their family environment. To support this argument, these authors
investigated mothers, who were child laborers, and their children in the Southeast region of
Brazil so as to know the concept of both concerning child labor. Aside affirming mothers’
view concerning how work protects children from negative influences, these authors also
observed significant divergence between children’s and mothers’ concept of child labor.
Specifically, on the one hand, children conceive work as help to their parents or
as a means of achieving financial independence. On the other hand, mothers consider
work as a way to teach children how to strive in life since the future through academics
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is uncertain, unpredictable and uncontrollable. Curiously enough, these authors pointed
that such concept is most adopted by mothers who were not child laborers. Analogously to
previous authors, Marin et al. (2012) and Marchi (2013) interviewed children and parents
from the Southern region of Brazil. Their findings were similar to those from previous
authors in the sense that work is conceived as a medium to meet family needs and to
educate children for the future.
Another social characteristic which may be contributing to root the culture of child
labor nowadays is the alarming increase of consumerism among children and adolescents.
According to Lage e Rosa (2011), the generalization of consumerism in children and
adolescents pressure, most especially, those from poor household who cannot afford to
keep up to such standards. In such circumstance, the combination of passiveness from
the constitutional and social dimensions together with generalized consumerism among
children and adolescents is most likely to sprout unnecessary child labor as those reported
in the publication of Repórter Brasil (2013). In the report, specialists informed that
some children of nowadays enter the labor market not to support family income, but to
acquire material items such as, for example, video games, music players, mobile phones
and branded cloths. Such observation is buttressed by (GONÇALVES et al., 2012a),
who conducted a field research interviewing 962 adolescents between age 14 and 15 who
resided in the Southern region of Brazil. These authors found that only about 18% of
these adolescents declared to work to support family income, whereas almost 79% worked
for self interest.
At this point, we notice the 1988 Federal Constitution engendered abandonment
of the concept of child labor as natural for the development, education and protection of
children and adolescents in the constitutional dimension. However, such concept continues
preserved in the social dimension, causing passiveness of society towards child labor. Such
passiveness is prone to perpetuate child labor and also limit the effectiveness of measures
aimed at reducing the same.
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3 Conditional Cash Transfer, Labor Inspec-
tion and Child Labor
Empirical studies concerning the determinants of child labor are
widespread and consolidated in literature. However most emphasize the
role of individual or family-level factors. In contribution, we allege and
empirically test the hypothesis that society-level factors also play key
roles in determining the rate of child labor in Brazil. The main focus of
this essay is to investigate if the Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer
and the Labor Inspection contributed to reduce the rate of child labor.
Alongside, we verify the role of other important factors such as: poverty,
unemployment, urbanization and proportion of children and adolescents
enrolled in school. For this purpose, we aggregate individual data from
2004 to 2014 PNAD to state level and adopted panel data models. Em-
pirical results found does not permit to sustain the hypothesis that the
Bolsa Família program and the Labor Inspection contributed to reduce
child labor rate in Brazil.
Article 60 of the Brazilian statute for children and adolescents, recognized in Law
no 8069 of the Federal Constitution, prohibits any labor activity to minors under the age
of 16, except in the condition of apprenticeship as from the age of 14. Still in 2014, there
were about 3,3 million child laborers between age 5 and 17 in Brazil (IBGE-PNAD, 2014).
Specifically, about 2% of this total were between age 5 and 9, about 25% between age 10
and 14, and about 73% between age 15 and 17. Despite the remarkable achievements of
the Brazilian government concerning the combat of child labor over time, these numbers
are still alarming. Thus, the contribution of studies concerning the potential determinants
of child labor continue vital.
Empirical studies concerning determinants of child labor is widespread in Brazilian
literature. However, majority use individual data to investigate factors that lead children
and adolescents to work. Such approach permits to account for the effect of individual and
family specific factors such as, for example, skin color, gender, family income, parent’s level
of education, family structure, etc (KASSOUF, 2001; SCHWARTZMAN; SCHWARTZ-
MAN, 2001; CACCIAMALI; TATEI, 2008; KASSOUF; JUSTUS, 2010; AQUINO et al.,
2010). Nevertheless, these studies do not account for relevant macro-level determinants
of child labor rate such as, for example, income inequality, urbanization, poverty and
unemployment, etc.
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The only empirical study which sought to explain the rate of child labor in Brazil
is that of Ramalho e Mesquita (2013). These authors used a panel data of Brazilian states
over the period of 2001 to 2009. Although the main objective of the study was to investi-
gate the determinants of child labor rate in urban Brazilian states, greater attention was
given to temporal dynamics and informality. Notwithstanding the contribution in these
aspects, these authors omitted several relevant macro-level determinants of child labor
rate such as urbanization, unemployment rate and the proportion of children enrolled in
schools. Moreover, the only factor treated as endogenous during model specification was
family income, leaving out the Bolsa Família program. This program is endogenous since
participation in the program is conditioned to the nonexistence of child laborers in the
family. Thus, the omission of relevant factors and the negligence of potential endogeneity
makes estimates inconsistent.
Therefore, the contribution of this essay towards the study of Ramalho e Mesquita
(2013) is that it controls additional macro-level factors which has been deemed relevant
by theoretical studies. Moreover, on this course we measure the impact of governmental
social programs in combating child labor. Furthermore, we account for endogeneity using
appropriate methods.
In short, the main objective here is to investigate the effect of the Bolsa Família
conditional cash transfer program (henceforth, PBF) and Labor Inspection on the rate
of child labor among Brazilian states. Concerning this objective, we put forward the
hypothesis that both measures contributed to reduce child labor rate from 2004 to 2014.
On the one hand, the PBF program ease financial strain of poor families, conditioning
them to enroll their children in school. On the other hand, the Labor Inspection withdraw
children from work, gives them social assistance and also fines exploiters of the labor of
children and adolescents.
As to the structure of this essay, Section 3.1 and 3.2 present reviews of theoretical
studies and previous evidences. Section 3.3 presents the empirical strategy and procedure.
Finally, Section 3.5 provides the descriptive analysis and results.
3.1 Theoretical Background
The attention aroused during the industrial revolution by the excessive use of
child labor in factories gave origin to the first insights concerning child labor. According
to Basu (1999), the main theoretical frameworks during the XVIII century were that of
Karl Marx, Alfred Marshall and Arthur Pigou.
Marx focused on the causes of child labor emphasizing the relationship between
the rise of a new technology (referring to machinery) and the demand of special work
force – labor of women and children. In his words:
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“We consider the tendency of modern industry to make children and
juvenile persons of both sexes co-operate in the great work of social
production, as a progressive, sound and legitimate tendency, although
under capital it was distorted into an abomination. In a rational state of
society every child whatever, from the age of 9 years, ought to become
a productive labourer in the same way that no able-bodied adult person
ought to be exempted from the general law of nature, viz.: to work in
order to be able to eat, and work not only with the brain but with
the hands too.” (KARL MARX, Instructions for the Delegates of the
Provisional General Council, 1866).
To Marx’s point of view, the arrival of machinery depreciated labor power in the
sense that machines reduce the number of work force and time necessary for activities in
factories. As a result, adult wage was depressed, and families whose income was forced
below subsistence level were compelled to put their children to work (MARX, 1967). In
other words, Marx concludes that the arrival of new technology initially diminishes the
demand of adult labor and, eventually, depresses wage, which in turn may lead to the
supply of child labor.
Marshall, addressed the consequences of child labor, emphasizing the role of in-
vestment in human capital. In his words:
“the less fully their own [adults] faculties are developed, the less will they
realize the importance of developing the best faculties of their children,
and the less will be their power of doing so. And conversely any change
that awards to the workers of one generation better earnings, together
with better opportunities of developing their best qualities, will increase
the material and moral advantages which they have the power to offer
to their children.” (MARSHALL, 1895)
At this point, Marshall was clearly shedding light on the dynamics and intergenerational
persistence of child labor and the capacity of education to revert poverty cycle.
In accordance with Marx and Marshall, Pigou acknowledged that ban of child
labor is benign. Therefore, such policy should be combined with social welfare programs
to relieve poor families of the opportunity cost burden incurred due to investment in
child’s human capital. In fact, theses authors argued that the externality accrued from
education is positive and worthwhile.
The contribution of these early writers set foundation on which later writers de-
veloped formal theoretical frameworks of household behavior. According to Basu (1999),
these theories either adopt the unitary model or the collective model. In the former, the
household is treated as a single-decision unit, i.e, an altruistic member makes makes all
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decisions on behalf of the other members. Contemporary studies adopt collective model,
which account for internal bargains and power struggle within the family. Using this ap-
proach, some studies investigate the determinants of child labor, focusing on decisions
made within the family – intra-household bargaining. However, some others focus on the
bargain between the employer and the child’s parent – extra-household bargaining.
Moehling (1995) adopted the intra-household bargaining model in which the house-
hold is composed of two agents: agent 1 and agent 2, a parent and a child, respectively. It
was assumed that there is only one consumption good 𝑥𝑖 in the economy, which satisfies
each unit of utility, 𝑢𝑖, of agent 𝑖 and that each agent cares about the other. Thus, the
household’s average utility depends on the income of both the parents and child, 𝑦1 and
𝑦2 respectively. Therefore, the household decision can be represented as follows
max
(𝑥1, 𝑥2)
𝛼(𝑦1, 𝑦2)𝑢1(𝑥1 𝑥2) + [1− 𝛼(𝑦1, 𝑦2)]𝑢1(𝑥1 𝑥2) (3.1)
subject to 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 ≤ 𝑦1 + 𝑦2
assuming that
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝑦1
≥ 0, 𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝑦2
≤ 0, 𝜕𝑢1
𝜕𝑥1
> 0, 𝜕𝑢1
𝜕𝑥2
≥ 0, 𝜕𝑢2
𝜕𝑥1
≥ 0, 𝜕𝑢2
𝜕𝑥2
> 0 and 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1 (3.2)
Furthermore, it is assumed that the child either work or play. Thus, this model can
be further sophisticated by including child’s leisure, which is represented by 1− 𝑒, having
that 𝑒 denotes time spent on work by the child. In this case, the household’s collective
decision problem is
max
(𝑥1, 𝑥2)
𝛼(𝑦1, 𝑦2)𝑢1(𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑒) + [1− 𝛼(𝑦1, 𝑦2)]𝑢1(𝑥1 𝑥2) (3.3)
subject to 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 ≤ 𝑦1 + 𝑦2
According to Basu (1999), the challenge faced by the family in this case is the
choice of 𝑒, which determines the level of income the child contributes to the family. The
author suggested to consider 𝑦2 exogenous and suppose that both agents, parent and
child, are selfish in order to find the household’s equilibrium. In so doing, conclusion was
drawn that the “optimum” child labor depends on the labor market value of adult wage
and child wage.
Unlike Moehling (1995), Gupta (2000) adopted an extra-household bargaining
model. In this case, the bargaining occurs between a greedy employer and a selfish parent
concerning the child’s sage, 𝑤, and part of this wage that should be paid in form of food
to the child, 𝜆. Gupta (2000) also assumed that the productivity of a child is related to
its feeding in a non-linear form and has a fixed minimum negotiated between the parent
and employer. Hence, the output of the child’s work is given by
𝑥 = 𝑥(𝜆𝑤) where 𝑥′(𝜆𝑤) > 0, and 𝑥′′(𝜆𝑤) < 0 (3.4)
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Supposing that parents and employer reach a settle point (𝑤, 𝜆) and they earn 𝑌𝑃 and
𝑌𝐸 respectively, the Nash bargaining problem is solved by:
max
(𝑤, 𝜆)
[(1− 𝜆)𝑤 − 𝑌𝑝][𝑥(𝜆𝑤)− 𝑤 − 𝑌𝐸] (3.5)
Compared to the model presented by Moehling (1995), one can clearly observe
the sharp contrast of the assumptions made in Gupta (2000) concerning the relationship
between parents and children. However, these two authors converge in the sense of finding
a single and static equilibrium.
Basu (1999) argued that previous studies overlooked the possibility of multiple
equilibrium in a labor market setting where children work. This author also added that
the assumptions made in previous studies concerning parent’s selfishness is too extremist
and, to a certain point, unrealistic since parents only send to send their children to work
for reason of survival. This observation gave origin to the luxury axiom which assumes
that a household will send children to work only if income from adults does not cover
for the necessary expenses for subsistence. In other words, the child’s leisure is a luxury
good for extremely poor families. In short, this axiom reinforce the role of poverty in the
household supply of child labor.
To construct the supply function of child labor, Basu e Van (1998) assumes that
there are 𝑁 identical households which consist of an adult and a child. In this setting,
adults work independently of wage level, but children only work to support family income.
Thus, the household’s preference (≻) is
{(𝑐, 𝑒)|𝑐 ≥ 0, 𝑒 ∈ {0, 1}} (3.6)
where 𝑐 and 𝑒 are family consumption and child’s work effort, respectively. Given the lux-
ury axiom, the household’s problem is to solve the following budget constraint, represented
as
max
(𝑐, 𝑒)
2𝑐 ≤ 𝑒𝑤𝐶 + 𝑤𝐴 (3.7)
where 𝑤𝐴 is adult’s income, 𝑠 is subsistence level and 𝑤𝐶 is the level of wage which the
child has to earn to bolster household’s income to meet a minimum subsistence level of
consumption1. The solution to the maximization problem is
𝑐(𝑤𝐴) =
⎧⎨⎩ 𝑤𝐴/2 if 𝑤𝐴 ≥ 2𝑠𝑤𝐴 + 𝑤𝐶
2 if 𝑤𝐴 < 2𝑠
(3.8)
𝑒(𝑤𝐴) =
⎧⎨⎩0, if 𝑤𝐴 ≥ 2𝑠1, if 𝑤𝐴 < 2𝑠 (3.9)
1 Note that since wage levels are being compared to family subsistence level, the implicit definition of
poverty here is the capacity to family income to meet basic needs.
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and the labor supply function of adults (𝑆𝐴) and children (𝑆𝐶) are
𝑆𝐴 = 𝑁
𝑆𝐶(𝑤𝐴) =
⎧⎨⎩ 0, if 𝑤𝐴 ≥ 2𝑠𝑁, if 𝑤𝐴 < 2𝑠
(3.10)
Together with the luxury axiom, Basu e Van (1998) proposed the substitution
axiom which assumes that adult labor is a perfect substitute to child labor. However, the
unit of child labor must be corrected by an adult-equivalent scale coefficient, 𝛾, which
varies from 0 to 1. This assumption was necessary to derive the aggregate demand of
child labor.
Assuming that there are 𝑛 firms in the economy producing a single good. The total
output of each firm 𝑖 is
𝑥𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐴𝑖 + 𝛾𝐶𝑖), 𝑓 ′ > 0, 𝑓 ′′ < 0, (3.11)
where 𝐴𝑖 and 𝐶𝑖 denote the number of adult and child workers in the firm, respectively.
Hence, the profit-maximizing problem faced by the firm is given by
max
(𝐴𝑖, 𝐶𝑖)
𝑓(𝐴𝑖 + 𝛾𝐶𝑖)− 𝐴𝑖𝑤𝐴 − 𝐶𝑖𝑤𝐶 (3.12)
Having that 𝑤𝐶
𝛾
is the child wage per adult-equivalent practiced in the labor market, the
solution of this problem implies that if 𝑤𝐴 <
𝑤𝐶
𝛾
firm employs only adult, but if 𝑤𝐴 >
𝑤𝐶
𝛾
children are employed. However, the firm deems indifferent to employ adult or children if
𝑤𝐴 =
𝑤𝐶
𝛾
. In a case where the firm opts for a combination of adult and child wage that
minimizes 𝑤𝐴 and 𝑤𝐶 , the aggregate demand for adult and child labor in the economy is
given by 𝑛𝐴𝑖 + 𝑛𝛾𝐶𝑖.
Having the aggregate supply and demand function of child labor at optimal wage
levels for adult (𝑤*𝐴) and children (𝑤*𝐶), the equilibrium points of this labor market is
attained at
𝐷𝐴(𝑤*𝐴, 𝑤*𝐶) = 𝑁
𝐷𝐶(𝑤*𝐴, 𝑤*𝑐 ) = 𝑆𝐶(𝑤*𝐴)
(3.13)
In Fig. 1, Basu (1999) illustrates a simplified version of the general model fromBasu
e Van (1998). The vertical axis represents adult wage level which determines if household
will send its children to work or not. On the horizontal axis which represents total labor
supply, 𝐴′ is the total supply of adult labor and 𝑇 is the total effective labor that children
can supply. If there are 𝑋 children in the economy, the distance form 𝐴′ to 𝑇 is 𝛾𝑋 which
represents the aggregate potential supply of child labor.
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Figure 1 – Supply and demand of child labor
Source: Basu (1999)
Supposing that the market adult wage is below
¯
𝑊 , all children are sent to work to
support household income to reach the subsistence level and aggregate labor supply is 0𝑇 .
At this point, adults and children earn𝑊𝐿 and 𝛾𝑊𝐿, respectively. Though, if adult wage is
set above ?¯? , no child is sent to work and aggregate labor supply is 0𝐴′. The slope between
B and C indicates that household responds to increase in𝑊 by withdrawing children from
the labor market one after the other, vice versa. Thus, the total potential labor supply in
the economy is represented by the curve 𝐴𝐵𝐶𝑇 , which Basu (1999) denominated hybrid
supply curve.
This intersection of the hybrid supply curve with the aggregate demand curve
represented by 𝐷𝐷′ clearly illustrates the multiple equilibra observed by Basu e Van
(1998). Specifically, this theoretical model indicates two stable equilibria (𝐸 and 𝐹 ) and
an unstable one (between 𝐵 and 𝐶). Basu (1999) argued that the same economy may
finds itself on point 𝐸 where adult wage is high and no child work (good equilibrium)
or on point 𝐹 where adult wage is low and all children work (bad equilibrium). Basu
e Van (1998) suggested the banning of child labor may make the economy to calibrate
from point 𝐹 to 𝐸. However, such policy is prone to become dormant after the economy
reaches point 𝐸. Basu (1999) added that point 𝐸 ′ is irrelevant because 𝐸 is superior to 𝐸 ′
which is preferred to 𝐹 by the household. In other words, if the household adult income
exceeds ?¯? , there is no reason for children to be sent to work.
The theoretical model developed by Basu e Van (1998) was further complemented
by Basu (1999) to include the effect of adult unemployment. This author argued that
the relationship between child labor and unemployment is prone to be ambiguous in a
competitive labor market. On the one hand, increase in adult’s wage may lead to reduction
of child labor as response to the increase in adult’s household income. On the other hand,
a rise in adult’s wage lead to increase in unemployment rate of adults, which is followed
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Figure 2 – Child labor and adult labor market
Source: Galli (2001)
by higher demand of child labor by firms (since adults and children are substitute subject
to equivalency correction). In this case, firm’s demand will meet household supply of child
labor, since households will seek to compensate depressed adult income.
Galli (2001), in line with Basu (1999) discusses the relationship between child labor
and adult unemployment. Acknowledging that children are only substitute to unskilled
adult labor subjected to equivalency correction, this author shows that exogenous chocks
in supply of child labor may provoke different reactions to adult wage, given the level of
flexibility of unskilled adult labor market.
In Fig. 2, graph (a), Galli (2001) portrays that exogenous increase in child labor
reduce demand of unskilled adult labor causing dislocation of demand curve from 𝐷 to
𝐷′, given the assumption that firms would rather hire children for being cheaper and less
regulated. Moreover, graph (a) also illustrates that the wage of unskilled adults is also
reduced. In graph (b) and (c), the author considered infinitely elastic and inelastic supply
of adult unskilled labor. As to case (b) which illustrate labor market with adult minimum
wage, exogenous increase in child labor supply cause reduction of unskilled adult labor
demand without changes in wage. However, in case (c) demand of unskilled adult labor
remains unaltered but wage is reduced.
Now we shift to theoretical models of the effect of governmental countermeasures
on child labor. Das e Deb (2006) elaborated an infinite-horizon dynamic model of child
labor considering a variable rate of time preference and credit constraints. An interesting
feature of this model, aside pointing the effect of credit, is that it addresses the effects
of some countermeasures against child labor in a dynamic horizon. The countermeasures
considered by these authors are: enrollment subsidy, increase in adult wage, improvement
in primary education infrastructure and lump-sum subsidy.
The construct of the basic model is focused on a household with two agents:
a parent and a child. These agents derive instantaneous utility, 𝑢𝑡, from consumption,
𝑐𝑡. The child is assumed to either work, 𝑙𝑡, or study, 1 − 𝑙𝑡, while the parent always
Chapter 3. Conditional Cash Transfer, Labor Inspection and Child Labor 35
Figure 3 – Public policies and child labor
Source: Das e Deb (2006)
work. Supposing the child has to work, the wage earned by the child and parent are
respectively 𝑤𝑐 and 𝑤𝑎 and 𝑤𝑎 ≥ 𝑤𝑐 > 0. Taking into account that child labor reduce
future productivity at adulthood as concluded by Basu e Van (1998), i.e 𝐿𝑡 = 𝑙𝑡−1, the
family income is given by
[𝑤𝐴ℎ(1− 𝐿𝑡)] + [𝑤𝑐𝐿𝑡+1] ≤ 𝑐𝑡 (3.14)
Based on its income level, household maximizes current utility represented by 𝑉𝑡 = 𝑢(𝑐𝑡)+
𝛽𝑉𝑡+1, where 𝛽 ∈ [0, 1] is a variable discount factor. The Lagrangian function which the
household has to solve is
ℒ =
∞∑︁
𝑡=0
𝑢(𝑐𝑡)𝛽𝑡 +
∞∑︁
𝑡=0
𝜆𝑡[𝑤𝑐𝐿𝑡+1 + 𝑤𝑎ℎ(1− 𝐿𝑡)− 𝑐𝑡] (3.15)
Taking 𝜔 ≡ 𝑤𝑎
𝑤𝑐
as adult-to-child wage ratio and resolving the household income and La-
grangian equation, a steady state equilibrium is found by the intersection of the following
equations
𝜔ℎ′(1− 𝐿*) = 1
𝛽
(3.16)
𝑤𝑐𝐿
* + 𝑤𝑎ℎ(1− 𝐿*) = 𝑐*
At this steady state, 𝐿* and 𝑐* denote the magnitude of child labor and household con-
sumption in the long run, respectively. Fig. 3 illustrate the case of child labor at a constant
rate of time preference. Graph (a) shows the response of child labor to economic policies in
the long run and graph (b) shows how the magnitude of child labor relates with household
consumption in the long run.
Analyzing, firstly, the long-run effect of better educational infrastructure on child
labor. Having that such policy affect the quality of education directly, Das e Deb (2006)
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multiplied A to the equation for human capital, thus, ℎ = 𝐴ℎ˜(1− 𝐿𝑡+1). As a result, Eq.
3.16 becomes
𝜔𝐴ℎ˜′(1− 𝐿*) = 1
𝛽
; 𝑤𝑐𝐿* + 𝑤𝑎𝐴ℎ˜(1− 𝐿*) = 𝑐* (3.17)
and 𝜔ℎ′(·) shifts rightward implying reduction in the long run extent of child labor and
increase in human capital accumulation since return from schooling becomes more attrac-
tive. Reduced child labor causes the 𝐿0𝐿0 curve to shift left and 𝐶0𝐶0 shifts right due to
greater human capital accumulated. At this point, household’s consumption is higher and
child labor is lesser.
Another economic policy to consider is enrollment subsidy. An enrollment subsidy
refers to programs which transfer cash or in-kind subsidy to poor families conditioned to
child’s enrollment and attendance in school. The Brazilian Merenda Esccolar and Bolsa
Família cash transfer programs are examples of enrollment subsidy. These programs have
the basic intention to ease poor families of financial burden and lure their children to
school in pursuance of the reduction of intergenerational spillover of poverty and child
labor. To model such policy, take 1−𝐿 to be school attendance, 𝑆𝑡 to be subsidy in value,
and that both are positively related. One can imagine that if 𝑆𝑡 ≥ 𝑤𝑐 and the luxury
axiom holds, parent will find it unnecessary to send its child to work. In this case, 𝑤𝑐 is
the opportunity cost of sending a child to school. Despite promising, the viability such
program is far-fetched due to its large cost. Hence, Das e Deb (2006) considers 𝑆𝑡 < 𝑤𝑐
assuming that parent might withdraw child from full-time work and send to part-time
work. The steady state conditions, given an enrollment subsidy program are
𝜔ℎ′(1− 𝐿*) = 1− (𝑆𝑡/𝑤𝑐)
𝛽
and 𝑐* = 𝑤𝑐𝐿* + 𝑤𝑎ℎ(1− 𝐿*) + (1 + 𝐿*)𝑆𝑡 (3.18)
What is observed is that an enrollment subsidy program has similar effect to that of
investment in educational infrastructure in the long run: reduction of child labor and
increase in household consumption.
Furthermore, the authors analyzed the effect of increase in adult wage. The causes
of increase in adult wage are diverse, varying from minimum wage laws to international
trade policy. Incorporating such policy in the model is quite analog to that of investment
in educational infrastructure for it only requires multiplication of a constant term to
the 𝜔ℎ′(·) function. In short, a increase in adult wage reduces child labor and increases
consumption in the long run.
Finally, Das e Deb (2006) analyze the effect of a lump-sum subsidy. This subsidy,
denoted with 𝑆, involves direct cash transfer to poor families without conditionalities.
Such policy does not alter the 𝜔ℎ(·) function for not being related to neither labor nor
human capital, thus 𝐿0𝐿0 is unaltered. However, long-run household consumption is in-
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creased to a level, which is now
𝑐* = 𝑤𝑐𝐿* + 𝑤𝑎ℎ(1− 𝐿*) + 𝑆 (3.19)
Another theoretical framework to be considered is that of Basu (2005) which mod-
els the effect of imposing fine on firms which employ child labor. This model considers
households with an adult and 𝑚 children. The authors assume that each child produces
𝛾 unit of adult’s full time labor and the supply of adult labor is perfectly inelastic. More-
over, assume that children are only sent to work if the adult’s wage, 𝑤, does not attend
the minimal subsistence level, 𝑠, vice versa. However, if children work, the wage they
earn is 𝛾𝑤. Supposing that the government in this economy stipulates that a firm caught
exploiting child labor will be fined a sum of 𝐷 and the probability of firms being caught
is 𝑝. Thus, the fine paid by firms caught is given by 𝑝𝐷. In this context, the child labor
wage set by firms necessarily has to be 𝛾𝑤 < 𝑝𝐷 for child employment to be feasible. As a
result, the relationship between adult and child wage is 𝑤𝑐 = 𝛾𝑊 −𝑝𝐷. Taking 𝑒 ∈ [1, 𝑚]
as the number of children that a household sends to work if 𝑤 < 𝑠, the wage which a child
needs to earn to reach subsistence is given by
𝑒𝑤𝑐 = 𝑠− 𝑤, thus 𝑒 = 𝑠− 𝑤
𝛾𝑤 − 𝑝𝐷 (3.20)
Eq. 3.20 points that the number of children necessary to attain subsistence level increases
if adult wage 𝑤 continues to decrease. However, the number of children a household has
to supply is finite. In this sense, a level of adult wage is attained at which parents judge
unnecessary to send children to work, so children are withdrawn from labor market. To
identify how the fining of firms relates with the supply of child labor, the government
variables (𝑝 an 𝐷) should be written in function of labor supply as follows
𝑒 = 0, if 𝑤 ≥ or 0 ≥ 𝛾𝑤 − 𝑝𝐷 𝑚𝑖𝑛
⎧⎨⎩ (𝑠− 𝑤)(𝛾𝑤 − 𝑝𝐷) , 𝑚
⎫⎬⎭ (3.21)
Fig. 4 illustrates better this relationship. The vertical and horizontal axis represent adult
wage, 𝑤, and total labor supply, respectively. It is observable that if 𝑤 ≥ 𝑠 only adults
work and the labor supply curve is 𝐴𝐵, but if 𝑤 falls below 𝑠 children are sent to work.
If adult wage declines, the number of children sent to work increases to a certain point
at which the number of children available reaches its limit and labor supply is 𝐶𝐹 . If 𝑤
continues to fall, the supply of child labor becomes unnecessary since 𝑤𝑎+𝛾𝑤 < 𝑠. Hence,
total supply of labor is 𝐴𝐵𝐶𝐹𝐺𝐻. Now assuming that the demand of labor, represented
by 𝐷′𝐷, is sufficiently elastic and the multiple equilibra scenario is lost, the equilibrium
point is set at 𝐸.
Assuming government decides to increase fine for child employment, the effect
of such policy, at first instance, is the reduction of child wage by the firms. Parents in
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Figure 4 – Child labor: legislative penalty and incidence.
Source: Basu (2005)
return will increase the supply of children to the labor market to attain subsistence level,
causing, as a result, the supply curve a rightward shift from 𝐴𝐵𝐶𝐹𝐺𝐻 to 𝐴𝐵𝐶 ′𝐹 ′𝐺′𝐻.
It is quite important to note that the increase in fine caused parent to offer more children
irrespective of adult wage level between 𝑠 and 𝑝𝐷′/𝛾. Basu (2005) pointed that, at such
point, if the fines are sufficiently high, child labor will be eliminated at equilibrium.
Apart from these cases of intra-national interventions by the government to reduce
or eliminate child labor, there are supranational and extra-national interventions which
aim to reduce child labor, especially in developing countries. Supranational interventions
involves policies adopted by international organizations such as ILO, WTO and UNICEF
and implemented, in most cases, through international labor standards. Extra-national
interventions are similar to supranational interventions but differs in the sense that poli-
cies are implemented by other countries and not by international organizations. Most
theoretical studies argue that such interventions are likely to be counter-productive if not
properly implemented and fitted to the peculiarities of the beneficiary country. In this
essay, we focus exclusively on intra-national interventions.
3.2 Previous Evidences
As spotlight is on macro-level determinants2, in this section we review the literature
which treats the impacts of economic progress on child labor. As economic progress, we
refer to the levels of poverty, unemployment, economic growth and urbanization.
2 For details regarding micro-level causes, see Basu (1999), Hilowitz et al. (2004a), Kassouf (2002),
Kassouf (2007) and ILO (2007).
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Poverty
Poverty has been overtly concurred, in most theoretical and empirical literature,
to be the major determinant of the supply of child labor both at the micro and macro
level. From the micro-level stance, many empirical studies (BASU; VAN, 1998; KASSOUF,
2001; EDMONDS; TURK, 2002; KASSOUF, 2002; BASU, 2003; HILOWITZ et al., 2004a)
defend that families send children to work only if adult’s income does not cover the
basic needs of the family. Thus, families in situation of poverty or extreme poverty are
more likely to send children to work, since rich families do not depend on children’s
income for subsistence. From the macro-level angle, studies such as Galli (2001), Edmonds
(2005), Edmonds e Pavcnik (2005) and Kambhampati e Rajan (2006) concluded that
macroeconomic progress reduces child labor. This is because richer societies can offer
more free and quality education, better health services and also adopt poverty reduction
measures, compared to poorer societies. Moreover, richer societies have higher level of
adult wage, which directly reduces micro-level poverty.
Inasmuch as poverty is widely accepted as a major cause of child labor, some
studies (BARROS et al., 1994; RAY, 2000; ROGERS; SWINNERTON, 2004; KAMB-
HAMPATI; RAJAN, 2006; DUMAS, 2007; KASSOUF; JUSTUS, 2010; Repórter Brasil,
2013; SARKAR; SARKAR, 2016) have questioned this relation. In short, these authors
claim that the validity of the hypothesis of poverty as the major cause of child labor is
doubtful. However, there is, yet, no consensus regarding the basis of such argument in
literature. In Barros et al. (1994) and Ray (2000), no evidence was provided concerning
the invalidity of the hypothesis. However, Bhalotra e Heady (2003) empirically defended,
using Ghanaian and Pakistani data, the wealth paradox that children from families with
larger farm size (proxy for family wealth in agrarian societies) are most likely to be child
laborers compared to children from families with smaller farm size.
Similar evidence was found by Dumas (2007) and Kassouf e Justus (2010) who
considered farm size a proxy for family wealth. On the one side, Dumas (2007) reinstated
the wealth paradox, adding that the labor supply of minors is an aftermath of labor
market imperfections in rural Burkina Faso. On the other side, Kassouf e Justus (2010)
contributed to this motion, using Brazilian data, by indicating that the probability dis-
tribution of child labor in function of farm size is a parabola opening downwards. Thus,
child labor increases with greater family farm size but reaches a specific maximum point
from which it declines.
Different from the wealth-paradox point of view, Rogers e Swinnerton (2004),
Kambhampati e Rajan (2006) and Dumas (2007) argued that poverty may not be linked
to variations in child labor. To Rogers e Swinnerton (2004) the reduction of poverty may
be bound to capital market constraint if adult children from poor families have to make
transfers to parent to repay investment made on studies, through loans during childhood.
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Kambhampati e Rajan (2006), using state-level macrodata from India, concluded that
increase in income due to economic progress may lead to increase in child labor. According
to these authors, the channel through which this might occur is by the increase in demand
of goods and services as aftermath of general economic growth. To Dumas (2007), child
labor may emerge not as a result of household needs but as a result of labor market
imperfections such as lack of landless class, high homogeneity in factor endowments and
high level of synchronicity in labor needs across households.
Now we turn to evidences from Brazil. Barros e Mendonça (1991), using the PNAD
data from the metropolitan areas of Fortaleza and São Paulo, tested the role of household-
level poverty to reduce child labor. These authors found that to reduce the Labor Force
Participation Rate of minors (LFPR) in São Paulo from 10% to 5% family-level per capita
income has to increase in, approximately, 120%. For the metropolitan area of Fortaleza,
these authors found that to reach the same target for the LFPR of minors family-level
per capita income has to increase in about 87%. Hence, the elasticity between family-level
poverty and child labor is very weak. Similarly, Barros et al. (1994) studied the role of
poverty in explaining the rate of child labor in Latin America with focus on the urban
areas of Brazil. In this course, these authors considered both household-level poverty and
society-aggregated-level poverty. The reason for such distinction is to isolate the effect of
each type of poverty, since poor households in poor societies do not face the same price
levels and resources constraint as poor households in rich societies.
The first approach adopted by these authors is the comparison of 14 Latin Amer-
ican countries using information from Cepal (1992). According to this data, the LFPR of
minors is heterogeneously distributed among Latin American countries. In specific, higher
LFPR of minors were found for Brazil, Guatamala and Honduras, while lower LFPR was
found for Chile, Venezuela and Uruguay. By adjusting the LFPR of minors from these
countries with their respective level of per capita income, the authors found that higher
LFPR of minors was not explained by lower level of per capita income for Mexico and
Brazil. It was observed that, compared to countries of similar per capita income, Brazil
had about 6 p.p. higher LFPR of minors. However, evidence was found concerning an
inverse relationship between poverty and child labor for Latin American countries as a
group.
Having this inverse relationship, these authors inquired for the reduction of average
per capita income necessary to reduce LFPR of minors from 10% to 5%. For the Latin
American countries as a group, an elasticity value of 0.406 was observed, implying that
for child labor rate to reduce from 10% to 5% per capita income has to increase by,
approximately, 120%. According to these authors, this will take about 27 years if the per
capita income increases at the annual rate of 3%. Thus, the relationship between poverty
and child labor rate in Latin American countries is inelastic. Regarding Brazil in specific,
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this inelasticity was way higher, implying that increase of about 340% in per capita income
will be necessary to reduce child labor rate from 10% to 5%. Hence, elimination of child
labor in Brazil through growth was deemed unfeasible.
For more evidence regarding the poverty-as-cause hypothesis, Barros et al. (1994)
use data from the National Household Sample Surveys (PNADs) to investigate if higher
child labor is observed in areas and periods of higher level of poverty in Brazil. As for
regional disparities, higher LFPR of minors was observed in richer metropolitan areas
(Southeast Brazil) compared to poorer metropolitan areas (Northeast Brazil). Similarly,
temporal variations point to higher LFPR of minors during periods of lower poverty
(around 1986) and lower during period of higher poverty (around 1983). Aside rejecting
the poverty-as-cause hypothesis, such relation points to the wealth paradox.
Thus, Barros e Mendonça (1991) and Barros et al. (1994) concluded that micro
and macro-level poverty are determinants of child labor in Brazil, but are far from being
the major cause of the high rates observed in Brazil in the 1980s and 1990s.
An interesting point to highlight regarding these studies is that if these authors
initially assumed that child labor is caused by price levels, household endowment and
preferences, but choose to ignore household preferences for being subjectively determined
and not measurable, and concluded that the economic variables (price levels and household
endowments) have weaker effect on child labor, these authors implicitly admitted the
importance of household preferences. However, blind eye was turned to preferences as an
important factor by these authors, which is very common in literature.
In order to back this up, it is important to take into account the circumstances of
child labor in the period studied by Barros e Mendonça (1991) and Barros et al. (1994).
As detailed in Chapter 2, the legal regulation of child labor only occurred effectively
in 1988. Until then, child labor was considered to be morally, culturally, socially, ide-
ologically and legally correct. It would, however, be naive to imagine that child labor
becomes morally, culturally, socially and ideologically incorrect simply because it became
legally incorrect. What is being argued here is that in the 1980s and 1990s, the values of
child labor were still firmly rooted into the Brazilian mentality a positive phenomenon.
Thus, completely abstracting from these values, which undoubtedly influence household
preferences regarding child labor, was not a smart move.
It is worthwhile to emphasize that poverty continues to be a cause of child labor,
but its role as the major determinant is questionable in Brazil. To support this argument,
empirical evidences found in some studies regarding the link between poverty and child
labor were collected and presented in Table 1.
Three major features are perceptible from this table: a) preeminent interest on
family-level poverty in literature; b) negative sign of coefficients and most importantly;
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c) very small coefficients. As mentioned in the introductory section of this essay, most
empiric studies focus on the micro-level causes of child labor, thus, neglecting important
macro-level determinants. Moreover, in addressing individual-level factors, studies opt
to control for parent’s level of education and omitting family income with the judicious
apology of the former being more informative and to avoid high multicolinearity.
Concerning the relationship between poverty and child labor, one can easily per-
ceive the consensus of the Brazilian literature towards a negative sign. Hence, higher fam-
ily income is cogent to reduce the number of children and adolescent working in Brazil,
although the degree of such effect does not seem so enticing as conventional theories
preach.
Kassouf (2001) used 1995 PNAD data to estimate probit models for child work
and studies considering as regressors, alongside with others, father and mother’s income,
which served as a proxy for family income. It is important to note that these regres-
sors were estimated due to unavailability of data regarding wages at community level.
Notwithstanding, this author found that, in the Brazilian urban areas, each percentage
increase in father and mother’s income reduces the probability of boys to work in 0.06
and 0.02 percentage points (hence, p.p.), respectively. Similarly, each percentage increase
in father and mother’s income reduces the probability of girls to work in 0.02 and 0.01,
respectively. Here, we notice that the effect of father’s income is higher.
Similarly, Schwartzman e Schwartzman (2001) estimated a logit model using 2001
PNAD data to determine the micro-level causes of child labor in Brazil. These authors
adopted the logarithm of family’s per capita income as a proxy for level of poverty. Also
observing a negative sign, they concluded that each percentage increase in family income
reduces, approximately, 0.067 p.p. in the probability of child labor.
Alike Kassouf (2001), Emerson e Souza (2003) investigated the determinants of
child labor using 1995 PNAD data to estimate probit models. Note that these authors
subtracted children’s income from the total family income so as to isolate the effect of
adult’s income. The coefficient observed for net family income was far weaker than those
observed so far (0.00012 p.p.). Similarly, Aquino et al. (2010) used 1992 and 2004 PNAD
data to estimate probit models, using net family income as one of the regressors for child
labor. No statistical evidence was found in models for 1992 PNAD data. The estimates
observed in the models for 2004 PNAD concerning the effect of family income in urban
and rural areas were similar to that found by Emerson e Souza (2003).
On the course to identify the regional determinants of child labor, Cacciamali et
al. (2010) estimated separate probit models for urban and rural areas. In addition, the
same models were estimated for each region in Brazil. Regarding urban-rural differences,
statistical evidence was found for the role of household’s per capita income in reducing
child labor only in rural areas (−0.00090 p.p.). Regionally, these authors concluded that
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household per capita income has negative effect on child labor in the Northeast (about
−0.00098), but positive effect in the Midwest (about 0.00090). InKassouf e Justus (2010),
conclusion was drawn that child labor in agricultural and livestock activities reduces in
3.75 p.p. for every 1% increase in income of families who reside in the rural area. Thus,
taking into account results found by Aquino et al. (2010), Cacciamali et al. (2010) and
Kassouf e Justus (2010), it is convincing to deduce that child labor in rural areas is more
sensitive to changes in family-level poverty.
De Carvalho Filho (2012) estimated a triple difference model in order to verify
the effect of exogenous chocks in household income on labor participation and school
enrollment of children in Brazil. To account for exogenous chocks, these authors consid-
ered financial old-age benefits as proxy for family income. The reason for this is that
financial old-age benefits emerged as a constitutionally mandated reform in the social
security system in 1991. Thus, as such benefit never existed before then, family income
was exogenously increased. This author also estimated separate models for boys and girls
to observe gender-effect. Generally, these authors found no significant effect of exogenous
increase in family income on child labor. However, considering the gender of the old-age
beneficiary, evidence was found that 100 reais benefit to elderly women reduces in 0.13
p.p. the probability of girls to work.
Last but not least, Ramalho e Mesquita (2013) used 2001-2009 PNAD data to
estimate dynamic panel models with the objective of identifying the determinants of child
labor rate in urban areas of Brazilian states. Similarly to De Carvalho Filho (2012), no
statistical evidence is found regarding the linkage between poverty and child labor.
At this point, it is apparent that the conclusions of these studies converge to: if
there is, at all, causal relationship between child labor and poverty in Brazil, the elasticity
of such relation is certainly weak. In other words, significant reduction of child labor
through poverty measures requires family income to increase to exorbitant levels.
Level of Urbanization
According to previous studies, urbanization rate is also an important determinant
of child labor. This is not only because of the difference in the level of poverty, but also
due to peculiarities attached to the type of child labor concentrated in both rural and
urban areas in terms of proportion, visibility and sectoral distribution. There is consensus
in national and international literature that the rate of child labor is greater in rural areas.
However, in Brazil, despite higher rates are observed in the rural areas, the number of
children and adolescents who work is higher in the urban areas due to the high population
density (INAIÁ, 2008; Repórter Brasil, 2013; KASSOUF, 2015).
Other factors which increase the labor force of children and adolescents in the
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urban area is the availability of better quality education, health services and greater
economic opportunities. Such factors tend to encourage migration from rural to urban
areas. It is, however, important to note that inasmuch as the conditions of an urbanized
area apparently seem better, one has to take into account the effect of inequality and
wage differences between skilled and unskilled workers. According to Barros et al. (1994),
the socioeconomic condition of poor households or unskilled workers in the urban areas
is more harsh compared to the same group in rural areas. Some plausible reasons for this
are wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor, higher cost of living, more competitive
labor markets, etc. (FERREIRA-BATISTA; CACCIAMALI, 2012).
Sectorial Distribution
The activities in which children and adolescents are engaged vary significantly.
However, there is consensus in literature that the agricultural sector is most responsible
for the usage of this vulnerable labor force in Brazil (KASSOUF, 2004). In the findings
of this author, about 54.2% of the child laborers between age 5 and 15 were engaged in
agricultural activities, especially in the rural areas. In descendant order of the sectoral
participation of child laborers of the same age group, the agricultural sector was followed
by the service and commercial sectors with 18.5% and 14.7%, respectively. In the same
year, the industrial sector was responsible for the employment of about 7.2%, while the
construction sector employed about 2.1% of child laborers.
According to Inaiá (2008) and the report published by Repórter Brasil (2013), aside
the concentration of child labor in the agricultural sector, some of its features are quite
worrisome. These features include high incidence of recruitment of child laborers between
age 5–9, preference for boys, long working hours, work with sharp objects, exposure to
toxic materials and intense solar radiation. Still, it is important to note that children
and adolescents are employed by the family in numerous cases in the rural Brazilian
areas. Generally, in such instance, child labor is conceived as positive to the development
of a child and also as helping hand, form of socialization and heir training by the family
(MARIN et al., 2012). Thus, child labor, especially in family agriculture, is backed up and
perpetuated by cultural beliefs. Similar beliefs are attributed to child labor in domestic
activities, mainly for female children, which is considered one of the worst form of child
labor since it is generally time exhaustive, prone to sexual exploration and invisible to
political measures.
According to the publication of Repórter Brasil (2013), despite child labor in urban
Brazil is more exposed compared to that in the rural, government policies are becoming
shorthanded in reducing the number of children and adolescents who work in informal
activities of urban areas such as collection and selection of waste, itinerant trade or street
hawking, load carrying in markets and drug trafficking. This report also pointed that
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child labor is, on the one hand, highly associated to family cultural beliefs in rural areas,
while, on the other hand, associated to consumerism, search of financial independence or
social inclusion and even addiction in the urban areas. Furthermore, the authors reported
cases of children who had basic needs satisfied but opted to work in order to acquire
material objects which their parent wouldn’t or couldn’t buy such as bicycles, video games,
cellphones or branded cloths. An example from this report, among many others, was that
of a 10 years old boy who started working because other children had bicycles but he
didn’t. As a result, this boy lost one of his eyes while mounting boxes which transported
vegetables3. This lesson teaches that children are not merely subjects of civil rights, but
also of desires and needs which are not contented by basic provisions.
Buttressing the point on childrens’ desires, Feffermann (2006) noted that chil-
dren, adolescents and youths who venture into drug trafficking see it as a form of fitting
themselves in the world of consumption created by the capitalist economy. Moreover,
the author claims that most of these youths feel respected and recognized because they
now have financial capacity to buy expensive items. It is important to note that such
feeling is not limited to dug traffickers, but also every other child, adolescent and youth
in the situation of social exclusion, which is common in urban areas. The aftermath of
such situation, generally in urban areas, is early work in formal or informal, temporary
or permanent and legal or illegal sectors.
DeGraff et al. (2016) focused their study on child laborers engaged in risky occu-
pations which cause harm to their health, safety and morals. These authors chose their
definition of “risky” following specifications of the ILO and the Brazilian Ministry of Labor
and Employment. Specifically, the categories of risky occupations addressed in this study
are domestic workers, street workers, construction workers and farm workers engaged in
the cultivation of tobacco, coffee, sugar cane and manioc. Having that the ILO regula-
tions and Brazilian Constituition prohibit risky work for individuals below age 18, these
authors considered the age group between 10 and 17. General findings from this study
point that most child laborers in risky working conditions are engaged in domestic services
and hazardous farming, followed by the construction and street work. These authors also
found that this ranking order is preserved in both rural and urban areas, however, there
were relatively greater proportions in the former compared to the latter. As per gender
distribution in these risky occupations, it was found that there is greater concentration of
girls in hazardous occupations. Specifically, most of these girls are involved in domestic
services, while boys are mostly involved in construction activities, hazardous farming and
street work.
3 The testimony of this boy, already adult, was presented in a seminar organized by the Superior Court
of Labor (TST, in Brazilian acronym) and made available in: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
xuKh1-lOx8>.
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Unemployment
Very few studies have been carried out regarding the effect of economic growth and
adult unemployment on child labor in Brazil. Empirical evidences from Edmonds (2005),
using Vietnamese data, points that child labor reduces with economic growth, however,
highlighting that such relationship is non-linear. In contradiction, Kambhampati e Rajan
(2006) found empirical evidence, using data from India, that contrarily to conventional
wisdom, increase in economic growth increases child labor as aftermath of the increase
in the demand of cheaper labor by firms. The authors, however, noted that child labor is
only reduced when growth is sustained sufficiently to outweigh increase in the demand of
cheaper and unregulated labor. Abu-Ghallous (2012), using Palestinians data, concluded
that increase in unemployment, which is also indicative of economic progress, leads to
increase in the rate of child labor.
As for Brazil, Duryea et al. (2007) used Brazil’s Monthly Employment Survey
(PME, in Brazilian acronym) to analyze the impact of household economic shocks, es-
pecially unemployment, on schooling and employment of youths in metropolitan Brazil.
The empirical strategy used was that of probit model and the database adopted cov-
ered about 100.000 children between age 10 and 16 from 1982 to 1999. The hypothesis
alleged goes in line with that theoretically posed by Basu (1999) and Galli (2001) that
adult unemployment may lead to increase in child labor. The general estimation results
provided statistically robust evidence which does not reject this hypothesis. Specifically,
unemployment shocks to male household head in the metropolitan Brazil increases the
likelihood of children between age 14 and 16 to enter the labor market. However, in a
specific model where authors created an interaction variable between employment shocks
and a dummy variable indicating children between age 10 and 14, statistically robust
evidence was found concerning a negative relationship between adult unemployment and
child labor. Although counterintuitive, such idea supports the observation made by Basu
e Van (1998) concerning the possible ambiguous effect of adult unemployment on child
labor.
Conditional Cash Transfer Program
There are variety of welfare programs adopted in Brazil to ease poor and extremely
poor families of financial constraints. Similarly to other developing countries, one of these
measures involve conditional direct cash or in-kind transfer.
One of the first conditional cash transfer (henceforth, CCT) programs – Bolsa
Escola and Renda Mínima4 – were created in the mid 1995s in the city of Campinas
located in the state of São Paulo. These programs granted financial subsidy to poor
4 Schooling grant and Minimum Wage, respectively.
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parents, who were obliged to enroll their children in schools. In 1996, the Program for
Elimination of Child Labor (PETI, in Brazilian acronym) was created due to the high
proportion and stark situation of children in the labor market. Specifically, the PETI
had the objective of withdrawing children and adolescents between age 7 and 15 from
hazardous work and enroll them in schools (SOARES; SÁTYRO, 2010). Aside enrollment
in schools, the PETI program required children to participate in extracurricular sport,
cultural, artistic and leisure activities in order to inhibit time allocation to work. Despite
greater attention was given to children and adolescents, the PETI program also created
job opportunities for families who earn less than half of the minimum salary in order to
prevent such families to send children back to work.
In 2003, all the cash and in-kind transfer programs designed to reduce poverty
were united form a single conditional cash transfer program – the Bolsa Família Program
(henceforth, PBF), which has nationwide coverage. The participation of families in the
PBF was conditioned to the level of income. Whereas, for continuity of participation,
beneficiary families have to meet additional conditions concerning health care and enroll-
ment and attendance of children in school. Therefore, one can suppose that the program
seek to increase the human capital of poor families through education and health, which
in turn yield better income distribution in the long run and also break poverty cycle.
In 2005, the PETI program was incorporated together with the PBF cash transfer
for the sake of better management and to exploit the synergy between both programs.
Despite the critics regarding the amalgamation of these welfare programs, numerous stud-
ies have pointed out that such action was imminent in order to optimize public resources,
increase coverage and enhance accessibility of grants by eligible families. Albeit the main
characteristics of the PETI program were maintained, the major objective of the PBF
program is to reduce poverty.
In specific, the PBF program attends families which are below the poverty line5,
giving priority to families with pregnant women or children or adolescents under age 17.
Regarding financial values, a fixed amount of R$77 (Brazilian currency) is transferred to
extremely poor families irrespective of family structure. In addition, a variable amount
between R$35 and R$175 is passed on to poor and extremely poor families depending
on the family structure. Having that the PBF program only addresses families below the
poverty line, the PETI program was reconfigured to focus on families child laborers from
families above the poverty line. However, the value transferred is expressively lower than
that of the PBF program – R$ 25 per child to families who reside in rural or urban areas
with less than 250 thousand inhabitants and R$ 40 per child to families who reside in
urban areas with more than 250 thousand inhabitants6.
5 In 2014, the poverty and extreme poverty line are set at R$154 ($1.90 per day) and R$77 ($0.95 per
day) monthly per capita income, respectively.
6 Current values as at August/2016.
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Generally, many criticize the PBF program regarding the unlimited period of par-
ticipation and number of families to be benefited by the program. As per number of eligible
families, the major argument is that setting a limit will enhance efficiency of resources
allocation in the sense that only the needy will be benefited. In respect of this argument,
Silveira et al. (2013) alleged that the program is more interested in the inclusion and
not the exclusion of beneficiaries. As per the period of participation, critics defend that
the lack of stipulation of the maximum period of which families will be benefited makes
beneficiaries “lazy” in the sense that the benefits may be conceived as a living. In response
to this, Jannuzzi e Pinto (2013) affirmed that the program contributed to increase school
attendance of children from poor families and enhance nutrition and health conditions
of beneficiaries. In addition, these authors affirmed that the supposed lazy spirit was a
myth because data also pointed that the insertion of beneficiaries in the labor market is
relatively the same as that of non-beneficiaries. Still, it was added that the program con-
tributed to accelerate economic dynamics through the multiplier effect of the consumption
of beneficiaries.
Most empirical studies which sought the effect of CCT programs on child labor
analyze its effect on the time allocation of children and adolescents. Findings from inter-
national studies such as Ravallion e Wodon (2000) and Maluccio e Flores (2005) point
out that CCT programs produce positive effect on schooling and inverse effect on child
labor. Attanasio et al. (2006) also, empirically, supported this finding affirming that CCT
programs cause significant increase in time allocated to studies and also increases the
school enrollment of children who are prone to enter the labor market early. However,
studies such as Duryea e Morrison (2004) and Glewwe e Olinto (2004) fail to find effect
of cash transfer programs on child labor.
In Brazil, there are still very few empirical studies which investigated the effect of
the PBF program on child labor. Therefore, no consensus is reached yet.
Cardoso e Souza (2004), using 2000 census data and propensity score methods,
analyzed the impact of the Bolsa Escola program7 on child labor and school attendance.
These authors found that the program had significant positive effect on school attendance
for both boys and girls. However, the program was found shorthanded in the task of
reducing child labor. In fact, the author observed that cash transfer were too small to
persuade families to forgo income from child work. Instead, families preferred children
to combine work and school. They also concluded that even if cash transfer could cover
child’s income parents and children may not be convinced to renounce extra income if the
contribution of the child to family income is high.
Ferro e Kassouf (2005) used 2001 PNAD data to also verify if the Bolsa Escola
had significant effect on child labor. Specifically, these authors opted for probit models to
7 A CCT program which preceded and had similar objectives to that of the Bolsa Família program.
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identify if the program influences the probability of a child to work or not, and adopted
weighted least square methods to ascertain if the program, at least, reduces the weekly
hours of work of children who are already in the labor market. Regarding working hours,
Ferro e Kassouf (2005) found evidence that participation in the program reduces about 3
working hours of child laborers. However, these authors highlighted that such reduction
has limited effect in the sense that it covers, mostly, children who do part-time work. This
is because most children who engage in full term jobs have less incentive to participate
in the program due to its modest values. Result concerning the probability of working
pointed that children from families which participated in the program are more likely
to work. However, these authors commented that such unexpected relationship may be
due to family unobservables such as “ambition”. In sum, these authors reached the same
conclusions as Cardoso e Souza (2004) regarding the effect of the Bolsa Escola program
that children from beneficiary families are most likely to conciliate work and study and
are not convinced to leave work.
In line with findings in Ferro e Kassouf (2005), Ferro et al. (2010) used 2003
PNAD data to estimate probit models and propensity score matching approach. These
authors concluded that the Bolsa Escola program reduces the probability of children from
beneficiary families to work and increases the school enrollment of the same. However,
no evidence was found concerning working hours or conciliation of work and schooling.
Specifically, Ferro et al. (2010) pointed that the program reduces probability of working
by 2 to 3 p.p. in the urban areas and 6 to 9 p.p. in rural areas.
Regarding the PBF program, Cacciamali et al. (2010) analyzed its impact on
child labor and school attendance using 2004 PNAD data to estimate probit models. The
estimates from these models indicated positive relationship between the PBF program
and child labor, i.e, children from beneficiary families are more likely to work. These
conclusion was sustained in models for urban and rural areas, and also in models for
separate regions in Brazil. However, Cacciamali et al. (2010) found that the program
was efficient in increasing school attendance of children and adolescents. These authors
clarified that, different from the PETI program, the main objective of the PBF program
is not to eliminate child labor but to reduce poverty. Moreover, they added that for
effective reduction of child labor the value transferred to families has to be more generous
and education quality has to be appealing in order to create incentive to sway children
from work to school. These authors suggested that aside enrollment, the inclusion of
conditionality regarding cultural, sport or artistic extracurricular activities alike the PETI
program may contribute to better allocation of children’s time.
Still on the effect of the PBF program, Araujo et al. (2010) sought empirical
evidence regarding its role on child labor among beneficiaries who reside in Brazilian urban
areas. The methodological strategy used to reach this objective was that of propensity
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score matching using 2006 PNAD data. Similarly to previous authors, Aquino et al. (2010)
concluded that the PBF program was efficient in increasing the school attendance and
enrollment of children and adolescents. However, the program presented shortcomings
regarding the reduction of child labor. These authors also buttressed the role of household
unobservables in the decision of child labor supply and participation in the PBF program.
Also adopting propensity score matching method for 2011 PNAD data, Do Nascimento
et al. (2016) concluded that participation in the PBF program has no significant effect
neither on the probability of a child to work nor working hours. However, evidence was
found that the sum transferred to families contribute to reduce the probability of child
labor, likewise working hours.
Conclusively, these studies pointed that the participation in PBF program has
no conspicuous effect on the probability of children and adolescents to work. However,
most studies found its effect in reducing working hours. Such unsatisfactory effect of this
program may be due to, firstly, the low elasticity of child labor to changes in poverty
as showed in Table 1. It is also important to take into account that, as theoretically
pointed out by Das e Deb (2006), the value transferred to families are relatively too low
compared to the income of child laborers. Thus, extremely poor families are less motivated
to participate in the program and those who opt to participate are less willing to withdraw
children from work8. Lastly, it is worthwhile to also consider that the culture of child work
as positive plays important role in narrowing the reach and effect of the PBF program
(see Chapter 2 of this master’s thesis). As noted by Silveira et al. (2013) regarding the
PBF program, “some effects are difficult to measure and some are dubious”.
Labor Inspection
As aftermath of the dramatic increase in the number of children and adolescents
working in the 1980s, the Brazilian government recognized child labor as a problem which
deserves priority. One of the adopted measures was the Labor Inspection with focus
on child labor. These Labor Inspection activities are conducted by the Secretariat of
Labor Inspection (SIT), which is part of the Brazilian Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MTE).
Concerning the inspection process, an annual plan is drawn by the Regional Su-
perintendencies of Labor and Employment (SRTEs) based on the guidelines of the SIT.
This plan is sketched taking into account the reports of child labor, prioritizing the worst
forms. Having planned, labor inspectors are responsible for the preventive actions and
inspection activities. The preventive actions involve awareness-creation by publicizing the
negative impacts of child labor through lectures, seminars, debates and campaigns to chil-
8 See detail regarding conciliation of work and schooling by children in Inaiá (2008) and its evolution
in Kassouf (2015).
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dren, employers and families. Months after preventive actions labor inspectors conduct
inspection activities, which involve visit of businesses or workplaces in urban and rural
areas throughout the country (ILO/SIT, 2010).
During these visits, inspectors identify irregularities concerning child labor, fill
out an examination form regarding the characteristics of the work exercised by the child,
withdraw child from work and issue infraction reports regarding exploiter, which may
lead to fining. In order to avoid return to work, children and adolescents are included
in social welfare programs. In specific, children under the age of 14 are enrolled in cash
transfer programs conditioned to school attendance and participation in social, educa-
tional and health care projects. Moreover, adolescents above the age of 14 are enrolled
in apprenticeship programs, which offer technical training in workplaces with the inten-
tion of learning and not production. In addition, the SIT published data regarding the
undertaken inspection activities in the Information System of Child Labor (SITI) since
2006.
The ILO/SIT (2010) report pointed out to positive results of the Labor Inspec-
tion in Brazil concerning the number of children which have been withdrawn from work.
Still, this report added that the efficiency of the inspection activities should not be mea-
sured only take into account the number of children removed from work, but also by
the awareness-creation. This is because the preventive actions undertaken by inspectors
increased the visibility of child labor issues in the society, which impacted on the attitude
of the media, governmental institutions, employers and families.
The only empirical study found regarding the effect of Labor Inspection on child
labor till date9 was that of Almeida (2015). Having that most inspection decisions are
taken based on complaints filed regarding child labor, the estimation of the effect of Labor
Inspection on child labor is subdue to underestimation and endogeneity. Therefore, this
author adopted a two-step generalized minimum least squares method using data for
2000 and 2010 from census and SITI database. In the first stage estimation the distance
between inspection agencies and firms and the number of labor inspectors were used as
instruments in order to estimate number of inspections. Subsequently, the estimate for
Labor Inspection was inserted as regressor in the second stage model, which was for child
labor. As for year 2000 and 2010 data, it was found that 1% increase in the number of
labor of inspection reduces the proportion of child laborers between age 10 and 17 in
0.22% and 0.26%, respectively. In absolute terms, the Labor Inspection accounted for
the reduction of, approximately, 8,658 and 8,856 child laborers in year 2000 and 2010,
respectively.
Based on the empirical literature presented in this section, it is possible to create
insight of the signs and challenges expected from our modeling exercises. We expect an
9 October/2016.
Chapter 3. Conditional Cash Transfer, Labor Inspection and Child Labor 53
inverse relationship between poverty and child labor rate. However, previous studies point
that the degree of such relationship is lower than expected. Reviewed studies indicate
that child labor is lower in urban regions, i.e, we expect a negative relationship between
urbanization and child labor rates. As to sectoral distribution, one expects to find higher
rates of child labor in the agricultural sector compared to the service, trade and industrial
sectors. As to unemployment rate, consensus was observed in empirical studies towards a
positive sign, i.e, the increase in unemployment rate should lead to increase in the rate of
child labor. Last but not the least, the signs expected from the main variables of interest,
PBF and Labor Inspection, are negative. On the one hand, most empirical studies found
that children from poor families who benefit from the PBF program have lesser probability
of working compared to children from poor families who do not participate in the program.
On the other hand, empirical evidence sustain the hypothesis that the Labor Inspection
contributed to reduce child labor in Brazil.
The major challenge for the modeling exercise is endogeneity. The variables of
interest PBF and Labor Inspection are suspected to be highly endogenous since they are
governmental factors which are also determined by the level child labor. The empirical
strategy adopted to circumvent this challenge will be detailed in the next section.
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Data
The main source of data used to reach the objective of this essay is the PNAD
conducted by the IBGE. Moreover, data concerning the Bolsa Família Program (abbrevi-
ated, PBF) and Labor Inspection were obtained from the Ministry for Social Development
(MDS in Brazilian acronym) and Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE in Brazilian
acronym), respectively.
As this essay focus on the macro-level determinants of child labor and the effect
of intra-national policies adopted by the Brazilian government to combat child labor,
individual data from PNAD were aggregated to Brazilian state level. Therefore, both
continuous and dummy variables were transformed in means and proportions computed
using the weights or sample expansion factors provided by the IBGE in the data files. By
aggregating data to state level and covering the period between 2004 and 2014 (without
data for 2010), we create a panel data composed by 27 states over 10 years. Note that
data concerning the Labor Inspection only covers the period between 2006 and 2014 and
had missings for some states. Thus, instead of having 210 observations (27 states times
10 years), we ended up with the total of 207. However, the overall panel data is strongly
balanced, even though with few gaps.
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Table 2 presents the mean and standard deviation for variables that are considered
for model specification. Note that the standard deviation is decomposed into between and
within deviations. From this table, we observe that the former is greater than the latter
for all variables. This implies that there is expressive heterogeneity among states.
The rate of child labor among individuals between age 5 and 15 during the period
of 2004 to 2009 and 2011 to 2014 was about 6.29%. As we will illustrate in Section
3.4, this rate reduced significantly during the referred period. As per family variables, an
average Brazilian family is comprised of, on average, 4 members and the level of education
of mothers was approximately 8 years. During this same period, the average per capita
family income was, approximately, R$ 715.
Table 2 – Summary statistics for panel data used for estimation
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
childlabor Percentage rate of child overall 6.29 3.20 0.61 17.11
labor between 2.48 1.12 11.68
within 2.07 1.19 12.67
childeduc Percentage of children and overall 92.24 3.26 80.97 97.60
adolescents between age 5 between 2.39 87.03 95.54
and 15 enrolled in school within 2.25 85.69 98.84
famincome Average family income per overall 714.87 294.80 276.79 1,962.02
capita between 273.90 408.05 1,624.42
within 119.98 291.30 1,052.47
mothereduc Average years of mothers’ overall 7.68 1.15 4.85 10.59
schooling between 0.97 5.77 9.79
within 0.64 6.01 9.02
familysize Number of family members overall 3.88 0.35 3.21 5.16
between 0.32 3.41 4.56
within 0.17 3.40 4.48
PBF Per capita value transferred overall 88.25 68.43 5.41 317.43
by the PBF to states in between 42.94 22.70 159.63
reais (Brazilian currency) within 53.86 −26.72 246.05
inspect Number of Labor Inspec- overall 176 250 1 1,510
tions with focus on child between 136 20 603
labor within -210 413 1083
unemp Unemployment rate among overall 5.89 2.36 1.69 15.06
economically active popula- between 2.20 2.65 12.24
tion within 0.99 1.19 8.71
urban Urbanization rate in percen- overall 80.23 9.32 58.25 98.21
tage between 9.087 63.89 96.78
within 2.63 72.46 85.85
Source: Prepared using data from PNAD.
Note: Number of observations is 270, except for the inspect variable which has 207 observations.
Regarding the childeduc variable, it is quite impressive to observe that about
92% of children between age 5 and 15 were enrolled in school during the period in view10.
10 To construct this variable, we took into account the minimum age for compulsory education and its
respective changes over time.
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The two variables of interest, PBF and inspect, indicate that the average per capita
value transferred by the PBF is about 88 reais and that about 176 work inspections are
conducted all over the states during the period of 2004–2009 and 2011–2014. We also
observe that the unemployment rate during the referred period was at about 6%. It is
quite important to recall that these statistics are only for general insight concerning the
magnitude and scale of variables.
3.3.2 Econometric Procedures
In order to adequately model the macro-level determinants of child labor in Brazil
we adopted a procedurally constructive strategy and present the results in Table 3. Note
that the focus here is on estimates, but on the choice of model which best suits the
objective of this study.
In terms of model specification, the response variable is the rate of child labor,
which is defined based on the specifications of the ILO and the Brazilian Federal Con-
stitution as presented in Chapter 1. Therefore, a child laborer is any individual between
the age of 5 and 15 involved in any labor activity deemed formal or informal, domestic or
non-domestic, temporary or permanent, paid or unpaid labor activities, except in condition
of apprenticeship. This variable is denoted as childlabor.
The group of regressors is composed of the: proportion of children and adolescents
between age 5 and 15 enrolled in school (childeduc); average family income per capita
(famincome); average years of mothers’ schooling (mothereduc); average number of family
members (familysize); per capita value transferred by the PBF program to states (PBF);
number of Labor Inspections with focus on child labor (inspect)11; unemployment rate
among economically active population (unemp); urbanization rate (urban): group dummy
for years to control for time shocks (years), and lastly; control for long-run tendency of
a time series effect of child labor (trend).
The starting point of the modeling exercise was the pooled regression
childlabor𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + x′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 where 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 − 𝛼− 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3.22)
estimated by OLS method alike a cross-sectional model. childlabor𝑖𝑡 is a column vector
of the response variable, x′𝑖𝑡 is a matrix of 𝑁 × 𝐾 regressors which vary over time, 𝑡,
and across state, 𝑖, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term which consists of time-invariant
factors (𝛼𝑖) and time-variant omitted factors (𝜀𝑖𝑡). Similarly to the conventional OLS
model, the Pooled OLS model also assumes exogeneity of regressors, 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|x𝑖𝑡) = 0, con-
ditional homoskedasticity, 𝐸(𝑢2𝑖𝑡|x𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎2, and conditionally uncorrelated observations,
11 Due to unavailability of this focused inspection for years prior to 2006, little adjustments were made
while modeling equations with this variable so as to avoid observation loss for other regressors
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𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝑢𝑗𝑡|x𝑖𝑡 x𝑗𝑡) = 0, where 𝑖 ̸= 𝑗. The violation of the exogeneity assumption leads to
inconsistency of 𝛽 estimates, whereas the violation or relax of the last two assumptions
makes the Pooled OLS model no longer fully efficient.
The results from this initial model is provided in column OLS of Table 3. The
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity on this model provided a valthe OLS model,
all likely unobservable and omitted factors are incorporated with the error term, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, and
are assumed uncorrelated with the regressors. However, in light of the cultural-historical
background of child labor in Brazil presented in Chapter 2, it is important to control for
unobservables in the model. The reason for this is that factors such as cultural, ideological
and social beliefs may sprout innate differences among states (BASU, 1999). Such control
is not possible in the OLS models, so we resort to Fixed and Random Effect models (FE
and RE, respectively). These models admit the presence of a time-invariant component
in the error, thus permitting control of state time-invariant unobservables.
Table 3 – Models from estimation procedures
Response variable: childlabor
OLS RE FE GMM-I
constant 19.80*** 18.97*** 6.577 17.57***
(2.055) (2.959) (4.096) (2.691)
childlabor𝑡−1 0.154**
(0.071)
famincome −1.032*** −0.783** 0.559 −0.448
(0.183) (0.334) (0.670) (0.376)
childeduc −2.689*** −2.068 −0.801 −0.924
(1.011) (1.299) (1.382) (1.353)
familysize −0.817* −0.827 −0.0693 −1.503*
(0.480) (0.821) (0.795) (0.823)
urban −1.596*** −1.701*** −0.615 −1.563**
(0.386) (0.444) (0.707) (0.747)
unemp −0.692*** −0.500*** −0.0485 −0.329**
(0.078) (0.108) (0.144) (0.140)
mothereduc −0.674* −0.983 −2.198 −1.548***
(0.391) (0.607) (1.460) (0.526)
inspect −0.0594*** −0.0579*** −0.0452** −0.0478*
(0.016) (0.020) (0.022) (0.025)
PBF −0.161*** −0.159** −0.254 −0.125**
(0.054) (0.065) (0.159) (0.060)
𝑁 207 207 207 207
𝑅2 0.783 0.536
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively; All variables, both the response varia-
ble and its regressors, are logarithmized; The constant term is the average
effect of state unobservables; 𝑁 is the number of observations.
Despite the FE and RE models account for unobservables, the treatment given
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by both differ. As to the FE model, the unobserved effects, 𝛼𝑖, are eliminated by mean-
differencing, since they are assumed to be time-invariant. Thus Eq. 3.22 is transformed
in
(childlabor𝑖𝑡 − childlabor𝑖) = (x𝑖𝑡 − x¯𝑖)′𝛽 + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡). (3.23)
Compared to the OLS model, the consistency of 𝛽 in the FE model requires a weaker
assumption that 𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝛼𝑖, x𝑖𝑡) = 0. In other words, the time-invariant component, 𝛼𝑖, of
the composite error, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is permitted to correlate with regressors.
An extended version of the FE model was provided in the Stata software, where
Eq. 3.23 is written as follows
(childlabor𝑖𝑡 − childlabor𝑖 + childlabor) = (x𝑖𝑡 − x¯𝑖 + ¯¯x)′𝛽 + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + ¯¯𝜀) (3.24)
whereby ¯¯y, ¯¯x and ¯¯𝜀 are grand mean of y𝑖𝑡, x𝑖𝑡 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡, respectively. The advantage of this
extension is that an intercept estimate and its respective level of significance are provided,
which is the average of unobservables, 𝛼𝑖.
The Random Effect model (RE) is quite similar to the Fixed effect model (FE)
in the sense that it admits and controls 𝛼𝑖. However, in the RE model 𝛼𝑖 is assumed
to be purely random and not permitted to correlate with regressors, i.e, 𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝛼𝑖 x𝑖𝑡) =
𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡|x𝑖𝑡) = 0. The results for both models are presented in columns FE-I and RE-I,
respectively.
To statistically back up the abandon of the pooled OLS model, the F -test and the
Breusch and Pagan Lagrange-multiplier test were carried out. The former tests between
FE model and pooled OLS model, whilst the later tests between the RE model and
pooled OLS model. With a F -test value of 5.62 we reject the null hypothesis of the
nonexistence of unobservable state time-invariant effects, 𝛼𝑖. Likewise, having a value of
?¯?2 = 30.11 for the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange-multiplier test, we reject the hypothesis
that var(𝛼𝑖) ̸= 0. This confirms that it is, indeed, important to control for time-invariant
unobserved factors.
To choose between the FE and RE models, the Hausmann test was performed.
With a test value of 36.52, we reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between re-
gressors and state unobservables. Therefore, the RE model was abandoned for the FE
model.
Ramalho e Mesquita (2013), using 2001–2009 PNAD data to estimate dynamic
panel data models, affirmed the existence of temporal dynamics of child labor rate in
Brazil. However, the models estimated till now do not permit the inclusion of lagged
dependent variable as regressor. Following the steps of these authors, as per the control
for temporal dynamic, we used the System Dynamic Panel-Data Estimator (henceforth,
Chapter 3. Conditional Cash Transfer, Labor Inspection and Child Labor 58
GMM). Thus, our dynamic model of order 1 in childlabor𝑖𝑡 is represented as
childlabor𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1childlabor𝑖,𝑡−1 + x′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇 and |𝛾| < 1 (3.25)
Aside providing consistent estimates for 𝛾1 and 𝛽, the Arellano-Bond estimator
accounts for endogenous regressors. In model 3.25, x𝑖𝑡 can be treated as exogenous or
endogenous. Exogenous regressors are those which are uncorrelated with 𝜀𝑖𝑡, they re-
quire no special treatment and are used as instrument for themselves. As to endogenous
regressors, 𝐸(x𝑖𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑠) ̸= 0 for 𝑠 ≤ 𝑡 and 𝐸(x𝑖𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑠) = 0 for 𝑠 > 𝑡. However, such vari-
ables can be instrumented using their lagged values. Moreover, due the moment condition
that 𝐸(Δy1, 𝑡−1 𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0, the GMM also permits to use Δchildlabor1, 𝑡−1 as instrument
(ARELLANO; BOVER, 1995; BLUNDELL; BOND, 1998). For this essay, we use all pos-
sible lags of endogenous variables as instruments, but we limited lags of the response
variable to the maximum of two. The reason for this is that, according to Cameron e
Trivedi (2010), the use of too many instruments for GMM estimator may cause poor
performance of asymptotic results.
The results obtained from the initial dynamic model are presented in column
GMM-I of Table 3. The variables considered exogenous in this model are unemp, familysize,
mothereduc and urban. The reason for this is that the decision of a child to work does not
determine neither of these variables at state level. On the contrary, the variables which
we consider as endogenous are famincome, gini, childeduc, PBF and inspect.
The famincome variable is suspected to be endogenous based on observation made
by Psacharopoulos (1997) and Basu (1999) that in extremely poor families, children tend
to be sole contributors to households income. In this sense, the endogeneity of the average
per capita family income tends to be high if the child’s income has significant weight in
the family income. Despite the debate concerning the conciliation of work and schooling
by a child, the simultaneous relationship between child labor and child education is in
consensus in literature (BASU, 1999; DESSY; PALLAGE, 2001; RANJAN, 2001; DAS;
DEB, 2006). Therefore, the proportion of enrolled children is potentially endogenous.
However, such endogeneity is reduced if most children conciliate schooling and work as
observed by Kassouf (2002) and Kassouf (2015).
The government variables PBF and inspect are suspected to be highly endogenous.
Specifically, the number of Labor Inspections conducted in a specific region depends on
the number of complaints filed about the use of child labor in the region. Similarly, the
amount of money transferred by the PBF to a certain region depends on the level of poverty
of the region which, in turn, determines the number of children working.
Arellano e Bover (1995) instructed that 𝜀𝑖𝑡 must be serially uncorrelated in order
to obtain consistent estimation of parameters. Formally, Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡 are correlated with Δ𝜀𝑖, 𝑡−1,
because 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝜀𝑖, 𝑡−1 = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖, 𝑡−1, 𝜀𝑖, 𝑡−1 − 𝜀𝑖, 𝑡−2) = −𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖, 𝑡−1, 𝜀𝑖, 𝑡−1) ̸= 0,
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however, Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡 will not correlate with Δ𝜀𝑖, 𝑡−𝑘 for 𝑘 ≥ 2. Loosely speaking, the first-
differenced errors, Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡, are correlated in the AR(1) but not in subsequent orders. The
statistic test that verifies this assumption is the Arellano-Bond test. The null hypothesis of
this test is that there is no autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors. Another test used
to verify if the dynamic panel model is misspecified is the Sargan test of overidentifying
restrictions. It is important to note that this test assumes that errors are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d), thus the Sargan test cannot be run on the heteroskedastic-
robust errors.
The Sagan test of overidentifying restrictions was performed on the GMM-I model
to verify if the instruments are valid. The model is considered overidentified because 189
instruments were used to estimate 10 parameters, hence there were 179 overidentifying
restrictions. Having that the Sargan test assumes strict homogeneity of error, we apply
this test on the regular standard errors of the model. The value of this test was 209.87 with
a 𝑝-value of 0.057, implying that we do not reject the null hypothesis that overidentifying
restrictions are valid at a level of 10%. Note that Arellano e Bond (1991) pointed that the
Sargan test overrejects in the presence of heteroskedasticity. This might be the reason for
the relatively low 𝑝-value, since there is clear evidence of heteroskedasticity as observed
in previous models.
Subsequently, the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced
errors was performed since the GMM estimator requires that 𝜀𝑖𝑡 to be serially uncorrelated.
Therefore, we expect to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation at the first order but
not at higher orders. The test value observed was 𝑧 = −3.57 and p-value 0.004 at first
order and 𝑧 = 0.92 and p-value 0.3557 at second order. Hence, the null hypothesis that
𝐶𝑜𝑣(Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡, Δ𝜀𝑖, 𝑡−𝑘) = 0 is rejected at a level of 1%, i.e, error 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is serially uncorrelated.
At this point, we conclude that the GMM estimator best fits the objective of
this essay. In short, it permits to account for time dynamics, unobservable time-invariant
factors and also to control potential endogeneity caused by the loop of causality between
the child labor rate and its determinants.
Henceforth, the model GMM-I will be regarded as our benchmark model and all
empirical results of this essay will be based on this model and its variations.
3.4 Descriptive Analysis
Brazil has recently been cited as international example in the quest of combating
child labor due to the expressive reduction observed during the last decade. As portrayed
in Fig. 5, the rate of child labor in Brazil presented a downward trend from 2004 to 2013.
Compared to 2004, slight increase of about 0.4 p.p. was observed in year 2005. However,
as from 2005 the rate of child labor plummeted expressively until year 2013. Rumor has
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it that this reduction is, mainly, due to the rise of a bigger welfare state marked by the
launch of the PBF program together with other social programs. Roughly, from 2004 to
2013, the Brazilian government was able to cut the rate of child labor in half.
Figure 5 – Percentage of child labor, 2004 – 2009 and 2011 –2014, Brazil.
Source: Prepared using PNAD data
Notwithstanding the favorable scenario witnessed during the last decade, the pas-
sage from 2013 to 2014 was marked by an abrupt increase of about about 0.9 p.p. in
the rate of child labor. Although studies are yet to point to the potential causes of this
increase, some believe it was simply a temporal fluctuation while others believe it to be
an aftermath of the current economic crises. The latter public opinion seems more con-
vincing since unemployment is on the rise and inflation has made most families to loose
purchasing power, thus leading to the usage of child labor to bolster family income. If
indeed economic crises caused increase of child labor, economic performance has to be
taken into account as potential determinant of child labor.
Urban-Rural Differences
In spite of the reduction of the child labor rate, Brazilian child labor experts point
to a new challenge, which is that of the reduced intensity of the reduction of child labor.
This novel scenario can be clearly observed in Fig. 6, which decomposes the rate of child
labor in rural and urban areas. The first observation from this figure is the preeminence
of the rate of child labor in the rural areas compared to the urban areas. Comparatively,
the rate of child labor in rural areas was about four times the rate in urban areas in 2004
and about three and half times in 2014. Such preeminence may be explained, partly, by
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Figure 6 – Percentage of child labor rate classified by rural and urban areas, 2004 – 2009
and 2011 – 2014, Brazil.
Source: Prepared using PNAD data
the level of poverty, dominance of agricultural activities and difficulty of inspection in the
rural areas.
Aside comparative proportions of both areas, a more curious observation is the
evolution of these proportions. Ignoring the recent chock, one clearly observes that the
rate of child labor in the rural area reduced more sharply compared to that of the urban
areas. This perception induces to conclude that the expressive reduction of child labor rate
in Brazil is driven, mainly, by the reduction observed in the rural areas. This perception
is supported by the coincidence of acute increase observed for rural areas and Brazil as a
whole, but not for urban areas.
In light of this observation, the following precipitant question prompts: is the
passiveness of the child labor rate, especially, in the urban areas related to what Brazilian
child labor experts and the ILO refer to as the ‘hard core’ (núcleo duro, in Portuguese)
of child labor? In order to answer this question such core has to be defined.
According to CONAETI (2011)12 and Rosado e Luciana (2014)13, the ‘hard core’
of child labor is a state of the problem where its eradication becomes more difficult, and
demands new strategic actions. In other words, at this state the set objective to eliminate
all forms of child labor until 2020 becomes more challenging. These reports also made
clear that this state becomes more evident in the worst forms of child labor such as those
observed in family agriculture, urban informal sector, illegal activities and domestic child
12 National plan of the prevention and elimination of child labor and protection of adolescent worker.
13 Final report of the parliamentary commission for inquiry concerning child labor.
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labor.
Poverty
In order to verify the extent at which poverty really explains child labor, Fig
7 and 8 present the classification of child laborers by their monthly family income per
capita for year 2004 and 201414. It is noteworthy to emphasize that the analysis of these
proportions is exclusively concerning child laborers and not comparative to non-child
laborers. Moreover, the class intervals were strategical chosen to account for the extreme
poverty lines (R$ 69 and R$ 77 per capita for year 2004 and 2014, respectively), poverty
lines (R$ 137 and R$ 154 per capita for year 2004 and 2014, respectively) and minimum
wage levels (R$ 260 and R$ 745 for 2004 and 2014, respectively). These same poverty
and extreme poverty lines were used to stipulate the eligibility of families in the PBF
conditional cash transfer program in both years. Having that the major objective here is
to verify the relationship between family income levels and the incidence of child labor,
the few cases of negative net family income were ignored15.
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Figure 7 – Percentage of child labor by average family income, 2004 and 2014, Brazil.
Source: Prepared using PNAD data.
Note: Income of children and adolescents were deducted from total family income.
14 Note that the average family income presented does not include children’s income. Thus only adults’
income and legal income of adolescents in apprenticeship were considered.
15 There were only cases of negative net family income for families without working adults or for cases
in which childrens’ income exceeds total income of adults from the same family, however, such cases
were few.
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For year 2004, we observe that about 35% of child laborers were from extremely
poor families, while about 27% were from poor families. In other words, about 62% of
child laborers were from families below the poverty line. Moreover, it is observable that the
proportion of child laborers from families with average family income per capita between
the poverty line and the minimum wage is lower compared to anterior class interval.
Taking into account the relative amplitude of each class interval, one can deduce that the
proportion of child laborers reduced as the family income per capita increases. Therefore,
our overall conclusion is that the distribution of child labor by family income levels is
skewed right, thus, the positive relationship between family poverty and child labor is
more evident.
An overview of the same exercise for year 2014 prompts curiosity, especially con-
cerning the distribution which seems normal and not skewed right as observed for year
2004. Specifically, in year 2014, only about 6% of child laborers were from extremely
poor families, while about 13% were from poor families. Cumulatively, only about 19%
were from families below the poverty line. It is, however, reasonable to imagine that this
poverty line is very low, so we double the poverty line (value of R$ 308). Still, more than
half of the child laborers (about 55%) were not from poor families in 2014. Amplifying
the poverty line further, we assumed that each member of the family (including adults
and children) earns the minimum wage (value of R$ 742). Yet, almost 20% of the child
laborers continue working. At this extent, the underestimation of the poverty line, bet-
ter still, the financial capacity of the family to cover subsistence consumption is not the
question. Thus, the relationship between poverty and child labor in Brazil might truly be
getting weaker as showed in Table 1 and as argued in the report published by Repórter
Brasil (2013). Moreover, such persistence may also be due to the culture of child labor
presented in Chapter 2.
Such a change in the profile of child laborers from 2004 to 2014 may have severe
implications on the effectiveness of government social programs to reduce child labor. The
PBF, for example, has its coverage highly limited concerning child labor in 2014 since only
poor and extremely poor families can participate. Nevertheless, we must recognize that
reduction of child labor is not the primary objective of the program. Although not our
focus here, it is worthwhile to remind that the PETI program attends families above the
poverty line. However, we believe that the value transferred to families in this program is
too low to attract participation since such families are not poor and children are offered
higher values in the informal labor market, even though subjected to unfair working
conditions.
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Figure 8 – Percentage of child labor by average family income, 2004 and 2014, Brazil.
Source: Prepared using PNAD data.
Note: Income of children and adolescents were deducted from total family income.
Sectoral Distribution
Fig. 9 illustrates the sectoral distribution of child labor in 2004 and 2014. The
economic sectors considered comprise activities regarding agriculture, industry, construc-
tion, trade and repair and services. We intentionally separated domestic services from
other services to pay focal attention. In accordance with most national and international
studies, it is perceptible that the agricultural sector is the major employer of child labor.
However, the participation of the agricultural sector reduced significantly over time.
Specifically, in 2004 about 53.3% of the child laborers were working in the agri-
cultural sector, while in 2014 this proportion reduced to 46.5%. The trade and repair
sector, which is second to agriculture, was responsible for the employment of 18.1% of the
child laborers in 2004 and 19.8% in 2014. The rate of child labor in the service sector is
quite similar to that of the trade sector. However, separate analysis of domestic services
show that a expressive portion of the children in the service sector are domestic workers.
The sector with the least employment of children and adolescents, in both years, was the
industrial sector.
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Figure 10 – Sectoral distribution of non-poor child laborers, 2014, Brazil.
Source: Prepared using PNAD data
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Figure 9 – Sectoral distribution of child labor, 2004, Brazil.
Source: Prepared using PNAD data
For the sake of inquisitiveness, Fig. 10 presents the sectoral distribution of child
labor considering those from families with average family income above the minimum
wage.
It is perceptible that these specific child laborers, who do not fit in the conventional
poverty doctrine, have peculiarities in the sense that they have certain preference for the
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service and trade sectors in both years. It is also interesting to observe that about 22% of
these children work in domestic activities in 2004, whereas this proportion was reduced to
5% in 2014. This may indicate, intuitively, that these children developed lesser preference
for domestic activities, which are generally not remunerated, and higher preference for
other activities, which are generally remunerated. If true, compared to 2004, children from
non-poor families preferred to work outside their homes in 2014. This should be alarming
to Brazilian child labor experts in the sense that these children are leaving relatively non-
hazardous activities to those which are, in most cases, time consuming and stressful16.
Spatial Distribution
Fig. 11 and 12 illustrate the spatial distribution of child labor in Brazil in 2004 and
2014, respectively. As presented earlier, the percentage of child labor reduced significantly
in Brazil as a whole during the referred period. However, this tendency was not observed
in all state.
First, one clearly observes the concentration of higher rates in the Northern and
Northeast compared to other regions. This is partly justifiable by the socioeconomic char-
acteristics of these regions in terms of poverty level, urbanization rate and preeminence of
the agricultural sector. Comparing the map of year 2004 to that of 2014, one perceives a
slight homogenization of the rates of child labor in 2014. Comparison of the rates indicates
that such homogenization is due to higher reduction of child labor in the Northern and
Northeast regions, and lower reduction in the Southern and Southeast regions.
The states with the highest rates of child labor in 2004, in reducing ranking order,
were: Piauí, Rondônia, Maranhão and Pará. In the same year, the lowest rates were
observed for (in increasing ranking order): the Federal District, Rio de Janeiro, Amapá and
São Paulo. Analogously for the year 2014, the states of Piauí, Pará, Acre and Maranhão
had the highest ranks, while the states of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Amapá and the
Federal District had the lowest rates. A more interesting observation is the evolution of
these rates. Impressively, the sates of Pernambuco, Alagoas, Rondônia and Ceará were
able to drastically reduce the rate of child labor from 2004 to 2014. The most alarming
observation during this period was the increase of 25.1% in the state of Sergipe and of
124% in the Federal District.
Still, the comparison of the values from both periods buttresses the observation
illustrated in Fig. 6 regarding the higher responsiveness of child labor in less developed
regions (North and Northeast) to reductions along time compared to relatively developed
regions (South and Southeast). Such responsiveness also supports the observation made
in the report published by Repórter Brasil (2013) that despite child labor in urban areas
16 This is only true if the assumption that domestic activities in relatively non-poor families are less
time occupying and stressful.
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Figure 11 – Percentage of child labor, 2004, Brazil.
Source: Prepared using PNAD data.
Note: M denotes mean of child labor rate within interval.
being more visible it is the most difficult to eradicate. According to this report, this is
because the Brazilian urban society passively accepts child labor in cases such as that of
children who sell candies in traffic, those who help in carrying luggage in market fairs and
even those involved in street performances or display.
Bolsa Família
Shifting to governmental policies to reduce child labor. As presented in Section
3.2, some of the primary measures adopted by the Brazilian government to reduce child
labor are the PBF program and the Labor Inspection with focus on child labor. Inasmuch
as we focus our analysis on maps, exact values are presented in Table 4.
Fig. 1317 illustrates the geographic distribution of the PBF benefit among states in
2004 and 2014. Specifically, the number of families attended by the program is represented
17 These maps are not labeled in order not to pollute the figures. For identification of the Brazilian
states refer to Fig. 11 or 12.
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Figure 12 – Percentage of child labor, 2014, Brazil.
Source: Prepared using PNAD data.
Note: M denotes mean of child labor rate within interval.
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Figure 13 – Rate of child labor and the number of families covered by the PBF program, 2004 and 2014, Brazil.
Source: Prepared using PNAD and the Ministry of Social Development (MDE) data
Note: M denotes mean of child labor rate within respective interval.
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by the size of the spheres positioned on the maps of each state. The initial observation
from Fig. 13a and 13b is that of similar allocation of the PBF benefits in 2004 and 2014.
Generally, we observe concentration in the Northeast and Southeast regions.
Comparing with child labor rate, a clear positive correlation is observable between
the color density of the map and the size of the spheres. However, this correlation does not
accompany significant changes in child labor rate from 2004 to 2014. Take for example,
the state of Acre that has one of the highest rates of child labor but participate modestly
in the program, compared to São Paulo which has the lowest rate of child labor but is one
the most privileged by the PBF program. Moreover, it is notable that the rate of child
labor and the coverage of the PBF program went on different directions in the state of
Sergipe and in the Federal District. Based on these maps, it is perceptible that the main
objective of the program is quite distant from directly reducing child labor. However, one
can not be too demanding since the program only combats child labor though one of its
conditionalities.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the PBF program only attends families with average
income per capita below the poverty line, giving priority to extremely poor families.
Now recall that in Fig. 7 and 8, we observed that about 62% of the child laborers were
from families below the poverty line in 2004, whereas only about 19% fell into the same
classification in 2014 . Thus, according to the poverty conditionality stipulated by the
PBF program, about 31% and 81% of child laborers were not eligible to participate in
the cash transfer program in 2004 and 2014, respectively.
At this point, it becomes unsurprising why empirical studies hardly find effective-
ness of the program on child labor, especially for recent years (see Araujo et al. (2010),
Cacciamali et al. (2010), Nascimento (2013)).
Labor Inspection
Fig. 14 and 15 present the geographical distribution of the number of Labor Inspec-
tions conducted with focus on child labor and the number of children who were effectively
withdrawn from work in 2007 and 2014. Therefore, in each figure there are two subfigures
– one for Labor Inspection coverage and the other for its effectiveness in reducing child
labor. We recognize that, according to ILO/SIT (2010), the effectiveness of the Labor
Inspection should not be exclusively measured by the number of children withdrawn,
but also take into account the awareness-raising activities. However, the effect of such
activities is contrafactual.
Even though the Labor Inspection activities were conducted in all state, in Fig. 14,
one observes concentration in specific states. Similarly to the PBF program, we note from
map (a) that the allocation of inspection activities does not really corresponds to the rate
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Figure 14 – Rate of child labor, number of Labor Inspections and number of children withdrew from work, 2007, Brazil.
Source: Prepared using PNAD and Information System of Child Labor (SITI) data.
Note: M denotes mean of child labor rate within respective interval.
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of child labor in states. In 2007, the states of Piauí and Maranhão had the highest rates
of child labor, but were ranked in the 20th and 18th positions concerning the number
of conducted inspections. Moreover, the states of Ceará, Mato Grosso do Sul and Minas
Gerais are first, second and third, respectively, as to the number of conducted inspection
but are 5th 17th and 18th, respectively, as to the highest rate of child labor. In fact,
one can observe that the highest rates of child labor are concentrated in the Northeast
region and the lowest are observed in the Midwest and Southeast regions. However, the
Northeast region is less privileged than the Midwest and Southeast regions concerning
inspection allocation. In these cases, the distribution of the number of Labor Inspections
among states is paradoxical since the major objective of the inspection activities is to
reduce child labor.
In order to understand this paradoxical distribution one has to consider the fea-
tures of the conducted inspections, the actual objectives of the program and its proper
articulation with legal apparatus. Firstly, it is important to recall that the Labor Inspec-
tion depends on the reported complaints in the region. However, this does not justify the
paradoxical distribution since the complaints are only part of what guides the planning
process. Still on features, it is worthwhile to note that the inspectors basically visit busi-
nesses and workplaces, overlooking child labor outside organized establishments. Take for
example children who work as street vendors, in family agriculture, in informal urban
activities or as domestic workers or housekeepers. These types of child labor, which ba-
sically comprises the so-called ‘hard core’ of child labor, are hardly reached. Specifically,
as child labor in the Northeast regions are more concentrated in family agriculture and
domestic services, which are not accessible by inspectors, inspection activities tend to be
concentrated in other regions where child labor is visible and accessible.
A dilemma is faced concerning the objective of the Labor Inspection: focus on
child laborers in regions where the incidence is higher but invisible or on child laborers
regions where the incidence is relatively low but visible. Although these alternatives are
not mutually exclusive, they may end up concentrating Labor Inspection. The proper
articulation of the Labor Inspection and legal apparatus determines the accessibility of
inspectors in certain forms of child labor. According to the report published by Repórter
Brasil (2013), the Brazilian constitutional right of inviolability of homes without judicial
authorization inhibits effective access of inspectors in family environments, thus, impeding
withdrawal of child laborers from family agriculture or domestic activities.
In terms of the effect of Labor Inspection on child labor, it is notable in Fig.
14b that greater number of children were withdrawn from work in the Northeast region
compared to the Midwest and Southeast regions. For instance, the state of Maranhão,
which had the highest rate of child labor in 2007 and was ranked in the 18th position on
the inspection’s priority list, had the second highest number of children withdrawn from
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work. Conversely, the states of Mato Grosso do Sul and Minas Gerais, which had lower
child labor rates but were highly prioritized for inspection were not even on the top list
of states which reduced child labor as a result of inspections.
In Fig. 15, the first observation is that of generalized increase in the number of
inspection activities in 2014. It is vivid that the number of Labor Inspections increased
more in the Midwest, Southeast and Southern regions compared to others. Still, in 2014,
none of the states with the highest rate of child labor, except Pernambuco, was prioritized
on the inspection allocation list. In other words, the negative correlation between the rate
of child labor and the number of inspection activities, which was observed in 2007 persisted
in 2014. However, we note that that despite the concentration of Labor Inspections in the
Southern and Southeast regions, the Labor Inspection continued more effective in reducing
child labor in the Northeast region.
Compared to the PBF program, we believe that the Labor Inspection with focus
on child labor has greater potential in reducing child labor. This is because the later
pays special attention on child laborers and not merely on poor people. In addition, apart
from withdrawing children from work and giving them adequate assistance, the Labor
Inspection conducts preventive actions against child labor through awareness creation of
the consequences of child labor. However, the Labor Inspection still faces limits due to
the features of its activities and the accessibility of inspectors in certain forms of child
labor.
3.5 Analysis of Empirical Results
The hypothesis which we analyze in this section is that Bolsa Família cash transfer
program and the Labor Inspection activities contribute to reduce child labor rate in Brazil.
To reach this objective, as detailed in Section 3.3, we opted for dynamic panel models
which permitted to control the endogeneity of both governmental countermeasures.
In table 5, we present the benchmark model (GMM-I) from section 3.3.2 and two
variations of itself. In model GMM-II, we included lagged values of the main variables
of interest, PBF and insect, to verify if the effect of both governmental countermeasures
transcends to subsequent periods. In the GMM-III model, we control for time shocks by
including dummies for years (years) so as to isolate the effect of regressors from fixed
effect of time in the rates of child labor. We statistically verified the importance of such
control by performing the Wald test for composite linear hypothesis. Having a test value
of 44.25, we reject the null that all years coefficients are jointly equal to zero, therefore
control for time fixed effects is necessary. Analogously, we tested the need to control for
long-run tendency of time series (trend). The test value was 10.73, thus, such control
is statistically important. Nevertheless, we proceed with empirical analysis by comparing
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Figure 15 – Rate of child labor, number of Labor Inspections and number of children withdrew from work, 2014, Brazil.
Source: Prepared using PNAD and Information System of Child Labor (SITI) data.
Note: M denotes mean of child labor rate within respective interval.
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results from this model with those from the benchmark model so as to emphasize the
importance of such controls.
From the benchmark model, which has no control for time shocks and lagged
values of the major variables of interest, PBF and inspect, we found empirical evidence
which points that both governmental countermeasures contributed to reduce child labor.
However, with these additional controls in model GMM-III, we notice that the effect
found for theses variables turned not to be statistically significant. Similar observation
were made for the controls for familysize and mothereduc. Thus, conclusion is drawn
that in light of temporal shocks and long-run tendency of time series there is no clear-cut
empirical evidence concerning the effect of neither the Bolsa Família conditional cash
transfer program nor the Labor Inspection activities.
Similar results have been found in literature concerning the effect of conditional
cash transfers in Brazil. For example, Cardoso e Souza (2004) and Ferro e Kassouf (2005)
found no empirical effect of the Bolsa Escola program in reducing child labor, but found
evidence concerning its effect on school attendance. Similarly, Aquino et al. (2010) and
Do Nascimento et al. (2016) found no effect of the participation in the PBF program
on the probability of children to work or not. However, the latter authors found that
the sum transferred to families reduced the child labor, likewise working hours. Lastly,
using the same estimation method as that which we used in this essay, (RAMALHO;
MESQUITA, 2013) also found no significant effect of the PBF. Nevertheless, we still
argue that these authors omitted relevant controls and also did no treat the endogeneity
of the PBF program.
It is important to recall that the main objective of the program is poverty and not
child labor and also that the program has limitations concerning the coverage of child
laborers. As noted in Fig. 7 and 8 of the descriptive analysis presented in Section 3.4,
the domain of the PBF program is considerably limited concerning child labor since it
only focuses on families below the poverty line. Therefore, having that majority of child
laborers were above this line as at 2014, our results were not shocking.
As per Labor Inspection, we acknowledge that Almeida (2015) provided the first
empirical evidence concerning the effect of inspection activities in reducing child labor.
However, our results do not provide sufficient empirical evidence to support this hypoth-
esis. Notwithstanding, we believe that the number of inspectors and inspection activities
are still modest to account for the scale of child labor in Brazil.
Nevertheless, as suggested by ILO/SIT (2010), we do not limit our definition of ef-
ficiency to the outcomes and impacts of the Labor Inspection activities, but also recognize
its unobservable impacts on child labor. Specifically, the Labor Inspection aims to reduce
child labor through four channels: a) awareness creation, which prevents child labor in the
first place; b) inspection which, directly reduces child labor; c) render of social assistance
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Table 5 – Results from benchmark models
Response variable: childlabor
GMM-I GMM-II GMM-III
constant 17.57*** 14.65*** 7.281
(2.691) (3.094) (4.435)
childlabor𝑡−1 0.154** 0.222** 0.231**
(0.071) (0.090) (0.094)
famincome −0.448 −0.409 0.526
(0.376) (0.378) (0.568)
childeduc −0.924 −1.920 −1.784
(1.353) (1.572) (2.934)
familysize −1.503* −1.200* −1.224
(0.823) (0.664) (0.775)
urban −1.563** −1.224* −1.223*
(0.747) (0.654) (0.669)
unemp −0.329** −0.288* −0.357**
(0.140) (0.162) (0.157)
mothereduc −1.548*** −1.378* −1.360
(0.526) (0.750) (0.836)
inspect −0.0478* −0.0371 −0.0254
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027)
inspect𝑡−1 −0.0290 −0.000444
(0.030) (0.030)
PBF −0.125** −0.627* 0.229
(0.060) (0.343) (0.398)
PBF𝑡−1 0.578* 0.236
(0.322) (0.359)
year2007 −0.0754
(0.071)
year2008 −0.133
(0.070)
year2009 −0.102
(0.112)
year2011 −0.188*
(0.098)
year2012 −0.332***
(0.073)
year2013 −0.335***
(0.076)
trend −0.149***
(0.046)
𝑁 207 178 178
Note: Robust errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote signi
ficance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively; All variables, both
both the response variable and its regressors, are logarithmized;
The constant term is the average effect of state; 𝑁 denotes the
number of observations.
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to withdrawn children, which prevent them to return to work and; d) fining of exploiters,
which serves as penal measure to caught firms and warning to others.
According to numerous studies (See Kassouf (2002), Hilowitz et al. (2004b), Inaiá
(2008), Aquino et al. (2010), Kassouf e Justus (2010), Marin et al. (2012) and ILO (2013),
among many others), the level of urbanization plays a very important role in the deter-
mination of the rate of child labor. Specifically, evidence shows that most child laborers
are found in the rural area, especially in the agricultural sector. The incidence of child
labor is higher in rural areas mainly because of fewer inspections, high incidence of family
agriculture and higher level of poverty compared to urban areas. The importance of this
variable is reflected in the magnitude of its estimate. The coefficient indicates that the
rate of child labor reduces in, approximately, 1.2% for every increase of 1% urbanization
rate.
According to Inaiá (2008) and Marin et al. (2012), child labor in the rural area
tends to be more hazardous because they involve the most invisible forms of child labor
and are less passive of reduction through inspection, especially in family agriculture and
domestic services. Marin et al. (2012) also affirmed that child labor is higher in many
Brazilian rural regions because it is not considered as exploit, but as assistance, means
of socialization and heir training. Note that, in such cases, child labor is not necessarily
caused by poverty, but by a category of social norm which is referred to as filial interactions
by López-Calva et al. (2002). Repórter Brasil (2013) concurs with Inaiá (2008) and Marin
et al. (2012) regarding this, but added that child labor in the urban area is more visible,
however the most difficult to eliminate.
Basu e Van (1998) and Galli (2001) theoretically demonstrated that child labor is
positively related to adult unemployment in the sense that it reduces the level of family
income and, thus, may lead such household to send children to work. However, such re-
lationship depends on the labor market structure and the degree of substitution between
adult and child labor. In the case of an oligopsonic adult labor market, such relationship
is observed, but Basu e Van (1998) informed that the relationship between adult wage
and child labor may be ambiguous in a competitive labor market. Similarly, Galli (2001)
pointed out that if child labor and unskilled adult labor are substitutes, a exogenous
increase in child labor supply can lead to the increase in adult unemployment. The esti-
mate found for unemp indicates a negative relationship between the rate of child labor and
adult unemployment, thus, not corroborating the theoretical relationship pointed by Galli
(2001). However, the coefficient observed goes in line with the evidence in Duryea et al.
(2007) for children between the age 10 and 14. A possible cause for this is that the unemp
variable captured the effect of economic progress. In this way, one can interpret that the
reduction of economic progress led to both adult and child unemployment. Nevertheless,
we suggest further investigation of the effect of the effect of adult unemployment on child
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labor.
Finally, our results corroborate that found by Ramalho e Mesquita (2013) regard-
ing the existence of temporal dependence of the rate of child labor, 𝛾. Specifically, we
observed a positive value of about 0.23. Similarly, these authors observed a positive sign
and a value of about 0.29. In other words, despite the divergence of our model specifica-
tion from that of these authors, we both conclude that the rate of child labor is dependent
on itself over time. In light of the possibility of spill-over effect of child labor from one
period to the other, in the next essay we address the persistence of such dependence over
generations of the same family.
80
4 Intergenerational Persistence of Child La-
bor
Early theoretical studies pointed to the probability of child labor to
perpetuate itself among generations of the same family through forgone
education. Recent empirical studies do not reject this hypothesis, thus,
affirming that children from parents who were child laborers are more
likely to start working at early age. Despite significantly contributing
to literature, no empirical evidence was provided concerning the tipping
point at which the vicious cycle of child labor may turn virtual. In this
essay, we test the hypothesis that such cycle may be reverted if the
minimum age for work is increased. To pursue this objective, we used a
pooled sample from 2004 to 2014 PNAD data to estimate probit models.
Aside reaffirming the existence of intergenerational persistence of child
labor, we found that the tipping point of the child labor cycle is observed
if the minimum age for work is increased.
One of the conclusions made in the previous essay of this dissertation is that of
the existence of inertia or temporal dependence of child labor rate in Brazil. In light of
such evidence, this essay discusses a socioeconomic consequence of the maintenance of
such dependence in the long run, that is, test for intergenerational persistence of child
labor.
There is consensus in literature that poverty can perpetuate itself over family
generations, especially, thorough education, igniting a poverty cycle. Having that poverty
is a potential motivator of the supply of child labor, it likely that the cycles of both
are also correlated. In order words, parents who forwent education due to work during
childhood are bound to earn lower income when adult (JUSTUS et al., 2015) and, thus,
remain poor. Moreover, poverty situation may drive such parents to send their children
to work in order to support family income to reach subsistence level (BASU; VAN, 1998).
As a result, such children may reinstate the same cycle faced by their parent, igniting the
child labor and poverty cycle. However, it is important to note that such relationship is
most likely to hold, on the one hand, if work and education are mutually exclusive choices
– which is not always true (KASSOUF, 2015). On the other hand, if work reduces the
quality of acquired human capital compared to that required in the labor market.
The existence of intergenerational persistence of child labor and poverty was sus-
pected and emphasized by Alfred Marshall in the XIX century. Thereafter, Basu (1999)
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Figure 16 – Percentage of trapped and untrapped children in the vicious cycle of child
labor
Source: Prepared using 2004-2009 and 2011-2011 PNAD data.
proposed a theoretical model which indicated how poverty cycle can trigger a vicious cycle
of child labor through forgone education. This author connoted such relationship as the
child labor trap and referred to the point at which such vicious cycle becomes virtuous as
the tipping point. Subsequently, Emerson e Souza (2003) extended this model and, using
cross-sectional analysis of Brazilian data, provided empirical evidence that parents who
were child laborers are more likely to send their children to work compared to parents
who were not child laborers. In line with these authors, Aquino et al. (2010) empirically
pursued similar objective, although exploiting differences of such trap between urban and
rural areas of Brazil.
Comparing the findings of both empirical studies, one is led to infer that there is,
indeed, the risk of child labor trap in Brazil. Unlike these previous studies which presented
a static analysis, here in Fig. 16, we illustrate how this trap evolved over time. Moreover,
this figure presents not only the trapped children – those who work and have parents
who were child laborers – unlike previous studies, but also spotlights untrapped children
– those who work but whose parents were not child laborers.
Firstly, we focus on the trapped children. Fortunately enough, the incidence of
intergenerational perpetuated child labor reduced expressively during the period between
2004 and 2014. This indicates that parents who were child laborers are being able to break
the vicious cycle of child labor due to the general reduction of poverty, increased access to
education, easier access to credit facilities and greater awareness of the negative impact of
child labor. Aside the continuous and systematic reduction of the proportion of trapped
children, especially between year 2005 and 2013, abrupt increase was observed from year
2004 to 2005 and from year 2013 to 2014. Therefore, we consider that it is important to
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control for time shocks.
Surprisingly, the untrapped children, who should not be working in the first place
according to conventional theories, seemed not to be highly affected by these socioeco-
nomic betterment. Recalling Basu (1999) and Emerson e Souza (2003), forgone education
for the sake of work during childhood as a result of poverty is what feeds the vicious cycle.
If this argument holds, parents who were not child laborers should be better off during
adulthood and should send not children to work.
Unlike in trapped children, the evolution of the proportion of those untrapped
seems to be less responsive to reductions over time. This proportion was clearly stagnant
during the period of 2004 and 2007, and only slight fluctuations1 were observed in sub-
sequent years. Notwithstanding, reduction was observed in 2011 compared to previous
years. However, as from the year 2011, these proportion becomes relatively stagnant once
again. It is also worthwhile to note that not even the abrupt increase observed in 2014
was able to cause expressively increase in the proportion of untrapped children. These
observations call for attention on these specific child laborers. However, our focus here is
on trapped children.
Despite the contributions of Emerson e Souza (2003) and Aquino et al. (2010),
we observe that no information was provided concerning the possibility of reverting the
vicious cycle of child labor. Therefore, in this essay, we seek to enrich this topic in the
following ways: a) analyze the existence of intergenerational persistence of child labor
controlling time shocks between year 2004 and 2004; b) indicate the intensity of the
vicious cycle according to the age group at which parents entered the labor market; and
c) point the minimum age for work, which reverts the vicious cycle, thus, contributing to
the debate concerning the best minimum age for employment in Brazil.
In a recent studies, Kassouf (2015) showed that the proportion of children and
adolescents who conciliate work and study increased in Brazil over time. Therefore, we
assume that work and study are not mutually exclusive choices and that child labor affects
the quality of human capital acquired, mainly, due to shortage of time for rest, play, study
and assimilation of academic knowledge. The hypothesis alleged to north this study is that
the vicious cycle may be reverted if the minimum age for employment is increased to, at
least, a level at which the human capital acquired through education is sufficient to secure
a better paid work to meet family’s financial needs.
This essay is divided in four sections. In Section 4.1 and 4.2 we provide the the-
oretical and empirical studies, respectively, that support the alleged hypothesis and give
insights concerning results to be expected during empirical exercises. Section 4.3 presents
the empirical strategy used and empirical results are provided in Section 4.4.
1 Remember that PNAD was not carried out in 2010.
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4.1 Theoretical Background
In terms of dynamics concerning child labor, few are those who consider its long-
run consequences. One of the first remarkable and documented perception concerning the
existence of intergenerationl persistence of child labor is that of Alfred Marshall in 1985.
In the authors words:
“But the point on which we have specially to insist now is that this evil
is cumulative. The worse fed are the children of one generation, the less
will they earn when they grow up, and the less will be their power of
providing adequately for the material wants of their children; and so on
to following generations. And again, the less fully their own faculties are
developed, the less will they realize the importance of developing the best
faculties of their children, and the less will be their power of doing so.
And conversely any change that awards to the workers of one generation
better earnings, together with better opportunities of developing their
best qualities, will increase the material and moral advantages which
they have the power to offer to their children.” (MARSHALL, 1895)
It is clear that Marshall (1895) was more concerned about the cycle of poverty
driven by the faculty or human capital of children from a certain generation. However,
one can easily deduce that given the high demand and deregulation of child labor in the
XIX century during the industrial revolution, the cycle of poverty was followed by the cycle
of child labor. Aside pointing to the existence of this vicious cycle, Marshall (1895) also
suggested its reversion through better labor market conditions, which permits parents to
propitiate better living conditions and education to children. Admitting that work during
childhood jeopardizes human capital accumulation of children which, in the future, tends
to limit their future productivity and in turn perpetuate poverty, Basu (1999) developed
the theoretical model of child labor trap.
The author considers an overlapping generation model with two periods. In the
first period the individual is a child and lives with his parents and in the second period,
the same individual is parent and has a child. In this model, work and study (proxy for
source of human capital) were considered mutually exclusive choices. In a day, a child is
considered to spend fraction 𝑒 of his time at work and 1−𝑒 ≡ ℎ in school. Supposing that
the level of adult human capital depends on the amount of time spent in school during
childhood, the total labor unit of an adult, 𝐿𝑡, is given by
𝐿𝑡 = 𝐿(ℎ𝑡−1), 𝐿′ > 0, 𝐿′′ < 0 (4.1)
Thus the wage of one unit of adult labor in a labor market with perfectly inelastic demand
is given by
𝑉 𝐿(1− 𝑒𝑡−1) ≡ 𝑊𝑡 (4.2)
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Figure 17 – Child labor trap.
Source: Basu (1999)
It was also assumed that there is a certain level of wage,
¯
𝑊 , below which parent send a
child to full time work (𝑒 = 1) and a level of income, ?¯? , above which children are sent to
school (𝑒 = 0). Assuming the substitution axiom, one can write 𝑒 as a function of parent’s
wage, thusly
𝑒𝑡 ≡ 𝑒𝑡 = 𝑒(𝑊𝑡) ≡ 𝑒(𝑉 𝐿(1− 𝑒𝑡−1)) ≡ 𝑒𝑡 = Φ(𝑒𝑡−1) (4.3)
where Φ is upward sloping and bounded at 𝑒(𝑉 𝐿(0)) = 𝑒(𝑉 ). For convenience, the author
considered that Φ intersects a 45∘ line illustrated in Fig. 17. Similarly to the model
presented by Basu e Van (1998), this dynamic model points out two stable equilibria
(point 0 and 𝐸) and one unstable equilibrium. At point E parent send its child to work
full-time. Such child acquires no human capital (through education) and continues poor
when adult and, therefore, has to send its child to work. In other words, the equilibrium
point 𝐸 depicts the child labor trap. On the other way round, the child is sent to school
on the equilibrium point 0. In this case, such child turns adult, earn adequately and, thus,
faces a virtuous cycle.
In the case of child labor trap, Basu (1999) suggested government intervention in
order to reverse the cycle of either poverty or child labor. The author also claimed that
if there is large effort to educate a certain generation, the economy will reach a “tipping
point” at which the vicious cycle turns virtuous. However, the sum of investment required
for this effort may turn such intervention unrealistic, especially in developing countries. In
this sense, the author points that the availability of credit to poor families or study loan
may incentive poor parents to enroll children in school and not send to work. Regarding
the effect of credit availability to poor families, Ranjan (2001) and Das e Deb (2006),
based on theoretical frameworks concur that the incidence of child labor can be reduced
Chapter 4. Intergenerational Persistence of Child Labor 85
by credit-related policies. However, Das e Deb (2006) emphasizes that such policies only
have effect in the long run.
Emerson e Souza (2003) contributed to the theoretical model presented by Basu
(1999) providing a similar theoretical model and an example of how intergenerational per-
sistence of child labor may emerge using the Cobb-Douglas utility function. Upholding the
assumptions made in Basu (1999) regarding parent’s altruism, family composition, lux-
ury and substitution axiom, credit constrains and human capital accumulation, Emerson
e Souza (2003) was able to illustrate how the trap may be generated. Additional assump-
tion was made that families with little education need children’s contribution through
work compared to richer families. With this, parents have to make the decision to send
children to work or not in each period. The utility function of such family is given as
𝑈𝑡 = 𝑈(𝑐𝑡, ℎ𝑡+1) (4.4)
where 𝑐𝑡 and ℎ𝑡+1 denote family total consumption and child’s acquired human capital,
respectively. Here, it is clear that the family cares about the future human capital of the
child, which is accumulated in the present through education. Having the human capital
assumption, parent’s and child’s income is given as 𝑤𝑎𝑡 = ℎ𝑡 and 𝑤𝑐𝑡 = 1− 𝑒𝑡, respectively,
where 𝑒𝑡 is the amount of time that a child spends in school. Thus, family income is given
by 𝑊𝑡 = 𝑤𝑎𝑐 + 𝑤𝑐𝑡 , which is subjected to meet the budget constraint of 𝑐𝑡 ≤ 𝑊𝑡.
Supposing that all individuals have the innate level of human capital of 1 which
becomes greater due to education, children and uneducated adults have 1 unit of human
capital and, therefore, earn the same in the labor market. This can be formally represented
by
ℎ𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑒𝑡) where 𝑓(0) = 1, 𝑓(1) = ℎ¯ > 1, and 𝑓 ′(𝑒𝑡) ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑒𝑡 ∈ [0, 1] (4.5)
In this model, the challenge adults face is to
max
𝑒𝑡
𝑈(ℎ𝑡 + 1− 𝑒𝑡, 𝑓(𝑒𝑡)) (4.6)
The solution to such problem is 𝑒*𝑡 , which is a function of ℎ𝑡 and the law-of-motion is
ℎ𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑔(ℎ𝑡)) ≡ Φ(ℎ𝑡). Although the Φ()˙ may assume any form, the case study here
is that in which 𝑓(·) and 𝑔(·) are positively related. In this case, a child labor trap may
occur giving rise to two stable equilibria (at point ℎ𝑡 = 1 and point ℎ𝑡 = ℎ¯) and one which
is unstable (at point ℎ𝑡 = ℎ*). Specifically, point ℎ𝑡 = ℎ* is critical in the sense that it
marks the threshold which separates the case in which the child does nothing but work
(ℎ𝑡 = 1) from that in which child only study (ℎ𝑡 = ℎ¯). This is better illustrated in Fig.
18.
To this point, it is noticeable that both Basu (1999) and Emerson e Souza (2003)
emphasized that child labor may be transmitted across generations, through the level
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Figure 18 – Intergenerational persistence of child labor
Source: Emerson e Souza (2003)
of human capital acquired by parents. Therefore, theoretical studies indicate a positive
relationship between past child labor and present child labor. Note that none of these
studies explicitly pointed the effect of the specific age at which parents entered the labor
market. However, logical deduction leads to expect that the earlier parents started working
the lesser human capital they were able to acquire through formal education and, thus
the higher the likelihood of their children to work.
4.2 Previous Studies
Numerous studies concur that child labor interferes with the education of children
in the sense that it compels them to evade school prematurely or conciliate work and
schooling, thus, reducing children’s accumulation of human capital. However, it is im-
portant to note that aside through forgone education, child labor trap may be sustained
through cultural and social norms such as filial obligations (LÓPEZ-CALVA et al., 2002;
EMERSON; SOUZA, 2003).
Concerning empirical evidence of the intergenerational persistence of child labor,
only two studies were found for Brazil, which are those of Emerson e Souza (2003) and
Aquino et al. (2010). Aside the theoretical framework presented in Section 3.1, Emerson
e Souza (2003) provided empirical evidence which confirms the hypotheses that parents
who were child laborers during childhood are more likely to send their children to work at
early age. In specific, the authors used 1996 Brazilian Household Surveys data (henceforth,
PNAD) to estimate probit and Cox proportional hazard models. Having that the PNAD
data provides information regarding the occupational status of children and the age at
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which parents started work, one can easily verify the intergenerational persistence of
child labor among generations of the same family. It is important to add that the major
reason why these authors adopted the 1996 PNAD data was because it provides not
only information concerning parents, but also that of grandparents in respect of level of
education and income. Thus, these authors were able to decently model the persistence
of child labor across three generations, which is undoubtedly one of the major strength of
their study.
In the probit model, the response variable, which assumes 1 if child works and
0 otherwise, was adjusted against regressors such as dummy variables for parents who
were child laborers, parent’s education, number of brothers, child’s gender and level of
urbanization of family’s residence. These authors further controlled for grandparent’s
level of education in order to enhance the proxy for family income. However, no statistical
significance was found for direct relationship between grandparent’s level of education
and the probability of grandchild to work. This result indicated that, despite being a
brilliant move, the control for grandparent’s income or level of education is irrelevant.
Consequently, there is no need to restrict studies to the 1996 PNAD data for the sake of
controlling grandparent’s variables.
Notwithstanding, statistically robust evidence was found for the positive relation-
ship between early work of parents and the probability of children to work. Specifically
results from all empirical exercises pointed that early labor of mothers has greater impact
on the decision of children to work or not compared to that of fathers. These authors
also confirmed that parent’s education is one, but not the only, important factor which
drives the child labor trap. The reason for this is that despite isolating the effect of family
income and parent’s level of education, the child labor cycle persisted. Therefore, con-
clusion was drawn that the effect of parental child labor may be more complex than the
supposed human capital relationship. With this, Emerson e Souza (2003) pointed out the
likelihood of such persistence to be attributed to cultural or social norms, buttressing the
crucial points made by Marin et al. (2012), CONAETI (2011) and emphasized in Chapter
2 concerning the cultural roots of child labor in Brazil.
Aquino et al. (2010) contributed to the study of Emerson e Souza (2003) by also
empirically investigating the existence of child labor trap in Brazil adopting probit models
and using data from 1992 and 2004 PNAD. As upgrade, these authors performed separate
analysis for rural and urban areas in order to verify if the intergenerational persistence
of child labor can be attributed to peculiarities of the Brazilian rural and urban areas.
Aside reaffirming the existence of the trap, evidence was found that the effect of parental
child labor is greater in the rural areas compared to urban areas and that the magnitude
of the effect reduced substantially between 1992 and 2004.
In contribution to both empirical studies reviewed in this section, this essay pro-
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vides information concerning how the specific age at which parents started work affects the
intensity of this trap. Most importantly, we provide the first empirical evidence concerning
the tipping point at which the vicious cycle of child labor turns virtuous.
4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Data and Sample
The database used here was obtained from the PNAD conducted by the IBGE,
covering the period of 2004 –2009 and 2011 – 2014. Acknowledging from Emerson e Souza
(2003) that it is unnecessary to control for grandparents’ variables, we opt not to limit
analysis to 1996 PNAD data and, thus, used a larger sample. Aside providing current
figures of the child labor cycle, this choice permitted to control time variations of the
child labor cycle and to expressively increase sample size.
We opted to filter the overall data to best fit the objectives of this essay. The first
filter was to restrict the sample to individuals between age 5 and 15, retaining about 19%
of the overall sample (see Sample I in Fig. 19). As the major interest of this essay is the
intergenerational persistence of child labor, we further restricted the database to children
and adolescents between age 5 and 15 who live with their mothers. The reason for this is
that the PNAD only register as family members those individuals who live in the same
household and consider one another as family. The loss in Sample II due to this filter was
modest (about 12% of Sample I) since we focus on young individuals who, in most cases,
are still dependent on parents.
Furthermore, the PNAD question concerning the age at which individuals started
working is only directed to those who were employed during the reference week of surveys.
This engendered additional unavoidable and crucial filter which caused loss of about 32%
from Sample II. Thus, the empirical analysis of this essay is limited to child laborers who
live in the same household with their mothers who were employed during the reference
week of the PNAD surveys.
We acknowledge that such filters may cause severe implication to analysis, espe-
cially since children with unemployed parents tend to be more vulnerable. For this, we
compare statistics of the overall and final samples in Table 6. Note that despite the ex-
pressive reduction of sample size, the mean and standard deviation of variables from the
overall and final samples converge.
The average rate of child labor in Brazil during the period in view was about 7%.
During this same period, it was observed that about 51% of the mothers contained in the
sample were child laborers. Specifically, about 12% of these mothers entered the labor
market at or before the age of 9 and, approximately, 40% of them started work between
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Overall sample
n= 3,840,849
Sample I
n=730,130
Sample II
n=641,746
Final sample
n=436,637
Keeping only individuals between
age 5 and 15
Keeping only individuals between
age 5 and 15 that live with their
mothers
Keeping only individuals between
age 5 and 15 that live with their
mothers who were employed during
the the reference week PNAD surveys
Figure 19 – Filtration of pooled sample of PNAD data (2004 to 2009 and 2011 to 2014)
Source: Prepared by author.
Note: n denotes the number of observations.
the age of 10 and 14. Specifically, the average age at which mothers start working is 14.
Furthermore, all estimates were computed using the weights or sample expansion
factors provided by the IBGE in the data files.
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Table 6 – Summary statistics
Filtered sample Overall sample
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
childlabor 1 for child laborer and 0 non child laborer 0.0703 0.2557 0.0415 0.1994
famincome Average family per capita income (in reais – R$) 711.01 1183.82 617.19 1076.32
male 1 for male and 0 for female 0.5064 0.5000 0.5106 0.4999
age Individual’s age in years 10.16 3.13 10.13 3.14
Individual’s childeduc 1 if enrolled in school and 0 if not 0.9610 0.1937 0.7603 0.4269
variables urban 1 for residence in urban area and 0 for rural 0.8036 0.3972 0.8161 0.3874
asians 1 if skin color is yellow and 0 if not 0.0029 0.0539 0.0028 0.0527
mulatto 1 if skin color is brown and 0 if not 0.5004 0.5143 0.4998 0.4996
black 1 if skin color is black and 0 if not 0.0032 0.0561 0.0572 0.2323
white 1 if skin color is white and 0 if not 0.4187 0.4933 0.4154 0.4928
familysize Family size 4.51 1.57 4.45 1.59
CLmom 1 if mother was child labor and 0 if not 0.5140 0.4998
CLmomage Age at which mother started working 14.72 5.11
CLmomage2 Square of age at which mother started working 242.82 225.57
CLmom0-9 1 if mother started working at or before age 9 and 0 if otherwise 0.1174 0.3220
CLmom10-14 1 if mother started working between age 10 to 14 and 0 if otherwise 0.3965 0.4892
Mother’s CLmom15-17 1 if mother started working between age 15 to 17 and 0 if otherwise 0.2387 0.4263
variable CLmom18-19 1 if mother started working between age 18 to 19 and 0 if otherwise 0.1211 0.3263
CLmom20-24 1 if mother started working between age 20 to 24 and 0 if otherwise 0.0831 0.2761
CLmom25-29 1 if mother started working between age 25 to 29 and 0 if otherwise 0.0257 0.1583
CLmom30-above 1 if mother started working at or after age 30 and 0 if otherwise 0.0172 0.1299
mothereduc Mother’s level of education (in years of studies) 7.56 4.39
agemom Mother’s age 36.03 7.15
Note: Number of observation for filtered sample is 436,637 and for overall sample is 730,130.
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4.3.2 Empirical Model
In this essay, our response variable is a dummy, which is 1 if the child or adolescent
is a child laborer and 0 if otherwise. Therefore, the conventional OLS model is inadequate
because such variables are Bernoulli distributed. Thus, probit models are resorted. Details
regarding the construct and properties of probit models presented in this section are based
on Cameron e Trivedi (2010).
In the probit model, the probability mass function of the observed outcome of y𝑖
is 𝑝y(1 − 𝑝)1−y with mean 𝑝 and var(y) = 𝑝(1 − 𝑝). The regression model is formed by
parameterizing 𝑝 to depend of an index function x′𝛽, where x is a 𝑘 × 1 regressor vector
and 𝛽 is a vector of unknown parameters which produces the probability function
𝑝𝑖 ≡ 𝑃𝑟(y𝑖 = 1|x) = 𝐹 (x′𝑖𝛽) =
∫︁ x′𝑖𝛽
−∞
𝜑(z)𝑑𝑧 (4.7)
where 𝐹 (x′𝑖𝛽) is a cumulative distribution function for 𝑝 ∈ [0, 1] and 𝑧 is a column of
𝐾 × 1 latent variable.
Generally, the estimates provided by the probit model is given a latent-variable
interpretation so as to provide a link with a liner regression model. This is done by
assuming a single-index model which relates the observed binary outcome, y, with the
latent variable, y*. Such model is composed of regressors, x𝑖, and an error term, 𝑢, and
is represented as
y* = x′𝑖𝛽 + 𝑢 and y =
⎧⎨⎩1 if y
* > 0
0 if y* ≤ 0 (4.8)
Simple manipulation of the latent model in Eq. 4.8 will show that 𝑃𝑟(y𝑖 = 1) = 𝑃𝑟(x′𝑖𝛽+
𝑢 > 0) = 𝐹 (x′𝑖𝛽). It is, however, important to note that the error term of the latent model
necessarily has to be normally distributed for the probit model to be most appropriate.
The estimation process of the probit model is done by the maximum likelihood
estimator (MLE) alike other binary outcome models with Bernoulli distribution. For a
sample of 𝑁 independent observations, the MLE maximizes the associated log-likelihood
function
𝑄(𝛽) =
𝑁∑︁
𝑖=1
[y𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐹 (x′𝑖𝛽) + (1− y𝑖)𝑙𝑛{1− 𝐹 (x′𝑖𝛽)}] (4.9)
which is obtained by iterative methods and is asymptotically normally distributed. Al-
though estimates observed form the probit model are consistent, interpretations may be
quite challenging due to the latent variable. For this reason, interpretation of observed
estimates will be based, exclusively, on marginal effects calculated thusly
𝜕𝑝
𝜕x = 𝜑(x
′𝛽)𝛽𝑗 (4.10)
To verify if model is misspecified, two major tests are executed: wald test, which
null hypothesis test for the combined statistical significance of parameters, and Likelihood
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Ratio test (LR), is used to compare models. Specifically, the LR test is used to compare
two nested models, i.e., when the specification of a simpler model (𝑠) is special case of a
general model (𝑔). This test is formally represented as the ratio between the likelihood
functions (ℒ(𝜃)) of both models: 𝐿𝑅𝑇 = −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒
(︂ℒ𝑠(𝜃)
ℒ𝑔(𝜃)
)︂
. Therefore, the LR test can
also be calculated using the difference in the log-likelihoods. Using this calculation one
can simply compare nested models based on the magnitude of the log-likelihoods, giving
preference for higher values (GREENE, 2003). For further comparation of models, we use
the Pseudo-𝑅2 also known as the McFadden’s test. Similarly to the 𝑅2 of conventional
OLS models, the upper and and lower limit of Pseudo 𝑅2 are 1 and 0, respectively. Thus
high values of the Pseudo 𝑅2 are desirable.
As per model specification, the response variable is a dummy which is 1 if individ-
uals below the age of 16 works and 0 otherwise (childlabor). The regressors considered
are: dummy variable which is 1 if the individual’s mother was a child laborer and 0 oth-
erwise (CLmom); seven dummy variables which control for the age bracket at which the
individual’s mother started work (CLmombelow9, CLmom10-14, CLmom15-17, CLmom18-19,
CLmom20-24, CLmom20-24 and CLmomabove30), whereas individuals below age 17 are used
as base group; age at which the individual’s mother started working (CLmomage) and its
square; mother’s age (agemom); mother’s level of education measured in years of school-
ing (mothereduc); logarithm of average per capita family income, log(famincome); family
size (familysize); a dummy variable which is 1 if the individual is male and 0 otherwise
(male); individual’s age (age); dummy variable which is 1 if the individual is enrolled in
school and 0 otherwise (childeduc); dummy variable if the individual resides in an urban
area and 0 otherwise (urban); five dummy variable for skin color or race2(white as base
group, asians, black and mulatto)3; group dummy variable for each year to control for
time shocks in child labor (dummy for years), and; control for long-run tendency of a
time series effect of child labor (linear trend).
Regarding the main variable of interest, CLmom, it is important to highlight that
as the PNAD data does not provide information concerning fathers, those of mothers will
be used as proxy to control for parental background. Evidences from Emerson e Souza
(2003) pointed that mother’s level of education has relatively higher impact on child labor
decisions. Thus, we assume that conclusions drawn from mother’s variables can serve as
proxy for both parents.
2 The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) classifies race/skin color according to
physical appearance which is self-declared by individuals. These categories are: white, black, yellow
(Asian-Brazilians), brown (Mulatto) and indigenous.
3 Indigenous population was excluded due to the small number of observations.
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4.4 Results
The hypothesis which we analyze in contribution to previous studies is that the
child labor cycle is reversible through the minimum age for work. The empirical strategy
used to reach this objective is the probit model estimated by maximum likelihood.
Table 7 presents the result from models I to V, which specifications were presented
in previous section. However, our analysis will be centered on the marginal effects pre-
sented in Table 8, which were calculated for discrete changes in dummy variables and
at means for continuous variables. The modeling exercise adopted here is a cumulative
incremental procedure of group regressors. Loosely speaking, category of regressors were
gradually incremented in the model in order to verify the stability of other estimates.
As the modeling exercise transit from model I to III, which is the complete bench-
mark model with all regressors, we observe that the signs and statistical significance
remained unaltered. Note that the (dummy for years) was included in all models to ac-
count for time shocks. However, the importance of such control was tested by carrying
out the Wald tests of simple and composite linear hypotheses on the benchmark model.
With a Wald test value of 𝜒2 = 681.96 the null hypothesis that all dummies for years are
equal to 0 is rejected at a level of 1%. Thus, the control of dummy variables for time is
important. In model IV, we substituted CLmom for a group of dummy variables to con-
trol for the age bracket in which the individuals mother started working (CLmombelow9,
CLmom10-14,..., CLmomabove30). Such control enables to verify the depth of the child labor
trap given the age at with the individuals’ mothers started working. Lastly, in model V,
theses age brackets were substituted for the specific age at which mother’s started working
and its square (CLmomage and CLmomage squared, respectively). The reason for this is to
observe if there is a quadratic relationship between this variable and the probability of
children to work. If such relationship exists, the next step is to find the specific age at
which this probability is minimum.
Given the similarity between the benchmark model and the panel data models pre-
sented in Chapter 3, it is of expectation that the signs for the log(famincome), childeduc
and urban from both models to converge. This was exactly the case. Therefore, poverty is
affirmed to be negatively related to child labor; the enrollment of children and adolescents
in schools reduces their likelihood to work and; the incidence of child labor is lesser in the
urban areas.
Regarding other control variables, it was found that boys are more likely to be child
laborers compared to girls. The debate herein is that the number of female child laborer is
prone to be underestimated because great number of girls work as housekeepers, babysit-
ters or domestic workers (GUARCELLO et al., 2007; Repórter Brasil, 2013). However,
numerous studies have shown that the incidence of child labor is more frequent among
Chapter 4. Intergenerational Persistence of Child Labor 94
boys (KASSOUF, 2001; EMERSON; SOUZA, 2003; ILO, 2007; INAIÁ, 2008; Repórter
Brasil, 2013; ILO, 2013, to mention few). The set of dummy variable for skin color indi-
cates that the incidence of child labor is higher among the mulatto and black population
compared to the white population.
Table 7 – Results of estimation (coefficients)
Response variable: childlabor
Category of
regressors I II III IV V
male 0.399*** 0.400*** 0.413*** 0.404*** 0.404***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
childeduc −0.389*** −0.388*** −0.337*** −0.306*** −0.309***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
age 0.211*** 0.214*** 0.215*** 0.213*** 0.214***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Individual’s urbano −0.879*** −0.812*** −0.681*** −0.727*** −0.713***
variables (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
asians −0.161** −0.122* −0.0350 −0.0106 −0.00747
(0.064) (0.065) (0.070) (0.077) (0.077)
brown 0.104*** 0.0591*** 0.0258*** 0.0135* 0.0118
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
black 0.0784*** 0.0343** −0.00825 −0.0170 −0.0119
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
logfamincome −0.0569*** −0.00735* −0.0230*** −0.0183***
Family’s (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
variables familysize 0.0344*** 0.0369*** 0.0384*** 0.0384***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
agemom −0.000310 −0.000698 −0.00145**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
mothereduc −0.0256*** −0.0273*** −0.0262***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CLmom 0.512***
Mother’s (0.007)
variables CLmombelow9 0.558***
(0.014)
CLmom10-14 0.331***
(0.012)
CLmom15-17 0.114***
(0.014)
CLmomage −0.100***
(0.003)
CLmomage squared 0.00186***
(0.000)
Time dummy for years yes yes yes yes yes
variables linear trend yes yes yes yes yes
𝑁 747868 716714 630471 432669 432586
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.237 0.240 0.273 0.270 0.272
Log likelihood −61023209.8 −58615484.1 −48361255.8 −39301877.2 −39197508.2
LR 𝜒2(degree of freedom) 45529.4 (16) 44103.9 (18) 40198.8 (21) 33339.0 (23) 33585.0 (22)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respec-
tively, and; 𝑁 denotes number of observations.
The coefficient of the major variable of interest, CLmom, indicates that children
and adolescents, whose mothers were child laborers, are most likely to be child laborers
compared to other children. This observation affirms the theoretical postulate of Basu
(1999) and supports the evidence found in Emerson e Souza (2003) and Aquino et al.
(2010) regarding the existence of intergenerational persistence of child labor. According
to these authors, the trap is manifested through forgone education or low accumulation of
human capital during childhood which, in turn, reduces future productivity and earnings.
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Individuals in such situation tend to remain poor and are induced to send their children
to work at early age. However, in light of the observations from Chapter 2, this study
admits that the child labor trap may also emerge as a result of unobservable factors such
as social and cultural norms (LÓPEZ-CALVA et al., 2002; MARIN et al., 2012).
Table 8 – Marginal effects for discrete changes in dummy variables and at means for
continuous variables
Response variable: childlabor
Category of
regressors I II III IV V
male 0.0359*** 0.0361*** 0.0350*** 0.0406*** 0.0405***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
childeduc −0.0350*** −0.0351*** −0.0285*** −0.0308*** −0.0309***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
age 0.0190*** 0.0194*** 0.0182*** 0.0214*** 0.0214***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Individual’s urbano −0.0791*** −0.0734*** −0.0576*** −0.0730*** −0.0715***
variables (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
asians −0.0145** −0.0111* −0.00296 −0.00107 −0.000748
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
brown 0.00940*** 0.00534*** 0.00218*** 0.00136* 0.00118
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
black 0.00705*** 0.00310** −0.000697 −0.00171 −0.00119
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
famincome −0.00514*** −0.000622* −0.00231*** −0.00184***
Family’s (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
variables familysize 0.00310*** 0.00312*** 0.00386*** 0.00385***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
agemom −0.0000262 −0.0000701 −0.000145**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
mothereduc −0.00216*** −0.00274*** −0.00262***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CLmom 0.0433***
Mother’s (0.001)
variables CLmombelow9 0.0561***
(0.001)
CLmom10-14 0.0333***
(0.001)
CLmom15-17 0.0114***
(0.001)
CLmomage −0.0100***
(0.000)
CLmomage squared 0.000186***
(0.000)
Note: Standard errors calculated using the delta method is in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The group variable that controls for the age group at which individuals’ mothers
started work provides more detail concerning the trap. The estimate for CLmom0-9 indi-
cates that the probability of child labor trap is highest among children whose mothers
started working at or before the age of 9 compared to those whose mothers entered the
labor market at later ages. Curiously, the marginal risk of the trap drops from 5.63 to
3.45 percentage points (p.p.) as the mother’s entrance in the labor market is postponed to
the age group of 10-14 (indicating reduction of about 39%). Further deferral of mother’s
entrance in the labor market to the age bracket of 15-17 provoked greater reduction of
this risk from 3.45 p.p. to 1.08 p.p. (reduction of almost 69%).
What can be deduced at this point, which is innovative to previous studies, is that
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the later an individual enters the labor market the less likely he/she is induced to send
children to work. The coefficient for CLmom18-19 appears negative, indicating a non-linear
relationship between the probability of child labor and the age at which mothers started
working. Thus, the model points that children from parents who enter the labor market
at this age tend to be involved in other activities other than work.
The suspicion of non-linear relation in model IV incited the control of the CLmomage
and CLmomage squared in model V so as to calculate the specific age in which this tip-
ping point falls. Not surprisingly, the sign for these variables were negative and positive,
respectively. Moreover, having an expressively low value for CLmomage squared it is de-
ducible that the function is more likely to be asymptotic and not quadratic. Nevertheless,
we found that the minimum point of this function is reach at about the age of 26.9. Thus,
this model shows that the probability of children to work is close to null if parents started
working at the age of 26.9. Note that it is around this age at which large number of
Brazilian students complete their undergraduate studies.
For illustration of this result, Fig. 20 presents the marginal effect of the age at
which mothers started working on the probability of their children to work. Clearly, the
relationship is negative, asymptotic and minimum at age 26.9. Thus, every additional year
of postponement of entry into the labor market reduces the risk of child labor trap till
its minimum. Aside the calculated marginal effects represented by the continuous line, we
also presented the confidence interval for the same, which is represented by the broken
lines. Notably, the extremely straight intervals indicate that estimate are very precise.
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Figure 20 – Marginal effect of the age at which mothers started working.
Source: Prepared using estimates from model I in Table 8.
Note: The continuous line is the estimated marginal effect and the broken lines represent confidence
interval.
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Curiously, Justus et al. (2012) found a similar result for the best age to enter
the labor market. Specifically, these authors found that the hourly earnings from work
is maximum when males and females start working at age 27.3 and 22.6, respectively.
Therefore, our result corroborates that found by these authors that the minimum age for
work set at 14 is, still, low to eradicate the negative impact of child labor in adulthood.
In short, the result found in this essay provides evidence which corroborates pre-
vious literature concerning child labor trap. Specifically, we found that the probability of
a child to work is negatively related to the age at which his/her parents started working.
Most importantly, our empirical result does not permit to reject the hypothesis that child
labor cycles can be reverted if the minimum age for work is increased.
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5 Child Labor Hazard on Mental Health
Child labor is usually deemed to negatively affect health. However, most
of the studies which investigate this hypotheses only considered the phys-
ical health. As novel contribution, we allege the hypothesis that the
impact of child labor transcends physical to the mental health of indi-
viduals. Specifically, in this chapter, we investigate the probability of
individuals who work or worked during childhood to develop symptoms
of mental depression during adulthood. Moreover, we also innovate in
the sense of accounting for possible genetic or maternal causal effects
among family members. For this essay, we used the 2008 PNAD and
its special supplements to estimate probit models. Empirical results sus-
tained the hypothesis that work during childhood is positively related
to the risk of developing mental depression in adulthood. Alongside, we
found that family health status and chronic physical illness in individu-
als play substantial role in determining their risk of developing mental
depression.
Depression is one of the alarming health challenges the world faces. Still, basic
health services to tackle mentally illness are scarce and even non-existent in many de-
veloping countries. In the Economist Events’ conference held on the 25th of November
of 2014, key global opinion leaders from diverse fields supported that despite depression
being a global crises, nations still fail to grasp the scale and urgency of the problem.
In short, depression still loses to physical health problems in the priority list of most
governments and policy makers.
Depression is a mental disorder characterized by depressed mood, loss of interest or
pleasure, decreased energy, feelings of guilt or low self-worth, disturbed sleep or appetite,
and poor concentration. In most chronic cases, depression comorbids with anxiety and
impairs individuals of the ability of exercising their daily routines. Moreover, in worst
cases depression may lead to suicide (MARCUS et al., 2012).
According to The Economist (2014), mental disorders do not only affect the mood,
intellectual and cognitive abilities of an individual, but also provokes severe consequences
to the society and economy as a whole. In the same report, information was provided
that about 4% of the GDP of the OECD countries is loss to mental illness, especially
due to productivity loss. Only in the UK, about 148 million working days are lost due
to depression, leading to yearly economic cost burden that ranges from 70 to 100 billion
Euros, whereas about 63% of this value is due to indirect cost, most especially loss of
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productivity, and only a modest percentage is spent on direct treatment for patients
(about 1% for psychotherapy and 3.5% for medications). Furthermore, the same report
provided that among all depressed patients, only 30 to 52% have contact with any health
professional, whereas only 8 to 16% of these contact mental health specialist and, yet, only
about 10% receive minimally adequate treatment. This report also alerted that the scale
of the problem is steadily rising and has already, in 2010, exceeded the WHO projection
for 2030 and that the health apparatus to tackle the same is minimal. Thus, it is highly
important to investigate the determinants of mental depression so as to give directions
to policy makers concerning measures to adopt to tackle the same and, thus, avoid huge
social and economic costs.
According to the Brazilian National Household Sample Survey data (PNAD), the
rate of mental depression in Brazil slightly reduced over time – from 4.96% in 1998 to
4.13% in 2008 (JUSTUS et al., 2012). Nevertheless, these figures are still high and wor-
rying because depression morbidity continues high among Brazilians. Specifically, Silva et
al. (2014) showed that one in seven Brazilians has symptoms of mental depression and
one in twelve has a twelve-month chronic mental disorder. Still, according to Gonçalves et
al. (2012b), only about 2.5% of the total annual federal health expenditure is allocated for
mental health treatments. Therefore, alike in other OECD countries, depression has not
been ranked among the major health concerns in Brazil. Taking the observed magnitude of
the problem and acknowledging the underestimation of the same, it is expectation that the
social and economic consequences of the same to be alarming. However, it is noteworthy
that the Brazilian government has adopted innovative measures to reach greater num-
ber of mentally ill patients. One of which includes higher resources allocation to remote
communities and adoption of territorial health care systems. These measures enhance the
access and reach of greater number of population who have depressive symptoms.
Despite the numerous empirical efforts to investigate the causes of depression in
literature, very little is consolidated concerning depression in children and adolescents.
This is partly due to the difficulty of diagnosing mental illness in younger individuals.
WHO (2001) asserts that recent health studies have indicated positive correlation between
childhood trauma and individuals’ behaviors during adulthood such as usage of drugs,
alcoholism, depression, suicide, greater propensity to illness and lower life expectancy.
In the literature, child labor is defined as children’s engagement in labor activities
which cause harm to physical or mental health, or moral development. However, according
to Guarcello et al. (2004), “the literature is richer in hypothesizing negative effects of
child work on health than it is in testing these hypotheses”. So far, there is no empirical
study which tested the hypothesis of the assumed negative effect of child labor on mental
health. Thus, in this essay we seek to provide the first empirical evidence concerning
this relationship. Specifically, we aim to test the hypothesis that work during childhood
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Figure 21 – Decomposition of the causes of mental depression
Source: WHO (2001)
increases the risk of individuals to develop depressive symptoms during adulthood. This
hypothesis is rooted in the argument that stress and pressure in very early stages in life
as result of child labor may lead to mental disorder, especially through three channels:
a) biological path: genetics and high Cortisol1 level; b) psychological path: insufficient
nurture, anxiety, grief and pressure; and c) social path: social stigma, poverty and low
education.
This essay is organized as follows: Section 5.1 presents previous studies concerning
the determinants of mental depression; Section 5.2 provides details concerning data and
empirical model, and; Section 5.4 presents descriptive analysis and empirical results.
5.1 Literature Review
Due to the novelty of the hypothesis which we seek to test in this chapter, no
previous empirical studies was found concerning the impact of child labor on the prob-
ability of individuals to develop mental depression. Thus, in this section we review the
determinants of mental depression from Brazilian and international literature.
As illustrated by WHO (2001) in Fig. 21, mental depression, alike most physical
illness, is the aftermath of the complex and interwoven combination of biological, psy-
chological and social factors. Thus, the detection and isolation of the individual effect of
each factor is a common challenge in health and socioeconomic literature. In this sense,
The Economist (2014) informs that the investigation of the causes of depression requires
a multi-faceted approach that ranges from heath to psychology as well as socioeconomic
literature.
1 Cortisol is an hormone which eats up the brain if secreted for long-term. (DIBATTISTA et al., 2005).
Still, Hodges e Sadow (1969) concluded that long term secretion of cortisol has potential impact in
retarding growth.
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Regarding biological factors, health studies have repeatedly confirmed the influ-
ence of genetics in the determination of mental health risks of individuals. Lohoff (2010)
and Ledford (2015) pointed that the gene is a means through which mental depression is
intergenerationally transmitted. However, WHO (2001) pointed that the effect of genetic
factors tends to be heightened if combined with psychological or environmental factors
such as malnutrition, infections, disrupted family environments, neglect, isolation and
trauma. Moreover, a biological path through which child labor may lead to mental de-
pression is stress. According to Woodhead (2004), stress due to environmental pressures
may significantly alter the level of hormones, immunity and cortisol in individuals, which
may lead to depressive symptoms especially in children. For children, moderate level of
stress from, for example, school is tolerable. Thus, children who work or conciliate work
with study tend to face excessive level of stress due to unnecessary demands and pressures
from themselves and from employers.
The role of psychological factors in determining the risk of mental depression has
been, for long, confirmed to be vital by health researchers. WHO (2001) and Sokolova
(2003) highlighted the relationship with parents or caregivers during childhood as a major
factor which molds an individual’s mind, intellect, emotional regulation, and behavior.
Therefore, children who had poor or insufficient nurture during childhood due to illness,
separation, death or mental health problems of parents or caregiver have high risk of
developing mental dysfunctions, either during childhood or later in life. According to
WHO (2001), evidence regarding these risk factors were observed in children who live in
institutions despite not being deprived of nutrition and bodily care. Mental disorders have
also been confirmed to be associated to physical health. Specifically, physical incapabilities
may cause grief or inferiority compley, which may affect the psychological balance of
individuals.
Other important psychological determinant of mental disorder is the failure to cope
adaptively to a stressful way of life. Here is a path through which child labor comes in.
Children and adolescents who work at early age prematurely face stress from work, which
are, at times, arduous, time consuming and hazardous. It is worthwhile to note that aside
stress from labor activities, children and adolescents also face stress through pressures
or abuses from employers. Generally, these these individuals are forced to prematurely
internalize the role or providing for family or self needs. In such cases, children tend to
be psychologically affected when they do not meet such goal.
The bigger problem is that most parents and empirical studies do not consider the
stress related to study. According to WHO (2001), learning, for children, may be quite as
stressful as work itself, especially when it comes to learning unfamiliar subjects – which
is basically what all child does in early stages of life. Thinking of it, most adults work
with familiar and recurrent activities and generally complain about the stress from work.
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However, most children, right at early ages, recurrently deal with diverse and unfamil-
iar subjects under pressure of getting good grades and, at times, not even knowing the
importance of why they learn these subjects. In most cases, after these children spend
almost half of the day trying to learn unfamiliar subjects, they get home filled with the
joy of leaving school and meeting loved ones. Unfortunately, such joy and revived energy
is, at times, conceived by parents as sign of idleness in school. As a result, children are
nonchalantly sent to do house chores or, in worst-case scenario, to work. In fact, most
adults choose to simply ignore or neglect the fact that learning is also psychologically
stressful.
In cases when children conciliate study with work, the psychological strain is higher
since they have to adapt to scenarios which are completely different from that of schooling.
Unfortunately enough, such children return to school the next day to face learning pressure
from teachers, who are simply performing their tasks. As aftermath, children tend to
show low academic performance in school. One the one hand, teachers who do not know
of the daily schedules of the child end up concluding regarding the natural academical
aptitude of the child. On the other hand, parents either concur with this point of view
or simply conclude regarding the inefficiency of the education system. In cases where
work is conceived as a positive phenomenon, such children end up being enrolled as
work apprentice. According to Magara (2005) and Aliyu (2006), in African countries,
male children withdrawn from school are enrolled as apprentice in local mechanic or
capentering workshops or in construction sites. Meanwhile female children are enrolled as
housekeepers, maids, tailors or vendors.
Although biological and psychological factors are important factors which cause
stress from within the individual, external social factors also play fundamental role on
mental health. Examples of such social factors are urbanization, poverty, technological
change, economic development, unemployment, level of education, racism, ethnicity, social
stigma and gender and sexual discrimination (WHO, 2001).
Urbanization, which is highly related with economic development, is a desired fea-
ture in this modern word. However, Justus et al. (2012) pointed that its nature may be
deleterious to mental health. This is because urbanization is, generally, accompanied with
greater number of stressors such as violence, inequality, pollution, traffic congestion, over-
crowding, frustration, dependence on a cash economy, among many others. However, rural
areas also have shortcomings such as isolation, lack of quality communication, transport
and health facilities, low economic and educational opportunities, etc.
Level of poverty also influences the risk of developing mental depression (WHO,
2001). Justus et al. (2012) using pooled sample of 1998, 2003 and 2008 PNAD data
estimated models of the determinants of mental depression in Brazil. Despite observing
empirical evidence of positive relationship between poverty and mental depression, these
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authors pointed that such relationship may not be linear. To account for this, poverty was
controlled by classifying family income into distribution deciles. The reason for a positive
impact of poverty is that, in most cases, poor individuals who do not have sufficient means
to cover necessary expenses may suffer frustration or grief, leading to mental imbalance.
According to WHO (2001), nowadays, in consumerist societies where mere incapacity to
acquire certain material objects or consume certain services may lead to social exclusion or
discrimination, poor individuals are prone to suffer social stigma. Such social stigma may
be internalized as inferiority complex or as impostor syndrome, making such individuals
to feel as if they do not fit in the society.
An interesting characteristic in the study of Justus et al. (2012) is that separate
equations were were estimated for men and women due to observed gender disparity.
In accordance with most health studies, these authors found evidence regarding higher
incidence of mental depression in women compared to men. Astbury (1999) alleged that
such disparity may occur because of the intense role that women play as mothers, wives,
educators and care givers, workers and not to mention the social discrimination and
chauvinism which they face in the society.
Justus et al. (2012) also found a non-linear relationship for the effect of education
and age on mental health. Specifically, the distribution of the risk of mental depression
as to age and level of education is a parabolic curve with downward opening. As for age,
this risk reaches its maximum at about the age of 43.8 for women and 47.8 for men. As
for level of education, the risk reaches its maximum roughly at 4 years of schooling for
women, while at 8 years for men.
Intuitive reflection may induce to think of a positive relationship between adult
work and mental depression due to stressors such as overwork and pressure. However, one
has to have in mind the “pain” of unemployment, which only get worse over time. The
combination of the feeling of lack of belongingness in the society, financial dependence on
family members and incapacity to meet material needs, when internalized, may lead to
mental disorder in individuals. Thus, it is also reasonable to expect negative relationship
between adult work and mental depression as a result of the psychological satisfaction of
being employed. However, such argument is untrue concerning children and adolescents,
since their labor is unregulated, badly remunerated and involves pressure and abuses.
Based on the observations from literate, we postulate that child labor may lead
to mental illness through: biological path – increase in the level of cortisol, reduction of
immunity levels and hormone imbalance as a result of stress; psychological path – lack
of nurture, stress, anxiety, self-pressure or pressure form employer; social path – social
stigma, poverty and low education.
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5.2 Methodology
5.2.1 Data and Sample
In this essay, we used the 2008 PNAD data and its special supplements on health
issues. Given the peculiarity of the objective of this essay, we had to filter the data sample
(see Fig. 22).
The first filter was the exclusion of individuals below age 10, since only individuals
above the age of 10 years were questioned concerning the age at which they started
working. Still, we excluded individuals above the age of 35 so as to focus on adolescents
and young adults. Therefore, our sample exclusively consist of individuals between age 10
and 35, keeping about 43% of the overall sample.
Overall sample
𝑁 = 391,868
Sample I
𝑁 = 168,038
Sample II
𝑁 = 99,617
Final sample
𝑁 = 42,559
Keeping individuals between age 10 and 35
Keeping individuals between age 10 and 35
who worked during the reference week of
PNAD surveys
Keeping individuals between age 10 and 35
who worked during the reference week of
PNAD surveys and live with their mothers
Figure 22 – Sample filtration
Source: Prepared by author
Note: 𝑁 denotes number of observations
In order to account for individuals who were child laborers we had to use data
concerning the age at which they started working. However, this control engendered an
unavoidable filter to database since this information only covers those who were employed
during the reference week of the PNAD surveys. As a result, about 40% of individuals
were excluded from Sample I.
Furthermore, to control for family health characteristics using mother’s variables
as a proxy, we focused our essay on individuals who live with their mothers in the same
household. Note that the PNAD survey only register as family those individuals who live
in the same household and declare one another as family. The cost of such filter was
relatively high (about 57% of Sample II) since most of the adults and elderly individuals
do not live with their parents. In other words, our final sample limits analyses to young
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adults. Specifically, about 6% of the individuals in this age group are between ages 10
and 14, about 59% are between ages 15 and 29, whereas less than 13% are above age 30
(see Table 9).
Table 9 – Frequency by age group
Age bracket Frequêncy %
10 – 14 2,715 6.38
15 – 17 5,561 13.07
18 – 19 5,853 13.75
20 – 24 14,122 21.34
25 – 29 9,080 10.81
30 – 35 4 868 1.48
Total 42,559 100.00
Source: Prepared using 2008 PNAD data.
Acknowledging that such filters may cause severe implication to analysis, we com-
pare statistics from the overall and final samples in Table 10. Note that despite the
expressive reduction of sample size, the mean and standard deviation of variables from
the overall and final samples converge. Admitting this weakness concerning data, we em-
phasize the unavailability of alternative database that contains information regarding
mental health of individual. Furthermore, note that this essay constitutes the first empir-
ical exercise which relates child labor to mental depression and also controls family health
characteristics.
From this table, we observe that about 1,5% of the population comprised in the
sample were diagnosed with mental depression by a doctor or physician in 2008. Regarding
the proxy variable to control for family genetics (depmom), approximately 10.1% of the
individuals between age 10 and 65 have mentally depressed mothers.
As to chronic physical disease, about 13% of the individuals had at least one
chronic physical disease. However, this proportion is higher among mothers contained in
the sample (about 57%). It is interesting to note that about 48% of the individuals work
or worked as child laborers. At this point, one perceives that child labor and, most likely,
its long-run consequences continue present in the Brazilian society.
Similarly to previous chapter, all estimates were computed using the weights or
sample expansion factors provided by the IBGE in the data files.
5.2.2 Empirical Model
Our empirical model specification is based on that of Justus et al. (2012) so as,
thereafter, make necessary and substantial contributions. As contribution to this study,
we verify if there is relationship between child labor and mental depression. Furthermore,
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Table 10 – Summary statistics
Filtered sample Overall sample
Variable Description Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev
depress 1 if depressed and 0 otherwise 0.0155 0.1237 0.0196 0.1388
childlabor 1 if he/she is or was a childlaborer and 0 otherwise 0.4813 0.4997
CL0–14 1 if he/she worked before age 14 and 0 otherwise 0.3084 0.4619
Variables CL15–17 1 if he/she worked at age 15–17 and 0 otherwise 0.3166 0.4652
of interest CL18–19 1 if he/she worked at age 18–19 and 0 otherwise 0.1876 0.3904
CL20–24 1 if he/she worked at age 20–24 and 0 otherwise 0.1080 0.3104
CL25–29 1 if he/she worked at age 25–29 and 0 otherwise 0.0131 0.1138
CLabove 30 1 if he/she worked at age 30 or above and 0 otherwise 0.0014 0.0378
depmom 1 if mother is depressed 0 otherwise 0.1012 0.3016
chronmom 1 if mother has physic. Chronic disease and 0 otherwise 0.5722 0.4948
male 1 if male and 0 if female 0.6109 0.4875 0.5326 0.4989
yellow 1 if skin color is yellow and 0 otherwise 0.0042 0.0647 0.0042 0.0643
white 1 if skin color is white and 0 otherwise 0.4462 0.4971 0.4398 0.4964
black 1 if skin color is black and 0 otherwise 0.0713 0.2574 0.0682 0.2522
brown 1 if skin color is brown and 0 otherwise 0.4825 0.4997 0.4919 0.4999
urban 1 if he/she resides in urban area and 0 otherwise 0.8301 0.3755 0.8479 0.3591
midwest 1 if he/she resides in the Midwest and 0 otherwise 0.1053 0.3070 0.1053 0.3069
Control northeast 1 if he/she resides in the Northeast and 0 otherwise 0.3302 0.4703 0.3368 0.4726
variables north 1 if he/she resides in the North and 0 otherwise 0.1207 0.3258 0.1288 0.3350
southeast 1 if he/she resides in the Southeast and 0 otherwise 0.3012 0.4588 0.2921 0.4548
south 1 if he/she resides in the South and 0 otherwise 0.1425 0.3496 0.1369 0.3438
chronic 1 if he/she has physic. Chronic disease and 0 otherwise 0.1314 0.3379 0.1389 0.3459
study i if he/she is enrolled in school 0.3653 0.4815 0.5787 0.4938
age Age 22.37 5.52 20.78 9.85
age(square) Age square 531.15 257.87 528.90 574.46
work 1 if he/she currently works 0.8822 0.3224 0.4314 0.4953
hourwork Weekly working hours 32.92 17.55 16.22 20.64
famincome Average per capita family income 579.3 773.26 528.95 787.81
famsize Family size 4.3 1.66 4.36 1.62
mothereduc Mother’s level of education (in years of studies) 7.03 4.53
agemom Mother’s age 49.09 8.99
Note: Number of observations for overall and filtered samples are 101.454 and 42,559, respectively.
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we innovate in the sense that mother’s variables were controlled as proxy to account for
possible genetic or maternal causal effect among family members.
Similarly to Chapter 4, probit models were estimated since the response variable,
depress, is a dummy that assumes the value of 1 if individuals affirmed to be diagnosed
by a doctor or medical practitioner to have mental depression and 0 if otherwise.
The regressor of interest is childlabor, which is a dummy variable that assumes
1 if the individual works or worked as child laborer and 0 if he/she doesn’t or didn’t.
This variable was substituted by six dummy variables to control for the age bracket at
which the individual started work: CL0–14 (reference group), CL15–17, CL18–19, CL20–24,
CL25–29 and CLabove 30. We controlled for mother’s mental health status with a dummy
variable which is 1 if the individual’s mother was diagnosed with mental depression and
0 if otherwise (depmom). This variable served as proxy for family genetics since the PNAD
data does not provide data concerning other members of the family. In addition, we
control for mother’s physical health status using a dummy variable which is 1 if the
individual’s mother has at least one chronic physical disease2 diagnosed by a doctor and
0 if otherwise(chronmom).
The other control variables are: number of family members (famsize); average per
capita family income (famincome); individual’s mothers age (agemom); dummy variable
which is 1 if the individual has at least one chronic physical disease and 0 if not (chronic);
dummy variable which is 1 if the individual is enrolled in school and 0 if not (study); a
dummy variable for individual’s gender which is 1 if male and 0 if not (male); individual’s
age (age) and its square; dummy variable which is 1 if the individual works and 0 if
he/she doesn’t (work); number of individual’s weekly working hours (hourwork); dummy
variable which is 1 if the individual lives in an urban area and 0 if he/she doesn’t (urban);
five dummy variables to control for skin color3(white as base group, asian, black and
mulatto)4, and; five dummy variables to control for regional difference (south as base
group, southeast, midwest, northeast and north).
Some variables are suspected to be endogenous. For example, work variables (work
and hourwork) can influence the likelihood of an individual to develop symptoms of mental
depression due to pressure and work intensity. However, a depressed individual is prone
to be jeopardized in his/her working place as a result of productivity loss which, in
turn, can cost him/her his job. Similarly, study and famincome are also suspected to be
2 The chronic physical diseases considered are: chronic back or spine problem, arthritis or rheuma-
tism, cancer, diabetes, bronchitis or asthma, hypertension, heart disease, chronic renal dysfunction,
tuberculosis, tendonitis or tenosynovitis, and cirrhosis
3 The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) classifies race/skin color according to
physical appearance which is self-declared by individuals. These categories are: white, black, yellow
(Asian-Brazilians), brown (Mulatto) and indigenous.
4 Indigenous population were excluded due to the small number of observations
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endogenous. However, the endogeneity of the later variable depends on the weight of the
individual’s income in the family income composition. As observed by Justus et al. (2012),
the effect of family income on the risk of mental depression is not linear, for this reason
the average per capita family income was logarithmized. Furthermore, these authors point
that the relationship between an individual’s age and his/her risk of developing symptoms
of mental depression is non-linear. For this reason, the square of age is included in the
model specification.
5.3 Descriptive Analysis
As discussed in Section 5.1, work at tender ages, irrespective of the sector or region,
may have deleterious effect on the human capital accumulation or health of individuals.
Focusing on mental health, Fig. 23 relates the incidence of mental depression and the age
at which individuals started working using 2008 PNAD data.
With brief glance, one perceives that the distribution is skewed left. In other words,
most individuals who were diagnosed with mental depression started working at early ages,
thus, indicating a positive relationship between child labor and mental depression. It is
interesting to observe that the incidence of mental depression reduced expressively from
the age bracket of 10-14 to 15-17 and from 18-19 to 20-24. Intuitively, this observation
points that the risk of mental depression reduces remarkably for individuals who start
working after the minimum age for work as apprentice (at age 14) and such reduction is
more pronounced for those who start working after the minimum age for night, hazardous
or unhealthy works (at age 18). In short, through this figure, we clearly observe higher
risk of mental depression in individuals who were child laborers.
Table 11 presents the cross-frequency between some regressors and mental depres-
sion. About 1.6% of the individuals who worked as child laborers were diagnosed with
mental depression by a physician or health practitioner in the year 2008. Moreover, we
also observe that that this incidence is higher among these individuals compared to those
who were not child laborers. As pointed by WHO (2001) and empirically verified by Jus-
tus et al. (2012), chronic physical illness such as cirrhosis, cancer, tuberculosis, renal or
heart diseases, etc. may lead to mental depression through the psychological or biological
channel. In year 2008, approximately 5.3% of the individuals with chronic physical illness
were diagnosed with mental depression. In accordance with these studies, it is clear that
the incidence of mental depression is way higher among women (about 2.4%) compared
to men (about 1%).
Still on the individual’s personal characteristics, Table 11 clarifies regarding higher
incidence of mental illness among individuals who are neither enrolled in school nor em-
ployed. Moreover, higher was also observed among white-skinned population compared
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Figure 23 – Number of people with mental depression by the age at which they started
working
Source: Prepared using 2008 PNAD data
to mulattos, blacks and Asians. In line with Justus et al. (2012), there were expressively
more cases of mental depression in urban areas, compared to the rural ones. In addi-
tion, regional variables show greater incidence of mental depression in the Southern and
Southeast region compared other regions. Intuitive analysis of the ranking of this regional
distribution leads to think of higher incidence of mental depression in more developed
and colder regions, which eventually corroborates the results of these authors.
The two family variables, depmom and chronmum, are considered to serve as con-
trol for biological (genetics) and psychological (affection) paths through which mental
depression may be passed from parents to offspring. On the one hand, based on WHO
(2001), individuals may develop symptoms of mental depression as a result of affection
for loved ones who are diagnosed with mental depression or chronic physical illness. On
the other hand, based on Lohoff (2010) and Ledford (2015), mental depression may arise
as a result of family genetics. Quantitatively, about 2.1% of the individuals who were
diagnosed with mental depression had mothers with chronic physical illness, while about
5.6% of the same individuals have mentally depressed mothers. This indicates that the
relationship between mental depression among family members is stronger than that of
physical chronic illness with mental depression.
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Table 11 – Percentage of mentally depressed and non-depressed individuals by category
of variables
Variable Mentally depressed (%) Number ofNo Yes observations
Child labor No 98.43 1.57 22,075Yes 98.46 1.54 20,484
Chronic illness No 99.01 0.99 36,966Yes 94.73 5.27 5,593
Gender Female 97.64 2.36 16,558Male 98.96 1.04 26,001
Enrolled in No 98.21 1.79 27,012
School Yes 98.86 1.14 15,547
Employed No 97.41 2.59 5,014Yes 98.59 1.41 37,545
Skin color
white 97.96 2.04 18,990
black 98.95 1.05 3,036
mulatto 98.82 1.18 20,533
Asians 98.88 1.12 179
Mother with No 99.17 0.83 18,207
chronic illness Yes 97.91 2.09 24,352
Mother with No 98.91 1.09 38,252
mental depression Yes 94.36 5.64 4,307
Urbanization urban 98.34 1.66 35,329rural 98.98 1.02 7,230
Region
Midwest 98.35 1.65 4,483
Northeast 99.01 0.99 14,053
North 99.44 0.56 5,136
Southeast 98.07 1.93 12,821
South 97.16 2.84 6,066
Number of observations 41,898 661 42,559
Note: Prepared using 2008 PNAD data.
5.4 Analysis of Empirical Results
The hypothesis that we analyze in this section is that work during childhood
increases the risk of individuals to develop depressive symptoms during adulthood. The
empirical strategy used to reach this objective is the probit model estimated by maximum
likelihood. For details concerning probit models consult in Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4 and
also in Greene (2003).
The coefficients observed from the probit models are presented in Table 12. How-
ever, we focus our analysis on the marginal effects presented in Table 13, which were
calculated for discrete changes in dummy variables and at means for continuous vari-
ables.
The first general perception from this table is that the standard errors observed
for all variables are extremely small.
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Moreover, that the signs obtained for each statistically significant variables from
all models corroborates the expectations which were set based on the literature survey pre-
sented in section 5.1. In model I, all the specified variables were included. In model II, the
same model was estimated without mother’s variables (depmom, agemom and chronmom).
What we observe is that without these control variables, other estimates are overesti-
mated. Aside this, the pseudo-𝑅2 dropped from 0.157 to 0.120 and the LR test indicated
that Model I is better adjusted.
Subsequently, model III was estimated with all variables in Model I, but dropping
those which were suspected to be endogenous as justified in Section 4.3.2. Aside the
estimates of other variables being slightly overestimated without the control of study,
famincome, work and hourwork, the pseudo-𝑅2 and the LR test indicated that model
I is better. Having that other estimates were not gravely affected after dropping these
variables, we opted to continue with model I.
Lastly, we estimate model IV, which is a similar version of model I. However, the
child labor variable was substituted by age groups which controls for the age bracket at
which individuals started working. This group dummy variable is more informative than
childlabor since it provides the marginal effect concerning each age group. Comparing
Model I to model IV, it is notable that there was slight increase of the pseudo-𝑅2 and the
LR test indicates that model V is better. Hence, the main interpretations will be based
on this model.
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Table 12 – Results of Estimation (coefficients)
Response variable: depress
Category of regressors I II III IV
log(famincome) −0.0544** −0.0633*** −0.0513**
Family’s (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
variables famsize −0.0365*** −0.0475*** −0.0320*** −0.0368***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
depmom 0.605*** 0.607*** 0.604***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Mother’s agemom 0.00320 0.00330 0.00306
variables (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
chronmom 0.127*** 0.134*** 0.127***
(0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
chronic 0.601*** 0.666*** 0.606*** 0.601***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040)
study −0.0150 −0.0140 −0.0128
(0.049) (0.047) (0.049)
age 0.0985*** 0.0986*** 0.0736** 0.101***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032)
age squared −0.00134** −0.00126** −0.000922 −0.00141**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
male −0.272*** −0.258*** −0.298*** −0.278***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
urban 0.0285 0.0412 0.0194 0.0563
(0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.059)
black −0.193** −0.204** −0.160* −0.195**
(0.086) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086)
mulatto −0.0685 −0.0807* −0.0444 −0.0706
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
work −0.161** −0.177** −0.171**
(0.081) (0.079) (0.081)
Individual’s hourwork −0.00318* −0.00286* −0.00308*
variables (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Midwest −0.179*** −0.229*** −0.176*** −0.183***
(0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.067)
Northeast −0.345*** −0.433*** −0.300*** −0.350***
(0.060) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060)
North −0.490*** −0.590*** −0.462*** −0.490***
(0.095) (0.093) (0.093) (0.095)
Southeast −0.142*** −0.191*** −0.145*** −0.139***
(0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050)
childlabor 0.0997** 0.113*** 0.108***
(0.041) (0.039) (0.040)
CL15-17 −0.180***
(0.049)
CL18-19 −0.179***
(0.058)
CL20-24 −0.145**
(0.065)
CL25-29 −0.0602
(0.133)
CLabove 30 −0.479
(0.420)
constant −3.184*** −2.746*** −3.446*** −3.083***
(0.433) (0.414) (0.382) (0.419)
𝑁 42559 42559 42559 42559
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.157 0.120 0.149 0.159
Log likelihood −1489456.9 −1554577.3 −1502534.8 −1485823.0
LR 𝜒2(degree of freedom) 783.2 (20) 660.8 (17) 752.7 (16) 794.4 (24)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively, and; 𝑁 denotes number of observations.
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Table 13 – Marginal effects for discrete changes in dummy variables and at means for
continuous variables
Response variable: depress
Category of regressors I II III IV
log(famincome) −0.00194** −0.00233*** −0.00182**
Family’s (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
variables famsize −0.00130*** −0.00175*** −0.00115*** −0.00131***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
depmom 0.0320*** 0.0325*** 0.0319***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Mother’s agemom 0.000114 0.000118 0.000109
variables (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
chronmom 0.00435*** 0.00460*** 0.00433***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
chronic 0.0303*** 0.0368*** 0.0309*** 0.0302***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
study −0.000531 −0.000513 −0.000453
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
age 0.00114*** 0.00133*** 0.000996*** 0.00112***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
male −0.00991*** −0.00974*** −0.0110*** −0.0101***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
urban 0.000996 0.00147 0.000688 0.00192
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
black −0.00587*** −0.00635*** −0.00503** −0.00592***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Individual’s mulatto −0.00240 −0.00293* −0.00158 −0.00247*
variables (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
work −0.00639* −0.00738** −0.00682*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
hourwork −0.000113* −0.000106* −0.000109*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Midwest −0.00554*** −0.00704*** −0.00549*** −0.00563***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Northeast −0.0106*** −0.0134*** −0.00942*** −0.0107***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
North −0.0118*** −0.0135*** −0.0114*** −0.0118***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Southeast −0.00509*** −0.00715*** −0.00522*** −0.00497***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
childlabor 0.00358** 0.00420*** 0.00392***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CL15-17 −0.00608***
(0.002)
CL18-19 −0.00578***
(0.002)
CL20-24 −0.00465**
(0.002)
CL25-29 −0.00203
(0.004)
CLabove 30 −0.0110*
(0.006)
Note: Standard errors calculated using the delta method is in parentheses; ***, ** and
* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
First, we analyze the effect of family health status. Results indicate that individu-
als who have mentally depressed mothers are more likely to develop symptoms of mental
depression compared to individuals without mentally depressed mothers. The coefficient
observed for the depmom variable had the highest value. Thus, the depmom turns out to
be the most important factor which determines the risk of mental depression among all
controlled variables. Quantitatively, children of mentally depressed mothers have about
3.2 percentage points (p.p.) higher risk of presenting symptoms of mental depression.
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However, this incidence can be attributed to either biological factors (genetics) or psycho-
logical factors (grief, sadness, affection, etc.) that link a mother to child. However, this
effects is further disentangled by observing the coefficient for chronmum of which estimate
is only about 0.3 p.p. Having that the marginal effect of mental depression of mothers
(depmom) is about five times the effect of chronic physical disease in mothers (chronmom)
and that both are considered chronic diseases/illness, one can suitably attribute the mag-
nitude of depmom to genetics. In so doing, we corroborate previous evidences concerning
the role of genetic factors on the risk of developing mental depression5.
As emphasized by WHO (2001) and Justus et al. (2012), chronic physical diseases
play important role in the risk of developing mental depression. Aside the direct impact
on the psychological state of individuals, such illness also provoke loss of productivity,
restriction to certain physical leisure and sport activities and also social discrimination.
The combination of these factors can cause, when internalized, impostor syndrome or
inferiority complex which, in turn, are potential causes of mental depression. The marginal
effect found for chronchild indicates that individuals with any of the controlled chronic
physical diseases have higher risk of being mentally depressed.
No empirical evidence was found at usual statistical significant levels concerning
the effect of mother’s age. However, it was observed that the risk of mental depression
slightly increases as individuals grow in age, but is prone to reduce at old age. This is
portrayed by the positive and negative signs found for age and age squared. This evi-
dence buttresses results found by Justus et al. (2012) indicating that the risk distribution
of mental depression by age group is a downward facing parabola.
According to Baker e Ashbourne (2002) and Abela e Hankin (2008), the incidence
of mental depression varies widely between the male and female gender. The empirical
evidence found in this study corroborates the findings of these authors that females are
more likely to develop depressive symptoms compared to males. Furthermore, our empiric
results also corroborate the relationship between family income and the risk of mental
depression in the sense that it points to a negative relationship between both variables.
Statistical evidence also shows that residence in urban areas, skin color, family
size and region of residence influence the risk of an individual to develop symptoms of
mental depression. Regarding urban residence, results confirm higher incidence of mental
depression in urban areas compared to rural areas, thus, corroborating findings of Justus
et al. (2012). WHO (2001) reported that the nature of modern urbanization may have
deleterious consequences on mental health as a result of higher incidence of stress, pollu-
tion, overcrowding, dependence on cash economy, discrimination, social class disparities
and high violence. The group dummy variable for region of residence upholds this result,
implying that the Southern Brazil, which is relatively highly urbanized, has higher inci-
5 See <http://depressiongenetics.stanford.edu/mddandgenes.html>
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dence of mental depression compared to the Southeast, Midwest, Northeast and North
regions. Curiously, the estimates for this group variables are distributed among regions
according to their urbanization rate.
As per skin color, evidence upholds that observed by Justus et al. (2012) regard-
ing the higher risk of mental depression among Brazilian white and Asian population
compared to the mulatto and black-skinned population.
Although stress and pressure from work may cause depressive symptoms, the
marginal effects observed for the work and hwork variables indicate that individuals who
work, and inclusively, those who work more hours have lesser risk of mental depression
compared to those who do not work. Despite this result corroborates findings from liter-
ature, we suggest better specification concerning types of work. This is because, on the
one hand, work elevates self-esteem through social status and promotes more interper-
sonal interactions. The effect of higher interpersonal interactions is corroborated by the
marginal effect found for famsize which implies that individuals from larger families have
lesser risk of mental disorders. On the other hand, excess work or work that involves high
pressure can lead to accumulation of stress, which is a potential cause of mental disor-
ders. This is better portrayed when one considers the estimate for childlabor, since it
generally involves unregulated pressure and working conditions.
The coefficient observed for this variable, which is of primary interest, indicates
that individuals who work or worked as child laborer have higher risk of developing symp-
toms of mental depression compared to those who entered the labor market at adult age.
This result corroborates the observation from Fig. 23 concerning higher incidence of men-
tal depression among individuals who started working at early ages. Specifically, individ-
uals who started working within the age group of 15-17 have about 0.6 p.p. lesser risk
of developing mental depression compare to individual who worked within the age group
of 10-14. Greater reduction is observed for individuals who worked at the age of 18-19.
Analogously, compared to the reference group, individuals who entered the labor market
between age 20 and 24 have lesser risk of mental depression. No statistical evidence was
found regarding subsequent age brackets. Therefore, postponing entry into the labor mar-
ket to the age of 14 is not enough to expressively reduce the risk of mental depression.
This model suggests postponement to, at least, the age of 24, which is the average age
at which most individuals finish undergraduate studies. Similarly to previous essay, our
findings here also corroborates that of Justus et al. (2015) concerning the best age for
individuals to enter the labor market in Brazil.
In Table 14, we simulate the risk of developing mental depression using estimates
from model I. Specifically, we vary regressors concerning child labor, gender, skin color,
urbanization and health status. Moreover, continuous regressors were fixed at means and
other dummy regressors were fixed at zero during simulations. In other words, the average
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individual of our analysis is assumed to be 25 years old, resides in the southern Brazil, not
enrolled in school, but work for about 33 hours per week. Furthermore, this individual is
from a family of four members with per capita income of about R$ 604 and the mother
is about 52 years of age.
For the first simulation exercise, we observed that, ceteris paribus, the risk of
developing mental depression is about 0.8% for a white-skinned woman who resides in an
urban area, was not a child laborer, does not have any chronic illness and her mother is
neither chronically ill nor mentally depressed. However, we notice that this risk increases
to 1.1% if the same woman worked during childhood. Curiously enough, this risk drops
by half (about 0.5%) for a male individual with the same characteristics. For such a male
individual, the risk of mental depression is about 0.6% if he resides in the urban area.
Moreover, we confirm that white-skinned individuals have greater risk than mulattos and
these have greater risk than blacks, despite all having identical characteristics in other
aspects.
Having that majority of the individuals contained in the sample are mulattos,
we continue the simulation exercise with these – a mulatto who is male, resides in an
urban area and was a child laborer. As per physical health, our model indicates that
such individual has the risk of about 2.2% if he has any chronic physical illness. This
risk increases expressively to about 7.7% if, aside such illness, the individual’s mother is
mentally depressed. Moreover, if his mother is not only mentally depressed, but also has
chronic physical illness, the risk increases to about 9.6%.
Table 14 – Prediction of mental depression risk
Indivudual characteristics Family health status
childlabor male urban black mulatto chronic depmom chronmum 𝑝(depress)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0084
yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0109
yes yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0053
yes yes yes 0 0 0 0 0 0.0057
yes yes yes yes 0 0 0 0 0.0033
yes yes yes 0 yes 0 0 0 0.0047
yes yes yes 0 yes yes 0 0 0.0221
yes yes yes 0 yes yes yes 0 0.0767
yes yes yes 0 yes yes yes yes 0.0960
Note: 𝑝depress is the risk of mental depression; continuous variables which are not included in this
table were fixed at means and other dummy variables were fixed at zero.
For subsequent simulation exercises, we predicted all possible combinations of vari-
ables and sorted by their respective risk values. In Table 15, we present combinations
which resulted in mental depression risk above 10%. The objective here is to observe the
characteristics of individuals who have the highest risk of developing mental depression.
Curiously, all cases of highest risks of mental depression have co-existence of
chronic physical illness of individuals and mental depression of mothers. Still, we ob-
serve that high risk of mental depression is common among women, child laborers and
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individuals whose mothers have chronic physical illness.
In short, our findings from this essay permits not to reject the hypothesis that
individuals who work or worked during childhood have higher risk of developing symp-
toms of mental depression during adulthood. Moreover, we provide empirical evidence
concerning the significant role of family biological and psychological linkages on the men-
tal health of individuals. Still, our results also corroborate previous literature concerning
the preeminence of mental depression among women and the adverse impact of chronic
physical illness on the mental health of individual.
Table 15 – Combinations of variables for mental depression risk above 10%
Indivudual characteristics Family health status
childlabor male urban black mulatto chronic depmom chronmum 𝑝(depress)
yes 0 yes 0 0 yes yes yes 0.1645
yes 0 0 0 0 yes yes yes 0.1578
0 0 yes 0 0 yes yes yes 0.1487
yes 0 yes 0 yes yes yes yes 0.1424
0 0 0 0 0 yes yes yes 0.1417
yes 0 yes 0 0 yes yes 0 0.1358
yes 0 0 0 yes yes yes yes 0.1357
0 0 yes 0 yes yes yes yes 0.1299
yes 0 yes yes 0 yes yes yes 0.1274
yes 0 0 0 0 yes yes 0 0.1225
0 0 yes 0 0 yes yes 0 0.1219
0 0 0 0 yes yes yes yes 0.1218
yes yes yes 0 0 yes yes yes 0.1170
yes 0 yes 0 yes yes yes 0 0.1164
yes 0 0 yes 0 yes yes yes 0.1159
0 0 yes yes 0 yes yes yes 0.1106
yes 0 yes yes yes yes yes yes 0.1096
0 0 0 0 0 yes yes 0 0.1078
0 0 yes 0 yes yes yes 0 0.1045
Note: 𝑝depress is the risk of mental depression; continuous variables which are not included in this
table were fixed at means and other dummy variables were fixed at zero.
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6 Conclusions and Proposals
This master’s thesis, which is divided in four independent essays, provides substan-
tial contributions concerning the determinants, dynamic and consequence of child labor
in Brazil, which are at stake but sparsely approached in literature.
In the first essay, we explored the cultural-historical concept of child labor in
Brazil. Differently from the conventional wisdom, we observed that child labor in Brazil
is not necessarily and generally conceive as a negative phenomenon to the development
of children and adolescents. Traces of such mentality was found present in centuries of
the Brazilian history and continues to influence contemporary decisions concerning child
labor in the social and constitutional dimensions. Specifically, to certain extent, work in
conceived to be positive in the sense that it dignifies, educate and protects children and
adolescents. In light of such conception, we suggest that public policies to make greater
effort in creating greater public awareness concerning the economic and health hazard of
child labor. Such measure is prone to reduce child labor in cases in which children work not
due to poverty but to cultural reasons. Moreover, such measure may serve as preventive
measure to avoid the transmission of such concept of child labor to future generations.
In the second essay we investigated the determinants of child labor rate, however,
paying special attention to the role of two governmental social programs – PBF cash
transfer and Labor Inspection with focus on child labor. The hypotheses alleged was that
both programs contribute to reduce the child labor rate in Brazil. On the one hand, we
alleged this hypothesis concerning the Bolsa Família program because it relieves poor and
extremely poor families of financial burdens and conditions beneficiary families to enroll
children in school. On the other hand, the Labor Inspection is alleged to have mitigating
effect on child labor because it assumes the role of withdrawing children from work so as
to enroll them in school and give social assistance. Moreover, exploiters of child labor are
fined and awareness is created in society concerning magnitude and consequences of early
work of children and adolescents.
These hypothesis were tested using dynamic panel models, which were estimated
using 2004–2009 and 2011–2014 PNAD data aggregated by state. In this essay, we did
not find conclusive empirical evidence which permits to sustain the hypothesis that the
PBF and Labor Inspection contributed to reduce child labor rate in Brazil.
However, through descriptive analysis, we found that approximately 62% of child
laborers in 2004 were from families below the poverty line. Curiously, this proportion
reduced expressively to 19% in 2014. These empirical and descriptive findings incite our
first political suggestion that policies designed to combat child labor should not focus
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exclusively on poor populations. This is exactly the case of the PBF program, which only
attends populations below the poverty line.
Among all factors controlled in the empirical model of this second essay, only that
for urbanization rate showed elastic relationship with child labor rate. This indicate that
adoption of regional policies that promotes urbanization may cause highly responsive
mitigating effect on child labor rate. Moreover, urbanization sprouts other social benefits
as per access to better health, education and infrastructural facilities, which in turn
bolster overall economic growth. Despite these enticing benefits, it is noteworthy that
urbanization policies have to take into account adverse effects such as increase in crime,
unemployment, migration, poor living conditions, etc. Inclusively, such conditions may end
up wheeling child labor to invisible and worst forms such as prostitution, drug trafficking
and street trading and services.
In the third essay, we investigated the intergenerational persistence of child labor,
focusing on its tipping point. The hypothesis alleged concerning this objective is that
families with child laborers are likely to to trapped in the vicious cycle of child labor, which
can eventually be reverted. This hypothesis is founded on the argument that individuals
who were child laborers accumulated less human capital through education and are likely
to be less competitive in the labor market and are, thus, subjected to lower earning when
adults. Consequently, such individuals are prone to remain in poverty and perpetuate
child labor among subsequent generations of the same family. Therefore, on the contrary,
if individuals defer their entry into the labor market and focus on accumulating minimum
required human capital they stand greater chances of getting better paid jobs in the labor
market and, therefore, break the child labor cycle.
We tested this hypothesis using pooled sample of 2004 to 2009 and 2011 to 2014
PNAD data to estimate probit models. Empirical results sustained the hypothesis of the
existence of child labor trap and a tipping point was observed. Similarly to previous studies,
we found that the risk of child labor in a given generation is negatively related to the
age at which parents started working. However, this risk becomes minimum if individuals
enter the labor market after the age of 27.
In Brazil, there is an intense political debate as to the minimum age for work,
especially through Proposals of Constitution Amendment (PEC, in Brazilian acronym).
In 2011, deputy Dilceu Sperafico presented PEC 18/2011 which suggested the reduction
of this age from 16 to 14 based on the argument that such proposal will amplify the
children’s right in the sense that it formalizes the work of those who really need to work
and guarantee them labor and security rights. In the same year, PEC 35/2011 was sub-
mitted by deputy Onofre Agostini supporting that work is beneficial to children and their
families, especially, in the financial, moral and educational sense if these working children
and adolescents are also enrolled in school and adequately followed-up. In 2013, PEC
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274/2013 was forwarded by deputy Edinho Bez who, in line with the deputies mentioned
earlier as per the minimum age for work, argued that work is educative for children and
adolescents and also reminded that “an empty mind is a devil’s workshop”(Congresso em
Foco, 21/06/2015)1. In February of 2016, these PECs were recovered during debates in
the National Congress and continued in discussion till October 4, 2016, with the final
review of Deputy Betinho Gomes which deemed the PECs as unacceptable.
In accordance with this decision, results from the third essay firmly oppose these
PECs and suggest that the minimum age for work should not be reduced from 16 to 14.
In fact, we found that the risk of intergenerational persistence of child labor is lower if
individuals enter the labor market at subsequent ages. Thus, the minimum age may be
adjusted to coincide with the end of compulsory education (age of 17) and, thus, meet
the specifications of the ILO Convention 138 concerning the compatibility of minimum
age for work and compulsory education. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that increase in
the minimum age may provoke adverse affect on families which solely depend on income
from child labor. In such a case, we suggest a focal and generous assistance conditioned
to child education.
Our results also corroborate literature concerning the capacity of large educational
investment on a generation to revert poverty and child labor cycles in subsequent gener-
ations. However, in line with Basu (1999) we admit that such policy may be too fanciful,
especially for developing countries.
Lastly, in the fourth essay, we investigated the relationship between child labor
and the mental health of individuals. The hypothesis alleged was that individuals who
venture into the labor market at early ages are more likely develop mental depression
during adulthood. The reason for this is that individuals who venture into the labor
market at early ages accumulate childhood stress due to early labor, which in most cases
is conciliated with studies. Consequently, during adulthood such individuals may suffer
psychological fatigue that, in turn, may sprout depressive symptoms.
This hypothesis was tested using 2008 PNAD data and its supplements to es-
timate probit models. The empirical evidence found sustains the alleged hypothesis of
positive relationship between child labor and probability of mental depression. Specifi-
cally, individuals who started working at or before the age of 14 have higher probability
of developing depressive symptoms compared to those who started at subsequent ages.
The mental health of individuals, especially children, continues to be an issue which
has not gained due attention in Brazil alike in most developing countries. Moreover, the
depression is, still, vastly attributed to biological or psychological and not socioeconomic
factors. The first suggestion we offer, in line with WHO (2001) and The Economist (2014)
1 The “Congresso em Foco”(Congress in focus, in English) is a journalistic site which covers facts and
information, specifically, from the Brazilian National Congress.
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is that mental disorders should not be faced exclusively as a biological or psychological
problem, but also as a social problem. Only in this sense that it will be clear that child
labor plays a determinant role on the risk of developing mental depression.
Again, emphasizing the political suggestion concerning minimum age for work,
results uphold that the risk of mental depression reduces if individuals defer the age
at which they enter the labor market. One major reason for this that most children,
adolescent and youths who work end up also studying, and this may intensify their level of
stress compared to adults who only work. During adulthood, these individuals who already
internalized stress from early ages tend to be more prone to develop mental disorders. In
the report of The Economist (2014), Patrick McGorry, Professor of the Centre for Youth
Mental Health from the University of Melbourne, supported this argument concerning
development challenges teenagers face in their transition to adulthood. Hence, if child
labor is not adequately tackled nations might end up creating psychologically stressed
individuals for the labor market and, thus, face high incidence of mental depression.
Furthermore, we suggest that basic mental health care should be provided for child
laborers withdrawn from work. Particularly, those engaged in the worst forms such as,
for example, agriculture, prostitution, drug trafficking and other activities that involve
slavery and exposure to toxic substances. The reason for this is that, in such cases, mere
conditional cash transfer programs may leave the psychological hazard of child labor
unsolved.
Empirical results from the last essay also indicated that children from mentally
depressed parents are more likely to develop depressive symptoms either though genetic or
maternal bond. However, we are more convinced that the effect found is mainly attributed
to family genetics because of the expressively lower effect found for the presence of other
chronic physical illness in mothers. In this sense, we suggest that public health policies also
pay attention to the offspring of individuals who are diagnosed of mental depression. This
measure may help to anticipate and detect potential cases of depression at early stages.
Furthermore, such potential cases may also be tackled by educating parents about how
to detect and what activities may reduce the risk of developing depression. The reason
for this measure is that most parents only detect or suspect mental depression in their
offspring in its advances stage.
In line with the above suggestion, we add that health specialists should provide, at
least, basic education concerning mental depression to individuals who have chronic phys-
ical illness and also suggest therapeutic activities to the same. This is because, depending
on the type of illness in question, individuals may become psychologically unbalance when
they overcontemplate their physical incapabilities and/or internalize inferiority complex
due to social discrimination.
Inasmuch as we acknowledge that the political suggestions offered here require
Chapter 6. Conclusions and Proposals 122
substantial government expenditure, we believe that such expenses will earn not only
health and social benefits, but also economic benefits.
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